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ABSTRACT 
 Most of the large-N empirical studies on the liberal commercial peace theory 
demonstrate that, in general, trade has a robust pacifying effect in reducing the 
probability of dyadical militarized interstate disputes. However, why trade’s pacifying 
effect varies across time and space remains a puzzle that previous research has not yet 
solved. The liberal commercial peace literature suggests the following questions are in 
need of answers: Why does trade promote peace mainly in inter-region dyads but not in 
intra-region dyads? What are the preconditions that make trade’s pacifying effect work or 
not work? In this research, I argue that there are two critical preconditions for trade’s 
pacifying effect to work: first, the benefits of trade must be substantively important, and 
second, important social actors who have stakes on trade must be able to influence the 
leaders when they are making foreign policy decisions. These two preconditions can be 
measured by countries’ degree of democracy and degree of development. Therefore, 
regionally, the pacifying effect of trade is stronger in regions where the countries are 
more democratic and more developed, and it gets weaker in regions where the countries 
are less democratic and less developed; temporally, because countries’ degree of 
democracy and degree of development vary from time to time, the pacifying effect of 
trade changes over time accordingly. I then extend this overarching framework to 
investigate the role of trade in the regional peace of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and 
the European Union countries, arguing that the variations of the regional peace can be 
predicted by looking at how trade affects the most important political issues in each of the 
vi 
regions. By finding out more nuanced preconditions, this research advances our 
knowledge toward the liberal commercial peace theory in the contemporary international 
relations research. 
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1 The unsolved puzzles 
 The topic of the dissertation is “The Liberal Commercial Peace, Regional 
Considerations: International Relations of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the 
European Union Countries.” The goal of this dissertation is twofold. First, I construct a 
theory to explain several puzzles remaining unsolved in literature about trade’s unstable 
pacifying effect (Chapter 2). Second, I propose a theoretical framework which links 
leaders’ political survival with the role that trade plays in each of the regions in 
investigation to explain the regional peace in Southeast Asia (Chapter 3), Latin America 
(Chapter 4), and the European Union countries (Chapter 5). Although the four main 
empirical chapters of the dissertation are disjointed, they share a similar framework 
which addresses how regions become peaceful and how to explain the within-region 
variation of the regional international relations in the viewpoint of trade.  
I begin with defining what the so-called “liberal commercial peace” is. The 
simplest definition of the liberal commercial peace is that: trade promotes peace. 
Although there are contradicting findings in literature regarding whether trade leads to 
peace or conflict,1   generally speaking, most of the large-N research confirms that, 
dyadically, with the increase of trade in proportion to both sides’ gross domestic product 
1 Refer to Barbieri (2002), Mansfield and Pollins (2003), and Crescenzi (2005) to see a more complete 
literature review about the relationship between trade and conflict. 
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(GDP), the probability that they engage in militarized conflict will decrease (Oneal & 
Russett, 1997, 2001; Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010).  
As for why trade should have a pacifying effect, scholars of the liberal 
commercial peace theory point out three main causal mechanisms to link trade with the 
reduction of conflict occurrence (Kastner, 2005). The constraint arguments state that as 
interdependence increases, the cost of military conflict also increases due to the loss of 
valuable assets and trade flows. The informational arguments claim that interdependence 
enables states to signal more efficiently their true level of resolve through threatening to 
use costly economic sanctions, therefore reducing the likelihood of dangerous 
miscalculations about each other’s resolves. The transformative arguments posit that 
interdependence can reduce the probability of conflict by reshaping the underlying states’ 
interests and preferences, either through changing the states’ core international objectives 
or through changing the balance of domestic political coalitions. According to these three 
causal mechanisms along with the findings of most of the large-N empirical research, the 
pacifying effect of trade should be a stable and universal one that works around the world.  
However, several findings have put trade’s pacifying effect into doubt. First, 
Barbieri (1996, 2002) demonstrates that trade leads to conflict rather than reduces it,2   
and Pevehouse (2004) demonstrates that trade actually makes conflict more likely to 
happen, while it simultaneously restrains the number of conflict from going rampant. 
Second, many demonstrate that trade’s pacifying effect varies across time and space, that 
is, during some periods and in some countries trade leads to peace, while during another 
periods and in another countries trade leads to conflict (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998; 
2 Although Xiang, Xu, and Keteku (2007) have demonstrated that Barbieri’s research committed an omitted 
variable bias – not controlling for states’ power. 
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Zorn, 2001). Third, if trade does have a pacifying effect, why except for the European 
Union countries (Ripsman, 2005), when it comes to regional peace, are there few scholars 
attribute it to trade? For example, the Middle East, Latin America, the West Africa, and 
Southeast Asia are known to gradually become a peaceful region since the end of the 
World War II (Kacowicz, 1995, 1998; Acharya, 2001; Miller, 2005). However, trade is 
seldom been mentioned as the main reason that stabilizes the regions. Lastly, Goldsmith 
(2006) demonstrates that if we separate the world into five regions according to the 
classification of the Correlates of War database – the West, Latin America, Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia, we will find that trade actually increases the probability of 
militarized conflict in all of them, even including the West. If trade does have a pacifying 
effect, how could we explain these empirical puzzles? 
2 The argument in short 
To solve these puzzles, this dissertation is composed of four independent articles 
as each of the empirical chapters. The first article (Chapter 2) serves as the overarching 
theory, in which I propose a set of unified preconditions that explain the regional 
variations of trade’s pacifying effect around the world. In short, I argue that trade’s 
pacifying effect is a conditional one, which is simultaneously mediated by countries’ 
degree of democracy and degree of development. The facts that trade’s pacifying effect is 
the most evident in the European Union countries and that it is not as evident in any other 
region around the world strongly suggest that trade would lead to peace only in 
“developed” “democracies.” Therefore, I posit that for the liberal commercial peace to 
work, dyadically, both countries must reach a domestic consensus on the benefits of trade 
so that both the leaders and the people in both countries would take trade into 
3 
consideration when dealing with international affairs. Only when all the important 
domestic political actors have a stable preference for the benefits of trade do “the three 
causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace” work in reducing the probability of 
militarized conflict. This is because “development” and “democracy” together suggest 
that the benefits of trade is substantively important and that people who have stake on 
trade could have the power to influence the leaders when they are making foreign policy 
decisions. These are the critical preconditions that make the three causal mechanisms 
work. Thus, all the four puzzles remaining in literature can be explained by my theory: 
First, because countries’ degree of democracy and degree of development change from 
time to time, as a consequence, the pacifying effect of trade varies accordingly as well. 
Second, due to proximity, countries in the same region tend to have similar degree of 
democracy and development resulting from shared geography and history, and countries 
in different regions tend to have different degree of democracy and development. 
Therefore, trade’s pacifying effect varies from region to region. Thus my argument 
solves the four puzzles. 
Aside from the first article (Chapter 2), the following three articles (Chapter 3~5) 
extend the findings in Chapter 2 to investigate how trade and economic concerns relate to 
regional peace in three different regions, respectively. In Chapter 2 I demonstrate that, 
higher degree of democracy and higher degree of development are the critical 
preconditions that make trade’s pacifying effect work. Then, what is the role of trade in 
regions where the countries are less democratic and less developed and where the “old” 
liberal commercial peace theory would predict a pacifying effect?  
4 
I select two regions that matches this requirement – Southeast Asian and Latin 
America. Theoretically, trade should have an evident pacifying effect in these two 
regions.3   However, empirical findings in literature demonstrate that trade is never the 
main reason that contributes to the regional peace. In Southeast Asia, the security 
management of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been argued to 
be the most important factor that maintain the regional peace based on a process of 
consensus building. In Latin America, the hegemonic stability effect managed by the 
United States is a well-known but controversial phenomenon. I propose a theoretical 
framework to explain the role of trade in these regional peace. I link trade with regional 
peace by looking at what the main domestic political issues are among countries in these 
two regions, because the main controversies in the domestic political arena also represent 
the leaders’ ruling foundation. To make sure their political survival is unthreatened, 
leaders must satisfy the demand of their winning coalition (Putnam, 1988; Bueno de 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). Therefore, to understand the role of trade 
in the regional peace, we should look at how trade may affect the balance of the key 
domestic political coalitions the leaders rely upon. In the Southeast Asian countries, 
keeping a good economic performance is the key for leaders to maintain their ruling 
legitimacy due to their special historical background; in the Latin American countries, the 
domestic threat of coup d’état, the international threat of their enduring rivalries, and 
their relationship with the United States are the critical concerns for leaders to survive. 
Thus, I argue, we can predict the regional international relations by looking at how trade 
3 I will further elaborate the reasons why trade should have an evident pacifying effect in these two regions 
in the next section. 
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may affect the political coalitions that the leaders must rely upon in order to keep 
incumbent.  
 Then, in Chapter 5, I extend this theoretical framework to investigate the 
international relations between the European Union countries. The European Union 
countries are the richest, the most democratic, and the most integrated region in the world 
where militarized conflict has been disappeared since 1986 and trade’s pacifying effect is 
the most prominent. I demonstrate that this theoretical framework is still useful to 
understand how trade affects the international relations between countries that are the 
least-likely ones to have conflict by looking at the balance between their domestic 
internationalizing and backlashing coalitions. 
In the next section, I will explain the theoretical reasons why I select these three 
regions to be investigated. By solving these four puzzles and proposing this theoretical 
framework, this research not only finds out more nuanced preconditions of the liberal 
commercial peace effect, but also enriches our knowledge toward how regions become 
peaceful and what the influence of trade is on regional peace.  
3 Case selection 
In this research I dig out how the regional characteristics affect the effectiveness 
of the liberal commercial peace effect by comparing three different regions around the 
world – Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the European Union countries. I select these 
three regions for investigation for four theoretical reasons. First, these three regions are 
known to have very peaceful international relations by many studies (Mitrany, 1948; 
Haas, 1964; Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, & Lee, 1957; Deutsch, 1961; Kacowicz 1995; 
Acharya 2001; Kivimäki 2001; Ray 2002; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Ripsman 2005; 
6 
Miller 2005; Solingen 2007; Tønnesson 2009; Kivimäki 2011), therefore, they are the 
most suitable regional cases to be tested to see whether the liberal commercial peace 
effect has contributed to the formation of the regional peace in terms of the reduction of 
militarized conflict. 
 Second, based on the concern of research design, these three regions are the most- 
likely cases that may enjoy the liberal commercial peace. The European Union countries 
have long been recognized as the most successful case of peace through interdependence 
and international integration, and their experiences to achieve peace are also the origin 
where scholars build the liberal commercial peace theory from. For the Southeast Asian 
countries, after decolonization since the end of World War II, state building and national 
prosperity have been their most important goals, and the establishment of ASEAN is 
meant to promote regional stability to attract badly needed foreign direct investment to 
stimulate economic development (Haftel, 2010; Tang, 2012). Thus, theoretically, the 
liberal commercial peace effect should be very prominent in the region as well. Lastly, 
Latin America is the most economically open region in the world during the 1990s when 
almost all of the countries adopted the Washington consensus of structure reform 
(Williamson, 1990). Therefore, theoretically, it should be the region with the most salient 
liberal commercial peace effect. In sum, based on the logic of the most-likely case study 
design (Eckstein, 1975; McKeown, 1999), these three regions should be the most likely 
ones to embody the liberal commercial peace effect. Thus investigating the regional 
variations of trade’s pacifying effect across these three regions should give us the most 
leverage to find out the preconditions of the liberal commercial peace. 
7 
 Third, all the three regions have important regional intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) to facilitate their intensive interaction between member states. 
Although the degree of regional integration varies across these three regions, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States 
(OAS), and the European Union (EU) have long been recognized to play an important 
role in promoting regional integration and conflict resolution in these three regions. In 
addition, the functionalists (Mitrany, 1948; Haas, 1958, 1964; Abbott & Snidal, 1998) 
and the liberals (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986; Russett, Oneal, & Davis, 1998; Oneal & 
Russett, 2001) all highlight the contribution of international organizations in conflict 
resolution and international coordination, whether in security issues or in trade issues. 
Therefore, due to the development of the three important IGOs, these three regions 
should be the most- likely ones to enjoy liberal commercial peace than any other regions.  
 Fourth, many scholars find that weak or failed states radically change the 
adaptability of international relations theories (Weiss & Kessler, 1991; Job, 1992; Ayoob, 
1999; Miller, 2005) which implicitly assume that every state is the same unity with 
similar functions (Waltz, 1979). For example, the international security dilemma 
emphasized by mainstream international relations theories is not the main focus of this 
kind of states; instead, internal security dilemma is what they pay attention to due to their 
lack of legitimacy, functioning coercive capacity, and a capable bureaucracy (Kelly, 2007, 
pp. 216–217). Unlike other regions which are full of weak states, in lack of populations, 
or geographically isolated, such as some regions in Africa, Middle East, and the Oceania 
countries, the three regions under investigation in this research (Southeast Asia, Latin 
America, and the European Union countries) are regions composed of modern national 
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states with sufficient state capability to function as normal national states, thus they 
should be suitable for the liberal commercial peace theory to apply.  
 For these four reasons above, I contend that investigating these three regions are 
proper to explore how the regional characteristics condition the liberal commercial peace 
effect. In the next section, I will summarize the content of the dissertation and point out 
how this research could make up the deficiency in literature as the contribution.  
4 Organization of investigation 
 The topic of chapter 2 is “The Liberal Commercial Peace, Regional 
Considerations.” As an overarching theory of the whole dissertation, I argue that trade’s 
pacifying effect is simultaneously conditioned on the degree of democracy and the degree 
of development, and that it embodies not in reducing all levels of conflict, but in reducing 
the conflicts that would cause fatality. I use data concerning the onset of militarized 
interstate dispute (MID) 3.10 (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) from the Correlates of 
War dataset to test my argument. The finding of this chapter also bridges the long debate 
between the democratic peace theories and the capitalist peace theories by demonstrating 
that both the degree of democracy and the degree of development are independent and 
mutually reinforcing (rather than mutually exclusive) moderators of trade’s pacifying 
effect. 
The topic of chapter 3 is “ASEAN and Southeast Asian Peace: National Building, 
Economic Growth, and ASEAN’s Conflict Management.” In this chapter I plan to solve 
an unsolved debate in the literature, that is, whether ASEAN’s security management in 
the region keeps the peace. I argue that the pacifying effect of ASEAN should be 
understood as a conditional one, which hinges on Southeast Asian countries’ economic 
9 
performance. For decades, national building and economic growth are the main goals of 
the Southeast Asian countries as well as their leaders’ ruling foundation. When the 
leaders are not able to maintain good economic performance, they tend to emphasize the 
national building issues, such as territorial disputes, to keep their ruling legitimacy, thus 
compromising ASEAN’s security management. Empirical analysis of the onset of 
militarized interstate disputes from 1950 to 2001 confirms my argument. My finding also 
contributes to the long debate about whether we need non-Western international relations 
theories to understand the international relations of the Asia-Pacific countries.  
 The topic of chapter 4 is “Latin American Peace: Hegemonic Stability during the 
Cold War and Capitalist Peace after the Cold War.” In this chapter I plan to solve an 
unsolved debate in the literature, that is, what the role the United States was in the 
formation of the regional peace. Generally speaking, there are three competing models 
about it: the hegemonic stability argument emphasizes that it is the United States’ peace 
keeping that stabilizes the region, the whirlpool model argues that the United States is 
only involved when its interests are compromised and it disengages soon after the events 
are solved, and the radical argument contends that the United States is actually the one 
who provokes conflicts in the region. I argue that Latin American peace should attributes 
to the United States’ hegemonic stability effect; however, this does not mean that the 
United States has sufficient policy tools to constrain the conflictual behavior of all the 
Latin American countries. In countries that have higher degree of economic dependence 
on the United States, the United States has enough influence and economic leverage on 
the former to constrain the former from using force. Instead, in countries that have lower 
degree of economic dependence on the United States, the United States does not have 
10 
sufficient policy leverage on the latter. As a consequence, the hegemonic stability effect 
of the United States’ security management becomes less evident in these countries. 
Therefore, the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ leadership in the region is 
a conditional one, which hinges on whether the United States has enough economic 
leverage to influence a certain Latin American country’s conflictual behavior. Besides, 
my argument also implies that after the end of the Cold War the regional peace should 
follow a “capitalist peace” trajectory when the region had lost its strategic value of 
geopolitics to the United States. 
 The topic of chapter 5 is “Embedded Liberalism and International Relations 
between the European Union Countries.” In this chapter I want to highlight a 
phenomenon that is not well-explained by relative literature. That is, how to explain the 
variation of conflict and cooperation between the European Union countries after the 
Cold War. The European Union countries are the richest, the most democratic, and the 
most integrated countries in the world without any single militarized interstate conflict 
since 1986, so previous research has trouble measuring the cooperation and conflict 
among them since there is no variation in the popularly-used datasets. By applying Gary 
King and Will Lowe’s “10 Million International Dyadic Events (IDE)” dataset (King & 
Lowe, 2003),4   I am able to investigate the international relations between the European 
Union countries. I argue that due to the logic of the embedded liberalism – the 
relationship between market opening and governments’ welfare spending, among the 
European Union countries, their degree of interdependence and degree of domestic 
4 King, Gary; Lowe, Will, 2003, "10 Million International Dyadic Events", 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/FYXLAWZRIA UNF:3:dSE0bsQK2o6xXlxeaDEhcg== IQSS Dataverse 
Network [Distributor] V5 [Version]. 
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compensation jointly will determine the number of their international conflicts. Among 
the EU countries, all things being equal, countries whose degree of interdependence and 
domestic compensation are both at a high level will have the least number of conflicts 
with their trade partners; countries whose degree of interdependence and domestic 
compensation are both at a low level will have few conflicts with their trade partners; 
countries who have low degree of interdependence and high degree of domestic 
compensation will have a few conflicts with their trade partners; and countries who have 
high degree of interdependence and low degree of domestic compensation will have the 
most number of conflicts with their trade partners. 
 Table 1.1 summarizes the plan of the previous three chapters. Among the three 
most-likely regions that may embody trade’s pacifying effect, according to the literature 
about the regional peace,5   only in in the European Union countries does trade have a 
meaningful contribution to regional peace. In the other two regions – Southeast Asia and 
Latin America, the pacifying effect of trade is not considered to help much in stabilizing 
the regions. According to literature, in Southeast Asia, regional peace is largely 
maintained by ASEAN’s security management through a way of consensus building; in 
Latin America, the hegemonic stability effect in terms of the United States’ security 
management is known as one of the main reasons that stabilize the region. However, the 
role of ASEAN and the United States in regional security does not go without challenge. 
Both ASEAN’s ability of security management in Southeast Asia and the United States’ 
ability of security management in Latin America vary case by case from time to time, and 
the literature has not yet offered a satisfying explanation. Even in the European Union 
5 More detailed discussion regarding the literature about each regional peace will be presented in each of 
the chapters. 
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Table 1.1 Plan of the dissertation 
Regions How regions became peaceful Explaining the within-region variations Dissertation Chapter 
Southeast Asia Security community Economic growth rate Chapter 3 
Latin America American hegemony The United States’ economic leverage Chapter 4 
European Union Interdependence and Integration Domestic compensation Chapter 5 
 
countries where interdependence has known as the main reason that promotes the 
regional peace, how to account for the variation of the international relations among the 
richest, the most democratic, and the most integrated countries remains an untouched part 
in literature. My arguments in each of the three chapters supplement the missing part of 
the literature and enrich our knowledge toward the regional peace by offering a 
theoretical viewpoint through the influence of trade on the domestic coalitions that the 
leaders must rely upon in order to keep incumbent.  
Lastly, Chapter 6 is the conclusion, in which I discuss how my findings could 
contribute to our understanding toward how the rise of China may affect the international 
security in contemporary international system, the most important event of international 
relations in our time. Will a large-scale conflict between China and the United States or 
between China and other East Asian countries become unavoidable with the rise of China 
as the realists claimed? Or will the increased interdependence between China and the 
United States or between China and other East Asian countries largely reduce the 
probability of a large-scale conflict as the liberals claimed? My theory offers some 
answers to this critical question by specifying more nuanced preconditions and their 
influence on China’s rising and international security.  
Overall, by investigating the regional variances of the liberal commercial peace 
effect, this research not only solves the puzzles of the global-regional and the temporal 
discrepancies regarding trade’s pacifying effect, but also advances our understanding 
about the liberal commercial peace theory in terms of the Lakatosian criteria (Lakatos, 




The Liberal Commercial Peace, Regional Considerations 
1 Introduction 
 Although there is a large literature about whether trade brings peace or conflict, 
most studies have reached a conclusion explicitly or implicitly stating that, overall, 
commercial ties have a net pacifying effect (Oneal & Russett, 1999; Maoz, 2009; Hegre, 
Oneal, & Russett, 2010; Choi, 2010); while, at the same time, the literature also points 
out that this liberal commercial peace effect may vary across time and space. For example, 
the Western European countries after World War II are the ideal type of the liberal 
commercial peace model, where trade interdependence “spilled over” (Haas, 1958, 1964) 
to political and social domains and so facilitated regional integration and a well-
functioned security community (Deutsch, 1961; Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, & Lee, 1957); 
Adler and Barnett 1998; Bellamy 2004). However, these spill-over and integration effects 
of the liberal commercial peace in other regions of the world are not as evident as in 
Western Europe. For instance, although most of the countries in Southeast Asia and Latin 
America have welcomed market liberalization policies for decades, the liberal 
commercial peace effect has never been deemed as the main reason to explain the 
regional peace in these regions (Kacowicz, 1995; Acharya, 2001; Ray, 2002; Miller, 2005; 
Johnston, 2012). Accordingly, there are several questions in need of answers. Why does 
the liberal commercial peace appear to operate in the Western Europe but not in other 
regions? How do we account for the regional variation of the liberal commercial peace 
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effect? Is there a universal theory of the liberal commercial peace? If the pacifying effect 
of trade is actually mediated by specific regional preconditions, what are they? Could we 
have a general theory to guide us about how to find out the regional preconditions that 
make the liberal commercial peace work? The goal of this research is to answer these 
questions by investigating the relationship between regionally-distinguished 
characteristics and the liberal commercial peace.  
 The liberal commercial peace theory holds the view that interdependence, 
specifically trade, should have a strong pacifying effect that can constrain both states 
from engaging in militarized interstate conflict, and that this pacifying effect should 
increase with the increase of interdependence. However, while the large-N research 
stably confirms the liberal commercial peace effect between the global dyads, empirical 
evidences between the intra-region dyads do not always support it. To explain the 
different effectiveness of the liberal commercial peace across different regions, I make 
two arguments in this research. First, I argue that looking at all levels of conflict is not 
proper to understand the liberal commercial peace effect, especially between the intra-
region dyads. Because trade is demonstrated as also a measurement of interaction 
between both sides, countries that trade more intensively are also those who are most 
likely to have disputes due to their intensive interaction. Therefore, the pacifying effect of 
trade should embody in the reduction of high-level conflicts (those that cause fatality), 
not the low-level ones (those that do not cause fatality). Because countries in the same 
region tend to have more intensive interaction than countries between different regions, 
therefore they tend to have more conflicts simply due to intensive interaction. As a 
consequence, to test the effectiveness of the liberal commercial peace effect between the 
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intra-region dyads, we should look at only the high-level conflicts instead of looking at 
all the recorded conflicts indifferently. 
Second, I argue that there are three regionally-distinguished characteristics that 
not only differentiate one region from all the others but also affect the three causal 
mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace, therefore making the effectiveness of the 
liberal commercial peace vary across regions. Besides, these three factors also help point 
out what conditions the pacifying effect of trade, that is, why in some regions trade 
reduces the probability of conflict and in others vice versa. These three regionally-
distinguished characteristics, I argue, are their differing degree of intra-regional 
interdependence, degree of development, and degree of democracy. These three factors 
are universal ones that explain the regional variation of the liberal commercial peace 
effect. Thus, my theory proposes a generalizable framework that bridges the contradicting 
findings at the global level and the regional level.6  
To access my argument, the structure of the research is as follows. In the next 
section, I first elaborate on what remains a puzzle in the literature about the liberal 
commercial peace phenomenon, that is, how to explain the regional variations of the 
liberal commercial peace effect, which is the question I want to answer in this research. 
Then, in the third section I construct my theory to solve this question, arguing that my 
theory can explain what conditions the liberal commercial peace effect both at the global 
level and at the regional level. I test my theory with statistical models using data from 
1950 to 2001 in the fourth section, in which the empirical results show robust support for 
6 In this research I use “at the global level,” “global dyads,” and “inter-region dyads” interchangeably to 
describe all the dyadic country combinations around the world, and use “at the regional level,” “regional 
dyads,” and “intra-region dyads” interchangeably to describe only the intra-region dyadic country 
combinations. 
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my theory. Overall, by bringing the regional concerns back in, this research largely 
enriches the liberal commercial peace theory not only in finding out more nuanced 
preconditions but also in extending more theoretical implications.  
2 The Puzzle: Regional variations of the liberal commercial peace effect 
 As Kastner (2005) had reviewed, there are at least three arguments commonly 
used to link economic interdependence with a reduced likelihood of military conflict in 
liberal commercial peace literature as causal mechanisms: the constraint arguments, the 
informational arguments, and the transformative arguments. The constraint arguments 
state that as interdependence increases, the cost of military conflict also increases due to 
the loss of valuable assets and trade flows (Papayoanou, 1996; Oneal & Russett, 2001b; 
Gelpi & Grieco, 2003; Smith, 2014). The informational arguments claim that 
interdependence enables states to signal more efficiently their true level of resolve 
through threatening to use costly economic sanctions, therefore reducing the likelihood of 
dangerous miscalculations about each other’s resolves (Fearon, 1995; Gartzke, 1999; 
Morrow, 1999, 2003; Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001; Powell, 2002; Gartzke & Li, 2003; 
Gartzke, 2003; Stein, 2003). The transformative arguments posit that interdependence can 
reduce the probability of conflict by reshaping the underlying states’ interests and 
preferences, either through changing the states’ core international objectives or through 
changing the balance of domestic political coalitions (Mitrany, 1948, 1966; Haas, 1958, 
1964; Deutsch et al., 1957; Deutsch, 1961; Adler & Barnett, 1998a; Solingen, 2001, 2003, 
2007; Simmons, 2003). Although the pacifying effect of the liberal commercial peace is 
not always a positive one, since in a dyadic level of analysis peace may result from the 
fact that the target state is successfully coerced by the sender state so that there is no overt 
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conflict; however, by and large, as a final phenomenon, trade does reduce the probability 
of conflict.  
 According to these three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace 
theory, the pacifying effect of trade should be universal and ubiquitous across the whole 
world since these three causal mechanisms, no matter one, two, or all of them, should be 
found in any pair of countries with sufficient economic ties. However, two empirical 
evidences have put the liberal commercial peace effect into doubt. First, although the 
liberal commercial peace effect has been empirically supported as very prominent in 
many studies (Oneal & Russett, 1999, 2001a; Maoz, 2009; Hegre et al., 2010), it is 
interesting that when it comes to the regional peace, few scholars attribute it to 
interdependence. For example, regional security research seldom confirms the 
contribution of the liberal commercial peace effect outside the Western European 
countries, especially the long peace in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle 
East (Lake & Morgan, 1997; Acharya, 2001; Lemke, 2002; Ray, 2002; Buzan & Wæver, 
2003; Miller, 2005; Goldsmith, 2007). Second, in statistical models, the liberal 
commercial peace effect usually does not hold in regional subsamples. For instance, by 
dividing the world into five different regions – the West, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America, Goldsmith (2006) finds that at odds with the liberal commercial 
peace literature, interdependence is actually positive with the probability of the onset of 
dyadic militarized interstate dispute (MID) in all the five regions, even including the 
West. As a result, the pacifying effect of interdependence demonstrated in most of the 
literature may be very likely resulting from the inter-regional commercial peace rather 
than the intra-regional one. In other words, intra-regional trade leads to conflict rather 
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than reduces it, and inter-regional trade vice versa. Although it should be quite reasonable 
that countries tend to have more trade and conflict with neighboring ones than with those 
who are far away, this still arouses an inquiry of why the liberal commercial peace effect 
does not work, especially at the regional level. If trade only reduces the probability of 
conflict between pairs of countries between different regions but not between those in the 
same region, the substantive effect of the liberal commercial peace may be trivial and 
over-emphasized by the liberals since it cannot promote peace for countries that interact 
the most frequently.  
Does the fact above result from some specific outlier states in each region that 
nullify the liberal commercial peace effect? Or does it result from the regional-specific 
characteristics that affect all the states in the region? In the monadic level of analysis, it is 
easier to understand why the liberal commercial peace effect does not work in certain 
countries because not all countries have the same characteristics. Since the goal of a 
scientific theory is to predict the central tendency, it is not surprising if we have some 
states as outliers against the prediction of the liberal commercial theory due to omitted 
variable bias such as other special preconditions. However, at the regional level of 
analysis, if the outliers are at the regional level, which means that most of the states in the 
region are outliers, a revision or a reconsideration of the liberal commercial theory may 
be a necessity. This can be done by two different ways. First, it is possible that the liberal 
commercial peace theory is not a universally generalizable one because it is derived only 
from the experience of the modern European countries after 1816, especially after the end 
of World War II, so that it may not well account for the international relations in other 
regions. Therefore, we need new theories (adding new causal mechanisms) to explain the 
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relationship between trade and conflict. Another way is to accept the three main causal 
mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace theory, but reconsider the regional 
preconditions that mediate the effectiveness of them, which, I argue, may be a more 
informative way since we have abundant literature of liberal commercial peace research 
and regional studies that help. In the next two sections, I will demonstrate why paying 
attention to the regional level of analysis is more helpful than looking at the monadic 
level of each outlier state, bringing the regional factors back in to enrich our 
understanding of the liberal commercial peace theory as well as the regional peace across 
the world. 
3 Bridging the global-regional gap of the liberal commercial peace effect 
 How do we account for the regional variation of the liberal commercial peace 
effect? Is there a universal theory of the liberal commercial peace? If the pacifying effect 
of trade is actually mediated by specific regional preconditions, what are they? Could we 
have a general theory to guide us about how to find out the regional preconditions that 
make the liberal commercial peace work? In this section, I make two arguments to bridge 
the gap between the general liberal commercial peace theory and its regional variances. 
First, I argue that looking at all kinds of MIDs to conceptualize conflict is not a proper 
way to investigate the liberal commercial peace effect. Because the pacifying effect of 
trade works not in the reduction of all kinds of conflicts, but in the reduction of conflicts 
that would cause fatality. Second, I argue that there are two universal factors that 
condition the liberal commercial peace effect – countries’ degree of democracy and 
development. As a consequence, the regional variances of the liberal commercial peace 
effect around the world are due to the regional variation of these two factors. By making 
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these two arguments, I offer a unified theory to explain the global-regional differences of 
the liberal commercial peace effect, instead of pointing out ad hoc explanations for every 
specific region around the world. 
3.1 Why using all recorded MIDs is not proper for investigating the liberal commercial 
peace effect at the regional level 
 There are many debates about whether using all the recorded conflict events is 
proper to test the liberal commercial peace theory, especially regarding the most popular 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) data of the Correlates of War dataset (Barbieri, 2003; 
Pevehouse, 2003; Reuveny, 2003). Generally speaking, there are mainly two kinds of 
concerns about it: The first one is the concern of data quality, and the second one the 
concern of theory.  
The first concern regards data quality. Not all levels of MIDs that happened will 
be recorded due to information availability, especially the low-level MIDs that happened 
in the third world countries where there is a lack of media coverage. Moreover, high-level 
MIDs tend to be recorded more correctly because they arouse more attention and give 
more information, especially those involved with casualties.  
MID includes a series of events that are defined as “a set of interactions between 
or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or 
actual uses of military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). Among these three 
categories, there are conflict events with casualties and without casualties. Thus, displays 
of military force that involved with casualties may actually be more severe and arouse 
more attention than actual uses of military force that caused no fatality. Therefore, many 
researchers promote the claim that looking at the MIDs that caused fatality is more proper. 
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For example, Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre (2000, p. 984) insist that the use of fatality 
MIDs helps avoid both coding irregularities and “attention bias” on low-level disputes. 
Souva and Prins (2006) also echo Toset et al. (2000) that “fatal MIDs offer greater 
temporal and spatial consistency in the historical recording of these events. Plus, they 
avoid very low-hostility disputes that may not reach the attention of policymakers” 
(Souva & Prins, 2006, p. 191). Given the fact that MIDs are very rare events,7  a slightly 
difference of the coding methods may result in a huge bias in a large-N research. For data 
quality concern, looking at only the MIDs that caused fatality gives us a more consistent 
measurement than taking all the MIDs into concern. 
 The second concern regards theory. Not all theories that predict the reduction of 
conflict have the causal mechanisms that cover all levels of conflict, and it is misleading 
to give all levels of conflict the same weight, either, simply by looking at the frequency 
of all levels of conflict.  
The three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace theory – the 
constraint argument, the informational argument, and the transformative argument – 
implicitly assume that trade’s pacifying effect should embody in the reduction of 
conflicts which are important enough to trigger the three causal mechanisms to work. In 
other words, low-level conflicts may not be salient enough to make trade be taken into 
consideration by leaders or any other influential social actors. In this situation, the three 
causal mechanisms may not work in low-level conflicts even though both sides have 
7 For example, there are only 1,289 MIDs (2.28%) in the total 56,647 politically relevant (involving at least 
one major power, contingency, or separated by less than 400 miles of water) non-directed dyad-year 
observations in the sample period from 1950 to 2001. Among the total 1,289 MIDs, there are only 945 
MIDs (1.67%) that involved the actual use of force, and only 439 MIDs (0.77%) that caused fatality. Given 
MIDs are such rare events, the estimated outcomes will be sensitive to the coding rules, which may change 
the number of MIDs in a large-N research. 
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significant trade. In addition, the degree of trade is also a measurement of the degree of 
interaction between both sides. It should not be surprising at all that countries who 
interact more often tend to have more conflictual issues simply due to their intensive 
interaction. For example, by using the COPDAB and the WEIS data,8  Pevehouse (2004) 
demonstrates that measurements of trade are also the measurements of the density of 
bilateral interaction. As a result, trade tends to make the presence of small amounts of 
conflict more likely due to intensive interaction, but simultaneously restrain the number 
of conflicts from going rampant due to the liberal commercial peace effect. Moreover, by 
using the MID data, Hegre (2009) also demonstrates that when investigating the trade-
conflict relationship, it is imperative to control for interaction density between both 
countries due to the same reason.9 
In the other situations, some low-level MIDs are actually caused by trade issues or 
geological reasons, such as the fishery disputes and the natural resource disputes between 
countries who share the same fishing ground or mineral vein. Those countries may well 
have a very closed economic interdependence relationship due to proximity, just like the 
U.S.-Canada fishery disputes or the China-Japan territorial disputes on the small islands 
8 Refer to Azar (1980) about the COPDAB data, and Goldstein (1992) about the WEIS data. As for the 
comparison across the COPDAB, WEIS, and MID datasets, refer to Vincent (1983), Pevehouse (2003), and 
Reuveny (2003). 
9 Besides, Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) find that although trade may not inhibit conflict, it does appear to 
shorten the spells of conflict, and Zorn (2001) finds that high levels of interdependence generally lower the 
probability of conflict, but in the short term trade increases the chance of conflict. Pevehouse (2004) and 
Hegre’s (2009) explanations here also offer a good causal mechanism to account for Beck et al. (1998) and 
Zorn’s (2001) findings that the pacifying effect of trade tends to be mixed if we do not differentiate the 
density of interaction between both sides. 
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in the East China Sea (Downs & Saunders, 1998; Hickey, 2014).10  Thus leaders in 
countries that have more intensive commercial interactions may also use militarized 
measures such as the demonstration of force to show their concern about the issues and to 
tell their people they did do something, but at the same time they do not really want to 
cause fatality since this will very likely destroy their current cooperative relationship. 
Therefore, this kind of conflicts that happens from time to time do not necessary mean 
that the liberal commercial peace effect does or does not work. Due to these reasons 
above, I argue that when using the MID data to test the liberal commercial peace effect, it 
is more proper to use MIDs that caused causality rather than to use all kinds of MIDs. 
Many “cheap MIDs” which involved only the low-level conflicts such as “threat to use 
force without casualties,” “display of force without casualties,” or even “actual uses of 
military force but without casualties” may not arouse attentions that are sufficient enough 
for the liberal commercial peace effect to work. Therefore, trade may play no role in 
these kind of cheap MID events. But this is not equal to saying that trade does have or 
does not have a pacifying/conflictual effect. Looking at fatal MIDs instead of all kinds of 
MIDs can help avoid conflicts that very likely have nothing to do with the liberal 
commercial peace effect, and thus is a more proper measurement of the conflicts that the 
liberal commercial peace effect should have prevented (or should have prevented but 
failed).11 
10 For example, according to the MID 3.1 data, from 1950 to 2001, there are 6 MIDs happened between the 
United States and Canada and also 6 MIDs happened between China and Japan. However, none of the 
above caused fatality. 
11 A good example is the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which is a series of missile tests conducted by 
China in the waters surrounding Taiwan including the Taiwan Strait from July 21, 1995 to March 23, 1996. 
The first set of missiles fired in mid-to-late 1995 by China were allegedly intended to send a strong signal 
to Taiwan’s president Tenghui Lee, who had been seen as moving Taiwan’s foreign policy away from the 
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In sum, if we use at all kinds of MIDs as the dependent variable to conceptualize 
international conflict, the liberal commercial peace effect will be significant only at the 
global level, not the regional level. This is because countries in the same region tend to 
have higher degree of interdependence due to proximity and more MIDs due to intensive 
interaction, and because the liberal commercial peace effect works not in reducing the 
occurrence of all kinds of MIDs, but in reducing the occurrence of the fatal ones. For 
these reasons, using only the MIDs that caused fatality to conceptualize international 
conflict is more proper to investigate the liberal commercial peace effect, and this effect 
should work both at the global level and at the regional level. 
 Due to the two main concerns above – the data quality concern and the theory 
concern, I posit that the liberal commercial peace effect is more prominent between 
global dyads than between intra-region dyads if we use all levels of MIDs to measure the 
reduction of conflict. Because the degree of trade is also a measurement of the degree of 
interaction, with the increase of interaction comes with more chances for both sides to 
have disputes. Countries in the same region tend to interact more intensively thus have 
more issues to dispute. As a consequence, trade does not have a significant pacifying 
effect if we look at all levels of MIDs in which many of them have nothing to do with 
trade or actually are triggered by trade. Instead, among countries in the same region who 
have substantive trade relations, although they tend to have more issues to dispute, it is 
One-China policy. The second set of missiles were fired in early 1996, allegedly intending to intimidate the 
Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. This crisis was coded as a MID that 
involved actual use of force without fatality in the COW MID 3.1 dataset, which is a MID that happened in 
spite of the high degree of interdependence between both sides and had no negative effect on bilateral trade 
later on. The trade flows between both sides still kept increasing very quickly after the missile crisis 
(Kastner 2007; 2009). This case shows that not all MIDs are relevant to the liberal commercial peace effect, 
even those in which force is actually used by one or both sides. 
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not their real interest to cause fatality to each other since doing so will compromise their 
interests for cooperation in the future. As a consequence, trade’s pacifying effect 
embodies in reducing the probability of fatal MID, and this phenomenon should be 
evident both between global dyads and between intra-region dyads.  
 Based on these reasons, my argument proposes two hypotheses to be tested:  
Hypothesis 1: If we look at all levels of MIDs, higher trade is associated with 
lower conflict occurrence only when including all dyads, not when limiting the analysis 
to intra-region dyads. 
Hypothesis 2: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs), 
higher trade is associated with lower conflict occurrence not only when including all 
dyads, but also when limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads. 
 Furthermore, as a theoretical implication of my argument, there are two more 
phenomena that should also be observed if my argument is robust enough. First, since the 
pacifying effect of trade between intra-region dyads is expected to be not statistically 
significant if we use all levels of MIDs to conceptualize it (due to the fact that intra-
region dyads interact more intensively and so have more disputed issues), it should be 
statistically significant once the degree of bilateral interaction is put into control. And, 
second, since the pacifying effect of trade mainly embodies in reducing the conflict that 
may cause fatality despite how many disputed issues there are between both sides, this 
effect should still be statistically significant even though the degree of bilateral 
interaction is put into control. Thus, my theory proposes another two hypotheses to be 
tested:   
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Hypothesis 3: If we look at all levels of MIDs, higher trade is associated with 
lower conflict occurrence whether including all dyads or limiting the analysis to intra-
region dyads, once the degree of bilateral interaction is put into control. 
Hypothesis 4: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs), 
higher trade is associated with lower conflict occurrence not only when including all 
dyads but also when limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads, whether the degree of 
bilateral interaction is controlled or not. 
3.2 Universal and regional preconditions of the liberal commercial peace effect 
3.2.1 Why the intra-region dyads are different from the inter-region dyads 
 Just like the methodological debate between the quantitative school and the 
qualitative school (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Brady & Collier, 2010), large-N 
empirical research of international relations theories is typically regarded by non-
quantitative scholars as too general to be useful when applied to explain the details of 
each specific event or the regional differences, especially the latter. Scholars who focus 
on the regional level of analysis make many arguments to justify the necessity of the 
regional level variables against traditional IR theories which typically assume 
universalism (Thompson, 1973; Lake & Morgan, 1997; Lemke, 2002; Buzan & Wæver, 
2003; Hoogensen, 2005).12  Among the many pro-regional-centered arguments, all of 
them would agree with the claim that traditional international relations theories insist too 
much on parsimony, therefore it is too abstract and distant to capture real world regional 
dynamics (Hentz & Bas, 2003). A good example is Shambaugh’s (2004) critique of 
Mearsheimer’s (2001) offensive realism that, “(i)t is a classic example of an international 
12 Refer to Kelly's (2007) review article about these arguments that emphasize the necessity of the regional 
level of analysis in the research of international relations. 
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relations theorist, who is not well grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying 
a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence” 
(Shambaugh, 2004, p. 94). At the cost of parsimony, bringing regional variables back into 
concern can enrich our understanding of the regional variance of general international 
relations theories. In terms of statistics, failing to take regional characteristics into 
concern when building international relations theory is equal to committing an “omitted 
variable bias” (King et al., 1994, p. 170). As Johnston (2012) has noted:  
“it is clear that whether because of geographic characteristics, cultural 
traits, the density of social network linkages, variation in the loss of 
strength gradient, or limits on other pathways for the diffusion of 
similarities, there is considerable variation across regions in the 
conduct of their international relations……Even important large-N 
work suggests regional variation matters for overall findings” 
(Johnston, 2012, p. 58). 
Therefore, I posit that the variation of the effectiveness of the liberal commercial peace 
across different regions is due to some regionally different “omitted variables” that 
influence the three main causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace but are 
neglected by general international relations theorists. 
Since regional omitted variables may bias statistical results, using regional 
dummy variables to roughly capsule all the possibly neglected omitted variables of each 
region is the most popular way to fix the statistical models. For example, Goldsmith 
(2006) argues that the regional omitted variables are very difficult or impossible to be 
reduced to “discrete causally independent variables because regions comprise very 
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complex sets of path-dependent interactions” (Goldsmith, 2006, p. 536). Therefore, he 
proposes two arguments to justify why for some purposes we should understand 
international relations based on “regions” and we should not further disaggregate 
“regions” into state level of analysis: 
“I suggest that regions imply: (1) more similar internal political and 
socioeconomic characteristics, both institutions and political culture; 
and (2) increased frequency of shared interactions and even shared 
perceptions, often leading to similar expectations and patterns of 
interaction embodied in regional norms or institutions. These are based 
not only on proximity, but on regional identity as well (and so apply 
even within the subset of contiguous but inter-Intra-region Dyads…)” 
(Goldsmith, 2006, pp. 536–537). 
 For these reasons, which mainly result from the path-dependence phenomenon 
(Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2003; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003), Goldsmith (2006) 
argues that “using regions as a manifest indicator for what appear to be complex 
interactions between numerous unmeasured latent factors is reasonable empirically and 
theoretically” (Goldsmith, 2006, p. 538). Because the regional independent variables are 
too complicated and entangled to be further specifically identified, as Goldsmith’s 
argument, using regional dummy variables is the simplest way to take regional 
characteristics into concern. 
 Although using regional dummy variables may to some degree alleviate the 
omitted variable bias problem in large-N research, it does not help if we want to further 
dig out what the regional factors are that make a difference. In other words, using 
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regional dummy variables does not advance our knowledge about what causes the 
regional variations of the liberal commercial peace. Do these regional variations result 
from different regionally specific variables in each of the regions respectively? Or are 
they caused by some universal variables that vary in each of the regions respectively? 
Using regional dummy variables to model the liberal commercial peace does not enable 
us to answer these questions.  
Echoing Goldsmith’s argument, I argue that it is the different regional 
characteristics that cause the variation of the effectiveness of the liberal commercial 
peace across regions. But different from Goldsmith, I neither plan to stop here only by 
arguing that there are regional differences of the liberal commercial peace nor make a 
strong assumption that there must be some regionally-specific variables that are neglected 
by large-N research. Instead, according to the suggestions of literature, I try to look for 
the universal factors that vary across different regions rather than look for ad hoc 
regionally-specific reasons that condition trade’s pacifying effect. Besides, I also try to 
design a general analytical framework based on literature that can guide us to find out 
how to make the liberal commercial peace effect work in different regions. In other words, 
I neither simply treat regional characteristics as an unmodelable or inseparable set of 
many entangled independent variables nor directly use regional dummy variables to catch 
all these regional characteristics as Goldsmith did in his research. Instead, according to 
literature, I enumerate the specific factors that differentiate one region from the others 
and construct an overarching theory to explain the regional variations of the liberal 
commercial peace effect. As such, the contribution of this research is to advance a 
theoretical progress of the liberal commercial peace theory.  
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3.2.2 The universal factors of the liberal commercial peace that vary regionally 
Literature of regional international relations research suggests that, due to their 
intensive interactions with other neighbor countries in the same region, countries in the 
same region tend to have very similar political, economic, and cultural characteristics, 
which result from their proximate geography and history and are then later “locked-in” by 
the path-dependent effect (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; Pierson 2000). By the same 
token, countries in different regions tend to have more divergent political, economic, and 
cultural characteristics than their intra-region counterparts. Because of this within-region 
and between-region difference, I posit that the different outcomes of trade’s pacifying 
effect in different regions are due to this within-region and between-region difference as 
well. So the next question to ask is, what are the specific factors which remain “similar 
within-region” but “dissimilar between-region” that make trade’s pacifying effect vary 
across regions? As mentioned before, the liberal commercial peace theory points out 
three causal mechanisms that explain how trade can reduce the probability of conflict. A 
review of the three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace is informative as a 
beginning: The constrain argument highlights the importance of opportunity cost, the 
informational argument emphasizes on the process of costly signaling, and the 
transformative argument accentuates the influence of domestic political coalitions and the 
national goals that political leaders pursue. Starting from these three causal mechanisms, 
I posit that the key to searching for the specific factors that make trade’s pacifying effect 
vary across different regions is in looking for the specific factors that are related with 
these causal mechanisms and vary across regions. Based on literature, I argue that it is the 
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degree of intra-regional interdependence, the degree of democracy, and the degree of 
development that together condition the pacifying effect of trade. 
Degree of intra-regional interdependence affects the three causal mechanisms in a 
very intuitive way. Higher intra-region interdependence means higher opportunity cost of 
cutting of trade as well as higher threshold of the sender state to threaten to cut off trade. 
Besides, higher intra-regional interdependence also indicates higher third-party trade and 
lower exit cost when the target state is threatened of cutting off trade (Crescenzi, 2003, 
2005; Peterson, 2011). Therefore, strategically, higher intra-regional interdependence 
enhances the pacifying effect of trade in the region by (1) positively, increasing the 
opportunity cost of loss of trade or increasing the threshold of using economic coercion, 
or (2) negatively, sender state’s successfully coercing target state by revealing a strong 
resolute to use economic sanction (Drezner, 1999; Gartzke, 2003). In addition, higher 
intra-regional interdependence itself may also be a consequence of good mutual 
relationship, denoting that both the national goals and domestic coalitions are 
internationalizing rather than backlashing, which also contributes to regional peace 
(Solingen, 2001, 2003, 2007).  
Degree of democracy is another factor that conditions the pacifying effect of trade. 
After all, leaders are those who make foreign policy decisions (Most & Starr, 1989; 
Friedman & Starr, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). If the 
leaders are not constrained by any of the three causal mechanisms, the links between 
trade and foreign policy selection are disconnected. As the increase of institutional checks 
and balances to the leaders as well as the inclusion of social actors who have stakes on 
trade, the more likely that they are to be sensitive to the three causal mechanisms 
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(Papayoanou 1996; Oneal and Russett 2001; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; 2008). Even in 
nondemocracies, we can still find the effect that the more domestic constrains the leaders 
face, the more cautiously they use force (Weeks, 2008, 2012). Besides, the more 
democratic the regimes are, the more likely the costly signaling effect of trade will work 
due to information transparency (Schultz, 2001). All in all, the literature suggests that the 
effectiveness of the three liberal commercial peace causal mechanisms is conditioned on 
the degree of democracy of each state. 
Degree of development also conditions the pacifying effect of trade. Before taking 
mutual trade into consideration, degree of development per se influences states’ 
calculation of using force mainly by two reasons (Rosecrance, 1986). First, if the 
conflictual issue is about territory expansion, development can reduce the probability of 
conflict because “the costs of seizing and holding a territory increase with increased 
development, and the relative utility of occupying the territory decreases,” therefore, “the 
chance that the expected utility of occupation exceeds the expected costs will decrease 
with increased development” (Hegre, 2000). Second, “since the utility of trade increases 
with increased development, then increased development also makes it more likely that 
the expected costs of breaking the trade bonds will exceed the gains to be expected from 
occupation” (Hegre, 2000, p. 9). From this opportunity cost and indifference curve 
perspective, what states long for can be achieved either by military measures or by 
economic ones, and increased development makes the former less attractive when the 
utility-maximizing states are doing the calculation. Recently, the capitalist peace scholars 
further demonstrate that a higher degree of development can largely enhance the 
democratic peace effect (Mousseau, 2000, 2003, 2005; Mousseau, Hegre, & O’neal, 2003; 
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Gartzke, 2007). When taking mutual trade into concern, given the fact that states with a 
higher degree of development tend to trade more, the effects of opportunity cost and 
costly signaling will tend to be more salient as well. By the same token, their national 
goals and domestic coalition may very likely be pro-internationalizing, too.  
Based on the literature I discussed above, both the pacifying effect of trade 
“between countries in the same region” and “between countries between different regions” 
should be conditioned simultaneously on both countries’ degree of development and 
degree of democracy, because the degree of development and democracy can mutually 
reinforce the three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial peace. Therefore, overall, 
based on the suggestions of previous research, I argue that the regional variances of the 
liberal commercial peace effect result from, in terms of statistics, an “omitted variable 
bias” or a “model miss-specification,” that is, the pacifying effect of trade should be a 
conditional one, which hinges simultaneously on both the degree of democracy and the 
degree of development. More specifically, a three-way interaction term of 
interdependence multiplied by development and democracy should be the independent 
variable instead of using interdependence as the only variable when modeling the liberal 
commercial peace effect. Once we specify the model as such, the regional variances of 
the liberal commercial peace effect should be disappear since these inter-region and intra-
region differences have been caught up by the three-way interaction already. Hence, the 
hypotheses to be tested are: 
 Hypothesis 5: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs), 
trade’s pacifying effect is conditioned simultaneously on both the degree of development 
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and the degree of democracy. That is, the three-way interaction of interdependence   ×
development  ×  democracy is associated with lower conflict occurrence. 
Hypothesis 6: If we look at only the MIDs that caused fatality (the fatal MIDs), 
the three-way interaction of interdependence ×   development  ×  democracy is associated 
with lower conflict occurrence not only when including all dyads but also when limiting 
the analysis to intra-region dyads. 
 What will happen if we try to predict all kinds of MIDs (instead of only the MIDs 
that caused fatality) with the three-way interaction? According to my theory, the three-
way interaction will not have a statistically significant pacifying effect, whether at the 
global level or at the regional level. The reason is that, although the pacifying effect of 
trade can be reinforced by both the higher degree of democracy and the higher degree of 
development, higher degree of democracy and development also enhance the 
intensiveness of bilateral interaction and therefore leading to more conflicts. As a 
consequence, the pacifying effect of the three-way interaction resulting from the 
enhancement of the three causal mechanisms will be offset by the simultaneously-
increased intensiveness of bilateral interaction. Thus, the last two hypotheses my theory 
proposes are:  
Hypothesis 7: If we look at all kinds of MIDs, the three-way interaction of 
interdependence ×   development  ×  democracy is not associated with lower conflict 
occurrence. 
Hypothesis 8: If we look at all kinds of MIDs, the three-way interaction of 
interdependence ×   development ×   democracy is not associated with lower conflict 
occurrence whether including all dyads or limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads. 
36 
 
To sum up, in this section, I argue that the pacifying effect of trade should be 
understood as the following two points. First, trade will not decrease the probability of 
conflict that does not cause fatality, but will reduce the probability of conflict that cause 
fatality. Second, this liberal commercial peace effect is conditioned simultaneously on the 
degree of democracy and the degree of development, which accounts for the regional 
variances of the liberal commercial peace effect across different regions around the world. 
I illustrate this unified theoretical framework of the liberal commercial peace effect at the 
regional level of analysis in Figure 2.1 on the next page. All the eight hypotheses will be 
tested with data of the onset of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from 1950 to 2001 
in the next section. 
4 Research design 
4.1 Dependent variables and statistical models 
Following most of the literature on the relationship between trade and conflict, I 
use the onset of a new militarized interstate dispute (MID) between a pair of states each 
year as the dependent variable. This is because the dyadic design can better take different 
security threats that different countries face into concern. Thus the unit of analysis is 
dyad-year. I use the MID 3.1 dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) of the Correlates 
of War database. A MID is defined as “a set of interactions between or among states 
involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of 
military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). The new MID onset is a dichotomous 
variable which is coded 1 for the first year of a new MID in a dyad and 0 otherwise. The 
subsequent years of the same MID in the starting year is dropped from the data to reduce 
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the logit regression model, assumes that the conflict events being analyzed are 
independent of each other. The temporal span of MID 3.1 data is from 1816 to 2001. 
Because most of the trade and GDP data is available only after 1950, the temporal 
coverage of this research is from 1950 to 2001. 
 For several reasons I mentioned above, in some models I look at only the MIDs 
that caused fatality, the fatal MIDs, instead of all the recorded MIDs. Because MID onset 
is a time-series cross-sectional binary variable across time (years) and space (dyads), in 
order to produce accurate standard errors and consistent coefficients, I estimate the logit 
regression model with the Huber/White robust standard error which assumes that 
observations within the same dyad across years are correlated but those between different 
dyads are uncorrelated, adjusting for clustering in dyads. I also adopt Carter and 
Signorino’s (2010) method to include peace years between two MIDs or fatal MIDs that 
happened in the same dyad (how long the dyad remains a peaceful relationship in years), 
its square, and its cube into the model to control for temporal dependence.13  As most of 
the literature, I estimate all the models with the dependent variable at time t  and 
independent variables at time 1−t  to mitigate problems of reverse causality. 
4.2 Independent variables and control variables 
 My theory predicts that the three-way interaction of interdependence ×  
development ×  democracy has a strong pacifying effect, so in order to have a complete 
model, my independent variables should include both this three-way interaction term as 
well as all its constituencies of interdependence ×  development, interdependence ×  
13 I also estimate all the models using Beck et al.'s (1998) peace years and cubic splines to control for 
temporal dependence. The outcomes are almost identical to Carter and Signorino’s (2010) method I 
adopted. 
39 
                                                          
 
democracy, and development ×  democracy. Like most literature of the liberal 
commercial peace, I conceptualize interdependence, development, and democracy 
following the “weak link” logic adopted by Dixon (1994) and Oneal and Russett (1997) 
which assumes that “the likelihood of dyadic conflict is primarily determined by the less 
constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal & Russett, 1997, p. 273). Typically, 
countries which has lower degree of interdependence, democracy, and development are 
regarded as the less constraint ones. Low dependence is the lower ratio of the sum of 
State A’s imports from and exports to State B over State A’s GDP in each dyad-year, data 
from Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded trade and GDP data. Low democracy is the lower 
democracy score of the two states in each dyad-year, data from the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013). The Polity IV dataset’s democracy score ranges from -
10 (the most autocratic) to 10 (the most democratic). Low GDP/pc is the logged GDP per 
capita of the lower GDP per capita value in each dyad-year, data also from Gleditsch’s 
(2002) expanded trade and GDP data. Thus the three-way interaction and all its 
constituencies are made of the combinations of these three variables, respectively.  
 To compare with most of the liberal commercial peace studies, I control for the 
following variables that had been demonstrated to have influences on conflict onset. I put 
the number of joint intergovernmental organization memberships (IGOs) into the model 
to include all the three Kantian peace components, and control for Polity difference, 
Power ratio, Alliance, Cold war, Contiguity, Distance, and None major power dyad 
in the models. IGOs is the number of total shared memberships of intergovernmental 
organizations of the two states in each dyad year, data from Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and 
40 
 
Warnke (2004).14  Polity difference is State A’s polity score minus State B’s polity score 
in absolute value, considering interest (dis)similarity resulting from different political 
regimes may influence the relationship between the two countries in each dyad (Bennett 
& Stam, 2000b; Peceny, Beer, & Sanchez-Terry, 2002). Power ratio is the weaker state’s 
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score (Singer, 1988) divided by that of 
the stronger state and then logged (to catch the decreasing marginal advantage of 
increasing power difference) to generate a power ratio which ranges from 0 (total 
preponderance) to 1 (exact parity between the two states). Alliance is a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if the two states in each dyad have signed a defense pact, neutrality, or 
entente in the year, and with a value of 0 if otherwise. Cold war is a dummy variable, 
taking a value of 1 between 1950 and 1989 to control for the change of international 
structure which may have a systemic effect on conflict onset in the region. Contiguity is 
a dummy variable which denotes whether the two countries of the dyad are contiguous by 
land, predicted to be positively correlated with conflict onset. Distance is the logged 
distance (in miles) between capitals of the two states in each dyad, predicted to be 
negatively related with conflict onset. Because major power countries are more prone to 
involve in international disputes (Bremer, 1992; Xiang, Xu, & Keteku, 2007), I create a 
dummy variable None major power dyad to control for this influence of power, taking a 
value of 1 is both states in the dyad are none major powers, and 0 if otherwise. The 
summary of all the variables used is shown in Table 2.1. 
14 Although I have noticed that previous research about IGOs’ pacifying effect is mixed as Dorussen and 
Ward's (2008) review had demonstrated, and that the aggregated count variable of shared IGO membership 
may mislead our understanding of IGOs’ role in promoting peace (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004), 
I still include this aggregated count variable in my models in order to further confirm my argument by 
considering all the Kantian peace variables at the same time. The statistical results are almost identical with 
or without this variable. 
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Although various variables are taken into control, the significance of my 
independent variables, especially the three-way interaction term, is not sensitive 
including or not including any of or all of these control variables above, whether 
including all dyads or limiting the analysis to intra-region dyads. 
4.3 Subsample variable: How to define a region 
To investigate the relationship between trade and conflict at the regional level, it 
is necessary to define what a region is, that is, they way to distinguish one region from all 
the others by theoretical reasons according to the goal of theory. The literature points out 
several theoretical methods to define a region. Generally speaking, regions can be defined 
by two main factors – physical regions (categorized by geographical and strategic reasons) 
and functional regions (categorized by economic, environmental, and cultural reasons) 
(Väyrynen, 2003), the former is also referred to “space of places” and the latter “space of 
flows” (Castells, 1996). For example, Goldsmith (2006) separates regions simply by 
geography using the Correlates of War database’s default, while Lake and Morgan (1997), 
Lemke (2002), and Buzan and Wæver (2003) define region mainly according to security 
externality and power structure concerns, and Huntington (2011) distinguishes regions by 
cultural factors and Buzan & Wæver (2003) somewhat also emphasize the concern of 
social construction. Because the goal of this research is to investigate how the universal 
factors that vary in different regions condition the pacifying effect of trade, mainly the 
intra-region trade and the intra-regional conflict which includes both places and flows, 
my position is somewhere between the physical and the functional approaches. That is, I 
am looking for a definition of region that is composed of approximate countries who have 




Table 2.1 Summary of all the variables used 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard Deviation  Min  Max 
Low dependence  521,971  0.0003777  0.0023553  0  0.2143973 
Low democracy  436,680  -4.237426  5.873694  -10  10 
Low GDP/pc  521,971  7.578194  0.8534986  5.639279  10.6778 
Low dependence X Low democracy  424,158  0.000171  0.0218834  -1.263152  1.55768 
Low dependence X Low GDP/pc  521,971  0.0032546  0.0214277  0  1.554244 
Low democracy X Low GDP/pc  424,158  -31.0953  46.00385  -106.778  102.0583 
Low dependence X Low democracy X Low GDP/pc  424,158  0.0035852  0.2046547  -8.788939  15.10027 
           
IGOs  539,106  21.64904  11.50687  0  108 
Polity difference  436,680  7.984609  6.537954  0  20 
Power ratio  545,231  -2.49345  1.96174  -11.97376  0 
Alliance  528,033  0.0701055  0.2553249  0  1 
Cold war  546,178  0.6268671  0.4836374  0  1 
Contiguity  546,178  0.0364588  0.187429  0  1 
Distance  546,178  8.250772  0.7804501  1.609438  9.421168 
None major power dyad  546,178  0.9270677  0.2600255  0  1 
           
MID Peace years  546,178  17.76141  13.08768  0  51 
MID Peace years  546,178  486.7549  586.4473  0  2601 
MID Peace years  546,178  15973.2  25821.03  0  132651 
Fatal MID peace years  546,178  18.00594  13.1508  0  51 
Fatal MID peace years  546,178  497.1569  593.472  0  2601 





For a pair of countries to have trade and conflict, according to the opportunity and 
willingness framework (Most & Starr, 1982, 1989), there must be a necessary condition 
that these two countries must have sufficient capabilities to interact with each other. By 
the same token, to investigate the pacifying effect of trade in different regions, it is 
imperative to define a region by a set of countries who have sufficient interaction with 
other countries in the same region but have rather insufficient interaction with countries 
outside the region. To match this theoretical need, I find Lemke’s (2002) definition of 
regions is the most ideal measurement available for my purpose. Based on Bueno de 
Mesquita’s (1981) operationalization of Boulding’s (1962) loss-of-strength gradient, 
Lemke (2002) defines regions as groups of proximate states all of which hold sufficient 
capabilities to interact with each other. By applying a similar formula revised from 
Boulding’s (1962), Lemke (2002) divides the world into 22 regions according to the 
model results: North America and the Caribbean, Central America, South America, 
Europe, West Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, the Central Lowlands of Africa, The South 
Atlantic Coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean region of Africa, the Central Highlands of 
Africa, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, the Maghreb, The Northern Rim of Africa, 
The Arab-Israeli region of the Middle East, The Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, East 
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, The Asian Archipelago, and Oceania. According to 
Lemke’s categorizing method, a set of countries that interact with each other the most 
intensively are categorized as a region. By this definition, a region contains countries that 
the most likely to have trade and conflict with each other. Therefore, it is the most ideal 
classification for the goal of this research: to investigate the variation of trade’s pacifying 
effect in different regions. 
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 By adopting Lemke’s (2002) definition of regions, I define the intra-region dyads 
as the dyadic country combinations that belong to the same region among the 22 regions 
above. The reference group is the global dyads often-used in large-N empirical IR 
research which are composed of the dyadic country combinations of all the countries 
around the world. According to the data I generated from the Eugene software (Bennett & 
Stam, 2000a), from 1950 to 2001, there are 417,773 none-directed dyad-year 
observations (and 13,538 global dyads); while according to Lemke’s (2002) definition, 
there are 32,372 none-directed dyad-year observations (and 1,177 intra-region dyads).15  
 Since I have differentiated intra-region dyads from global dyads, here I 
demonstrate some stylized facts to show that looking at intra-region dyads rather than 
global dyads is more informative to understand interstate militarized conflict. Table 2.2 is 
the tabulation of all the fatal MIDs occurred from 1950 to 2001 between all dyads. Table 
2.2 shows that there are total 466 MIDs that caused fatality occurred among the 546,178 
dyad-year observations during the sample period. The baseline probability of fatal MID is 
0.09%. 
Table 2.3 is the tabulation of all the fatal MIDs that occurred between inter-region 
dyads from 1950 to 2001. According to Table 2.3, 205 of the total 466 MIDs (44%) are 
happened between inter-region dyads among the 502,248 inter-region dyad-year 
observations during the sample period. The baseline probability of fatal MID happened 
between inter-region dyads is 0.04%. 
Table 2.4 is the tabulation of the fatal MIDs that happened between intra-region 
dyads from 1950 to 2001. According to Table 2.4, 261 of the total 466 fatal MIDs (56%) 
15 Not counting in the dyads with missing values of the independent variables and the control variables.   
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are happened between intra-region dyads among the 43,930 intra-region dyad-year 
observations during the sample period. The baseline probability of fatal MID happened 
between intra-region dyads is 0.59%, which is 6 times higher than the baseline 
probability of all the fatal MIDs between global dyads (0.09%) and 15 times higher than 
the baseline probability of fatal MIDs between inter-region dyads (0.04%). 
This tabulation analysis highlights the theoretical necessity of analyzing intra-region 
dyads. As we see in Table 2.2, Table 2.3, and Table 2.4, intra-region dyads are more 
likely to undergo fatal MIDs than inter-region dyads, which confirms the effect that 
countries that interact more tend to have more trade and conflict. Thus, for the liberal 
commercial peace effect to be a meaningful phenomenon, it must work not only between 
the global and inter-region dyads but also between the intra-region dyads. If trade’s 
pacifying effect works only between the global dyads and inter-region dyads but not 
between intra-region dyads, then there is a good reason to reconsider the liberal 
commercial peace theory. In the next section, I will use statistical models to show that my 
theory is more robust than the liberal commercial peace theory because the former does 
not hold in intra-region dyads, while my theory offers a more consistent explanation for 
both the global dyads and the intra-region dyads.  
4.4 Interaction density control variables: Hegre’s (2009) approach 
As for the control for the bilateral interaction density, I adopt Hegre’s (2009) 
approach to conceptualize the bilateral “size dependence.” As many previous studies 
have demonstrated (Tinbergen, 1962; Deardorff, 1997), “the volume of trade between 
two countries is to a large degree proportional to the product of the two countries’ GDP 
and inversely proportional to the distance between them” (Hegre, 2009, p. 28). At
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Table 2.2 The number of fatal MIDs between all dyads, 1950~2001 
 Frequency Percentage 
No 545,712 99.91 
Yes 466 0.09 





Table 2.3 The number of fatal MIDs occurred between inter-region dyads, 1950~2001 
 Frequency Percentage 
No 502,043 99.96 
Yes 205 0.04 






Table 2.4 The number of fatal MIDs occurred between intra-region dyads, 1950~2001 
 Frequency Percentage 
No 43,669 99.41 
Yes 261 0.59 





the same time, as for the interaction density in terms of interpersonal contact, Zipf (1946) 
shows that the number of persons that move between any two cities is also in proportion 
to the product of the number of populations of these two cities divided by the distance. In 
other words, the bilateral interaction density, whether in trade or in interpersonal contact, 
can be measured by similar methods, which is called “the gravity model” given that it has 
the same structure as the gravity model in physics. Therefore, Hegre (2009) suggests that 
to handle this kind of interference of “size dependence” on bilateral trade and conflict, we 
should put in all the decomposed variables of trade and conflict – that is, their constituent 
parts – to control for interaction density. These decomposed parts include both (logged) 
populations, distance, and contiguity. Besides, Hegre (2009) also suggests to put in 
(logged) GDP per capita and degree of democracy of both sides into the gravity model 
because richer and more democratic countries have higher ability to interact with other 
countries. Since I already have Contiguity and Distance in the control variables, in the 
models which I control for interaction density, I include Country A’s population, 
Country B’s population, Country A’s GDP per capita, Country B’s GDP per capita, 
Country A’s polity score, and Country B’s polity score as the control variables of 
bilateral interaction density.  
5 Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Basic analysis 
 In Table 2.5 I test the first two hypotheses. Model 1 is the popular Russett and 
Oneal model of the triangulating peace research (Russett and Oneal 2001), which takes 
all the dyads into concern. The result is the same as the liberal commercial peace 
literature that interdependence does reduce the probability of MID. However, Model 2  
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Table 2.5 Liberal commercial peace, global and regional, 1950~2001 
 
[Dependent Variables t ]  All MID Onset  Fatal MID Onset 
  Test Hypothesis 1  Test Hypothesis 2 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
  All Dyads Intra-region Dyads  All Dyads Intra-region Dyads 
[Independent Variable 1−t ]       
Low dependence  -63.513*** -20.008  -98.459* -77.029* 
  (18.841) (12.514)  (39.315) (37.221) 
   P<0.110    
[Control Variables 1−t ]       
Low democracy  -0.043** -0.030  -0.035 -0.014 
  (0.014) (0.019)  (0.025) (0.027) 
       
Low GDP/pc  -0.097 -0.298**  -0.632*** -0.721*** 
  (0.074) (0.112)  (0.128) (0.154) 
       
IGOs  0.024*** 0.008  0.024* 0.016 
  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.012) 
       
Polity difference  0.041*** 0.043***  0.045*** 0.034* 
  (0.008) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.017) 
       
Power ratio  0.193*** 0.127*  0.218** 0.238** 
  (0.044) (0.056)  (0.070) (0.085) 
       
Alliance  -0.304** -0.434***  -0.284 -0.592*** 
  (0.140) (0.154)  (0.186) (0.210) 
       
Cold war  0.253* -0.199  0.353 0.458 
  (0.113) (0.164)  (0.203) (0.240) 
       
Contiguity  2.779*** 2.507***  3.451*** 3.466*** 
  (0.169) (0.197)  (0.295) (0.421) 
       
Distance  -0.410*** -0.145*  -0.483*** -0.266* 
  (0.066) (0.070)  (0.110) (0.124) 
       
None major power dyad  -1.758*** -0.775***  -1.864*** -0.428 
  (0.172) (0.217)  (0.284) (0.404) 




 -0.321*** -0.259***  -0.275*** -0.322*** 
  (0.022) (0.030)  (0.037) (0.038) 




 0.011*** 0.008***  0.009*** 0.012*** 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) 




 -0.000*** -0.000**  -0.000** -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Constant  -0.343 -0.546  2.622 1.333 
  (0.874) (1.071)  (1.514) (1.644) 
51 
 
Pseudo R2  0.350 0.257  0.371 0.327 
Log Likelihood  -6225.803 -2548.931  -2178.461 -972.497 
Chi-squared  2699.641 546.070  1487.689 378.777 
Number of clusters  13,538 1,177  13,538 1,177 
Number of observations  417,773 32,372  417,773 32,372 






demonstrates that this liberal commercial peace effect does not hold when we look at 
only the intra-region Dyads. In Model 2, interdependence does not have a significant 
pacifying effect anymore; in addition, its substantive effect shrinks by a great deal. The 
result of Model 1 and Model 2 shows that, when looking at all levels of MIDs, the liberal 
commercial peace effect only works inter-regionally, not intra-regionally, which suggests 
that previous findings of the liberal commercial peace effect largely result from the inter-
regional effects rather than from the inter-regional ones and that the substantive effect of 
trade’s pacifying effect in reducing all levels of MIDs is over-emphasized by the liberals. 
 Model 3 and Model 4 test my argument about a correct understanding of the 
liberal commercial peace effect: Trade does not always decrease the probability of low-
level MIDs (those that do not cause fatality) due to the fact that trade is also a 
measurement of interaction density, while trade does decrease the probability of high-
level MIDs (those that caused fatality). The result of Model 3 and Model 4 show that, 
when looking at only the MIDs that caused fatality, the liberal commercial peace effect 
holds stably whether at the global level or at the regional level.  
 In Table 2.6 I test the two extended hypotheses: Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. 
Model 5 and Model 6 demonstrate that once controlling for interaction density, the liberal 
commercial peace effect is significant in reducing all levels of MIDs at both the global 
level and the regional level. Model 7 and Model 8 show that if we look at only the MIDs 
that caused fatality, the liberal commercial peace effect is significant at both the global 
level and the regional level, whether controlling for interaction density or not.  
Table 2.7 is the test of the three-way interaction because my argument expects 




Table 2.6 Liberal commercial peace, global and regional, with interaction density, 1950~2001 
 
[Dependent Variable t ]  All MID Onset  Fatal MID Onset 
  Hypothesis 3  Hypothesis 4 
  Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 
  All Dyads Intra-region Dyads  All Dyads Intra-region Dyads 
Interaction density  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
[Independent Variable 1−t ]       
Low dependence  -57.921*** -22.095  -85.100* -65.777* 
  (16.872) (12.450)  (36.101) (30.388) 
   P<0.076    
[Control Variables 1−t ]       
Low democracy  -0.083*** -0.088***  -0.092*** -0.056* 
  (0.014) (0.018)  (0.026) (0.027) 
       
Low GDP/pc  -0.338** -0.344*  -0.877*** -0.696** 
  (0.110) (0.153)  (0.160) (0.215) 
       
IGOs  0.007 -0.003  0.006 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.009) 
       
Power ratio  0.191*** 0.122  0.274*** 0.220* 
  (0.041) (0.068)  (0.068) (0.097) 
       
Alliance  0.053 -0.175  -0.011 -0.277 
  (0.143) (0.159)  (0.186) (0.205) 
       
Cold war  0.628*** 0.069  0.730*** 0.658* 
  (0.133) (0.188)  (0.221) (0.296) 
       
Contiguity  2.206*** 2.174***  3.093*** 3.054*** 
  (0.189) (0.208)  (0.319) (0.437) 
       
Distance  -0.670*** -0.350***  -0.694*** -0.444** 
  (0.093) (0.084)  (0.147) (0.143) 
       
None major power dyad  -0.413* -0.072  -0.431 0.119 
  (0.199) (0.274)  (0.370) (0.611) 
       
Country A’s capability  6.474*** 0.736  -0.249*** -0.306*** 
  (1.597) (2.319)  (0.037) (0.039) 
       
Country B’s capability  0.593 0.556  0.007*** 0.011*** 
  (2.272) (3.652)  (0.002) (0.003) 
       
Country A’s population  0.243*** 0.217***  -0.000 -0.000** 
  (0.045) (0.063)  (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Country B’s population  0.218*** 0.170*  8.871** -3.893 
  (0.049) (0.073)  (2.785) (6.587) 
       
Country A’s GDP/pc  0.207*** -0.021  -2.180 -7.698 
  (0.057) (0.090)  (4.193) (10.839) 
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Country B’s GDP/pc  0.220** 0.229**  0.201** 0.262** 
  (0.068) (0.084)  (0.073) (0.101) 
       
Country A’s polity score  0.036*** 0.044**  0.137 0.185 
  (0.009) (0.014)  (0.078) (0.097) 
       
Country B’s Polity score  0.017 0.020  0.264*** -0.173 
  (0.010) (0.016)  (0.076) (0.161) 




 -0.285*** -0.237***  0.154 0.304** 
  (0.021) (0.030)  (0.087) (0.102) 




 0.009*** 0.007***  0.050*** 0.021 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.014) (0.019) 




 -0.000*** -0.000*  0.020 0.016 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.017) (0.019) 
       
Constant  -8.111*** -6.821***  -3.515 -5.980** 
  (1.356) (1.777)  (2.036) (2.160) 
Pseudo R2  0.372 0.272  0.391 0.342 
Log Likelihood.  -6020.258 -2495.520  -2110.438 -951.620 
Chi-squared  2757.497 714.652  1734.142 552.058 
Number of clusters  13,538 1,177  13,538 1,177 
Number of observations  417,773 32,372  417,773 32,372 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 2.7 Three-way interaction of liberal commercial peace, global and regional, 1950~2001 
 
[Dependent Variables t ]  Fatal MID Onset 
  Test Hypothesis 5  Test Hypothesis 6 
  Model 9 Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
  All Dyads Intra-region Dyads  All Dyads Intra-region Dyads 
Interaction Density  No No  Yes Yes 
[Independent Variables 1−t ] 
      
Low dependence  734.302*** 427.002*  726.865*** 437.039* 
  (177.010) (181.729)  (183.555) (198.029) 
       
Low Democracy  0.043 0.006  -0.136 -0.072 
  (0.158) (0.166)  (0.148) (0.146) 
       
Low GDP/pc  -0.589*** -0.660**  -0.740*** -0.609* 
  (0.166) (0.183)  (0.174) (0.227) 
       
Low dependence  84.331*** 68.925***  81.877*** 59.752** 
×  Low democracy  (21.890) (21.266)  (23.631) (23.429) 
       
Low dependence  -114.610*** -70.813*  -110.768*** -71.491* 
×  Low GDP/pc  (27.457) (28.273)  (28.118) (30.605) 
       
Low democracy  -0.006 -0.000  0.009 0.005 
×  Low GDP/pc  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.019) (0.019) 
       
Low dependence  -12.434*** -10.080**  -11.725*** -8.881** 
×  Low democracy  (3.275) (3.108)  (3.443) (3.345) 
×  Low GDP/pc       
       
[Control Variables 1−t ] 
      
IGOs  0.027** 0.018  0.008 0.006 
  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.009) 
       
Polity difference  0.041** 0.031    
  (0.013) (0.017)    
       
Power ratio  0.228** 0.252**  0.279*** 0.220* 
  (0.070) (0.085)  (0.068) (0.096) 
       
Alliance  -0.274 -0.613**  -0.003 -0.283 
  (0.180) (0.207)  (0.183) (0.204) 
       
Cold war  0.422* 0.488*  0.756*** 0.696* 
  (0.204) (0.243)  (0.220) (0.294) 
       
Contiguity  3.396*** 3.512***  3.071*** 3.126*** 
  (0.289) (0.433)  (0.314) (0.449) 
       
Distance  -0.502*** -0.279*  -0.702*** -0.453** 
  (0.112) (0.126)  (0.147) (0.145) 
       
None major power dyad  -2.017*** -0.590  -0.606 -0.231 
  (0.275) (0.412)  (0.380) (0.625) 
       
Country A’s capability      8.332** -6.278 
     (3.040) (6.898) 
       
Country B’s capability     -2.956 -9.668 
     (4.217) (10.274) 
       
Country A’s population     0.195** 0.264* 
     (0.071) (0.103) 
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Country B’s population     0.142 0.197* 
     (0.079) (0.096) 
       
Country A’s GDP/pc     0.259*** -0.175 
     (0.077) (0.163) 
       
Country B’s GDP/pc     0.146 0.311** 
     (0.088) (0.104) 
       
Country A’s polity score     0.049*** 0.022 
     (0.014) (0.018) 
       
Country B’s polity score     0.019 0.015 
     (0.017) (0.019) 




 -0.274*** -0.319***  -0.250*** -0.304*** 
  (0.036) (0.037)  (0.037) (0.039) 




 0.009*** 0.012***  0.007*** 0.011*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) 




 -0.000* -0.000**  -0.000 -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Constant  2.728 1.170  -4.117 -6.465** 
  (1.855) (1.963)  (2.197) (2.260) 
Pseudo R2  0.376 0.331  0.394 0.344 
Log likelihood  -2162.386 -967.650  -2100.422 -947.792 
Chi-squared  1596.129 388.190  1852.416 591.801 
Number of clusters  13,538 1,177  13,538 1,177 
Number of observations  417,773 32,372  417,773 32,372 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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democracy and the degree of development. Model 9 and Model 10 test Hypothesis 5, 
where the three-way interaction term is significant in reducing the MIDs that caused 
fatality at both the global level and the regional level. That is, whether at the global level 
or at the regional level, the pacifying effect of trade is conditioned on both the degree of 
democracy and the degree of development.  
 Model 11 and Model 12 test Hypothesis 6, which states that the three-way 
interaction term is significant in reducing the MIDs that caused fatality at both the global 
level and the regional level, even though the interaction density is also taken into concern. 
That is, whether at the global level or at the regional level, the pacifying effect of trade is 
conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the degree of development, and this 
three-way conditional effect holds stably whether the interaction density is controlled for.  
The statistical test for Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 is not shown for brevity. The test 
shows that when looking at all levels of MIDs, the three-way interaction is not 
statistically significant in reducing conflict, whether at the global level or at the regional 
level. The reason is that the degree of democracy and the degree of development are also 
the measurement of the intensiveness of bilateral interaction, and so countries interact 
more frequently tend to have more low-level MIDs. This nullifies the pacifying effect of 
the three-way interaction.  
 The three-way interaction also explains for the puzzle why in some regions trade 
actually leads to conflict rather than reduce it. In all the three-way interaction models in 
Table 2.7, one of the constituent variable, Low dependence, is significant with a positive 
coefficient, which means that in dyads where the degree of democracy and development 
is not high enough, trade actually increase the probability of fatal conflict. In other words, 
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in regions where there are few democratic and rich countries, trade may lead to conflict 
rather than promote peace. Thus my theory provides a unified explanation for the 
regional contradicting variations of the liberal commercial peace effect. 
 In sum, all the hypotheses my theory proposed are well-supported by the 
empirical evidences. These results confirm my arguments that, first, looking at all kinds 
of MIDs is not a proper way to understand the liberal commercial peace effect, because 
the pacifying effect of trade works not in reducing all kinds of MIDs, but in reducing the 
MIDs that would cause fatality; and, second, the liberal commercial peace effect is 
simultaneously conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the degree of 
development, that is, higher levels of democracy and development can reinforce trade’s 
pacifying effect due to enhancing the three causal mechanisms of the liberal commercial 
peace. My argument not only explains for why there are global and regional variations of 
the liberal commercial peace effect, but also develops a unified theory, the three-way 
conditional preconditions, that bridges the global-regional discrepancies of the liberal 
commercial peace effect. 
5.2 The outcome of the control variables 
 The results of the control variables are also very informative and important to my 
theory. In Table 2.5, Table 2.6, and Table 2.7, I frame the control variables which have 
different effects on the dependent variables between the global level and the regional 
level.  
In Model 1 and Model 2 where the dependent variable is the onset of all kinds of 
MIDs, Low democracy, IGOs, and Cold war have significant influences at the global 
level, not at the regional level; instead, Low GDP/pc has significant influence at the 
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regional level, not at the global level. In other words, when considering all kinds of MIDs, 
the increase of the degree of democracy reduces the probability of conflict mainly 
between a pair of countries from different regions, not in the same region; the increase of 
development (Low GDP/pc) reduces the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of 
countries in the same region, not from different regions; the increase of IGO 
memberships increases the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of countries 
from different regions, not in the same region; and a pair of countries from different 
regions are more likely to undergo MIDs during the Cold War period, but this 
phenomenon does not exist between a pair of countries in the same region.  
In Model 3 and Model 4 where the dependent variable is the onset of fatal MIDs 
only, IGOs and None major power dyad have significant influences at the global level, 
not at the regional level; instead, Alliance has significant influence at the regional level, 
not at the global level. In other words, when considering only the fatal MIDs, the increase 
of IGO memberships increases the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of 
countries from different regions, not in the same region; a pair of countries in the same 
region who are allies are less likely to undergo MIDs, but a pair of countries from 
different regions who are allies are not; and none major power dyads from different 
regions are less likely to undergo MIDs, but none major power dyads in the same region 
are not. 
In Model 5 and Model 6 where the dependent variable is the onset of all kinds of 
MIDs and the interaction density of both sides is taken into concern, Power ratio, Cold 
war, and None major power dyad have significant influences at the global level, not at 
the regional level. In other words, when considering all kinds of MIDs, the increase of 
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power ratio increases the probability of conflict mainly between a pair of countries from 
different regions, not in the same region; a pair of countries from different regions are 
more likely to undergo MIDs during the Cold War period, but this phenomenon does not 
exist between a pair of countries in the same region; and none major power dyads from 
different regions are less likely to undergo MIDs, but none major power dyads in the 
same region are not. However, in Model 7 and Model 8 where the dependent variable is 
the onset of fatal MIDs only and the interaction density of both sides is taken into 
concern, this global-regional discrepancies disappear. Compared to Model 3 and Model 4 
where the dependent variable is also fatal MID onset but not controlling for the 
interaction density of both sides, the global-regional consistency of Model 7 and Model 8 
implies that the global-regional discrepancies should result from different interaction 
density, so once controlled for it the discrepancies no longer exist.  
In Model 9 and Model 10 where the dependent variable is fatal MID onset, the 
independent variable is the three-way interaction, and the interaction density is not 
controlled, IGOs and None major power dyad have significant influences at the global 
level, not at the regional level; instead, Alliance has significant influence at the regional 
level, not at the global level. The outcome of Model 9 and Model 10 is very similar to 
Model 3 and 4. The only difference between “Model 3 – Model 4” and “Model 9 – Model 
10” is the independent variable (Low dependence vs. the three-way interaction). Again, 
in Model 11 and Model 12 where the dependent variable is fatal MID onset, the 
independent variable is the three-way interaction, and the interaction density is controlled, 
this global-regional discrepancies disappear. The outcomes of Model 11 and Model 12 
are very similar to Model 7 and Model 8. The only difference between “Model 7 – Model 
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8” and “Model 11 – Model 12” is the independent variable (Low dependence vs. the 
three-way interaction). Notice that in Table 2.7 the coefficients of the three-way 
interaction hold stably at both the global level (-12.434 vs. -11.725) and the regional level 
(-10.080 vs. -8.881) whether the interaction density of both sides is controlled for or not. 
Compared to the very unstable result of the Low dependence independent variable 
before and after controlling for the interaction density (-98.459 vs. -85.100; -77.029 vs. -
65.777), this implies that the three-way interaction is a more proper way to model the 
liberal commercial peace effect despite different levels of analysis.  
In sum, many of the control variables have different effects between the global 
level and the regional level, and once the interaction density is controlled for, this global-
regional difference no longer exists. The results here confirms the methodological 
necessity of the regional level of analysis that when testing general theories of 
international relations, we should test it not only at the global level but also at the 
regional level. 
5.3 Substantive effects 
 To further interpret the substantive effect of the three-way interaction, in Figure 
2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4 I plot the predicted probability of fatal MID onset based 
on the estimation of Model 11 in Table 2.7, according to the change of Low dependence, 
Low democracy, and Low GDP/pc, respectively, holding all other variables constant.16  
In each plot, I look at how the probability of fatal MID changes with the predictor under 
16 I plot all the figures according to the method suggested by Dawson and Richter (2006) and Dawson 
(2014). I first standardize all the independent variables and control variables, and re-run Model 11 to get 
new coefficients. Then, I plot the figures according to the new coefficients. Therefore, the variation of the 
predictor of each plot refers to the variation of each independent variable after it has been standardized.  
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four different conditions: when both the other two moderators are at their high level, 
when both of them are at their low level, when one of them is at its high level and the 
other is at its low level, and when one of them is at its low level and the other is at its 
high level. Low level or high level of each moderator is determined by their 1st or the 
99th percentile of all the observations.17 
 Figure 2.2 shows how the degree of democracy and the degree of development 
condition trade’s pacifying effect. For simplicity, I denote the four situations as poor 
autocracies, rich autocracies, poor democracies, and rich democracies. As we can see in 
Figure 2.2, at the regional level, poor countries are more likely to have conflict than rich 
countries. In poor autocracies, the probability of conflict decrease with the increase of the 
degree of dependence; however, in poor democracies, the probability of conflict increases 
with the increase of the degree of dependence. In rich countries, the pacifying effect of 
trade is not as salient as in rich countries. In total, Figure 2.2 confirms my argument that 
the pacifying effect of trade is conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the 
degree of development.  
 Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 demonstrate the three-way interaction based on the 
point of view from democracy and from development, holding the degree of dependence 
constant at its low and the high values.  
17 Although Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012) suggest that theories with interaction terms should be tested 
with all the combinations of the lowest and highest values of all the variables, I do not demonstrate the 
results when Low dependence, Low democracy, and Low GDP/pc are at their extreme values at both 
ends, respectively. Instead, I present the results when these variables are very low and very high (at the 1st 
and the 99th percentiles). This is because the real world data of these three variables have extreme outlier 
values at both ends. Therefore, adopting the values of the 1st and the 99th percentiles will be a more proper 
way to show the relative low and high values of these variables rather than adopting their lowest and 
highest values.   
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Figure 2.3 shows how the degree of dependence and the degree of development 
condition democracy’s pacifying effect. For simplicity, I denote the four situations as 
poor and highly-dependent countries, poor and low-dependent countries, rich and highly-
dependent countries, and rich and low-dependent countries. As we can see in Figure 2.3, 
at the regional level, poor countries are more likely to have conflict than rich countries. 
Counter-intuitively, the increase of the degree of democracy does not have salient 
influence on the probability of conflict in three of the four situation; and, in poor and 
highly-dependent countries, the increase of the degree of democracy actually increase the 
probability of conflict. Put differently, the pacifying effect of trade in poor and highly-
dependent countries with increased degree of democracy is not evident as the liberal 
commercial peace studies may contend.  
 Figure 2.4 shows how the degree of dependence and the degree of democracy 
condition development’s pacifying effect. For simplicity, I denote the four situations as 
low-dependent democracies, low-dependent autocracies, highly-dependent autocracies, 
and highly-dependent democracies. As we can see in Figure 2.4, at the regional level, the 
pacifying effect of development is remarkably stable under all of these four different 
situations. That is, the increase of GDP per capita will consistently decrease the 
probability of fatal MID despite the degree of dependence and the degree of democracy.  
Comparing the results of Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4, we can find 
several patterns of trade’s pacifying effect. First, trade’s pacifying effect is, exactly as my 
theory predicts, a conditional one. In rich democracies and poor autocracies, trade 
reduces the probability of conflict. However, in poor democracies, trade increases the 
probability of conflict; and in rich democracies, the relationship between trade and 
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conflict is not very clear. These contradicting facts explain why the relationship between 
trade and conflict has been a debatable issue for a long time: Because the pacifying effect 
of trade alone is not strong enough compared to other liberal factors, and because the 
pacifying effect of trade is further conditioned on other liberal factors, the pacifying 
effect of trade is very sensitive to model specification, time, space, and the level of 
analysis (global or regional). Therefore, as a consequence, it is very difficult for scholars 
to reach a consensus when it comes to trade’s pacifying effect. Second, at odds with the 
literature which argues that trade’s pacifying effect is augmented by the increase of the 
degree of democracy, my findings demonstrate that this pacifying effect is actually more 
complicated. For example, while Gelpi and Grieco (2003; 2008) find that trade constrains 
the conflict behavior of democratic leaders but not autocratic leaders, I find that trade 
does not constrain the conflict behavior of leaders in poor democracies and rich 
autocracies. I find that there is no literature to account for these anomalies (trade leads to 
conflict in poor democracies and barely has effect on peace or conflict in rich autocracies) 
except for my theory. This suggests that when it comes to leaders’ conflict behavior in 
different political regimes, looking at the domestic institutional constraints and audience 
costs on political leaders18  is not enough, if the country’s degree of development is not 
taken into consideration. Third, in accordance with the capitalist peace theories, the 
pacifying effect of development is the most strong and stable compared to democracy and 
dependence. This explains why many scholars argue that it is development rather than 
democracy or dependence that contributes to peace. More discussion about the 
18 Such as Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Fearon (1994, 1995), Werner (1996), Smith (1996; 1998), Schultz 
(1999, 2001), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Slantchev (2006), and Weeks (2008, 2012). 
68 
                                                          
 
relationship between the capitalist peace theories and my theory will be addressed in the 
next section. 
5.4 Robustness checks 
 I also conduct several sensitivity checks to see whether the result of my model 
hold stably. These include the check for multicollinearity of the independent variables, 
the use of different conceptualization of regions (including the COW regions and the 
Buzan and Wæver’s (2003) regions), looking at politically relevant dyads (Lemke & 
Reed, 2001) and politically active dyads (Quackenbush, 2006) at the global level, 
controlling for countries’ interest similarity by including their United Nations General 
Assembly Voting patterns (Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013), and use international crisis 
behavior (Hewitt, 2003) as the alternative dependent variable for international conflict. 
The results are not shown for brevity. All the robustness checks demonstrate that the 
outcome of my models are not sensitive to various checks.  
6 Conclusion and Discussion 
 By looking at only the militarized interstate disputes that caused fatality and by 
applying the unified framework of the three-way interaction, my argument bridges the 
global-regional gap of the liberal commercial peace effect, that is, it accounts for the 
regional variations of trade’s pacifying effect. The key is that the pacifying effect of trade 
is conditioned on both the degree of democracy and the degree of development, because 
these two factors can simultaneously strengthen the three causal mechanisms that link 
trade to the reduction of militarized conflict. Therefore, the pacifying effect of trade 
varies across regions because countries’ degrees of democracy and development tend to 
be similar within-regionally and different between-regionally.  
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 Aside from proposing a unified theory of the liberal commercial peace effect, my 
argument may also shed light on the debate between the democratic peace theories and 
the capitalist peace theories (Schneider, 2014). The capitalist peace theories point out 
four theories to claim that it is the capitalist’s concerns rather than the democratic effects 
that lead to peace (Mousseau, 2010): peace through trade and free markets (Weede, 1996); 
(McDonald, 2004), peace through market-intensive economy (Mousseau, 2000, 2002, 
2003; Mousseau et al., 2003; Mousseau, 2009, 2013), peace through financial openness 
(Gartzke et al., 2001; Gartzke, 2007), and peace through the limited proportion of 
governments’ nontax revenue (McDonald, 2007, 2009); however, proponents of the 
democratic peace theories contend that the democratic peace theories have more solid 
micro-foundation causal mechanisms to link democracy to peace (Schneider & Gleditsch, 
2010; Choi, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2012; Chan, 2012). One of the reasons 
why so far the debate has not yet been solved (Gartzke & Weisiger, 2013; Mousseau, 
2013; Ray, 2013; Dafoe, Oneal, & Russett, 2013) is that, empirically, the factors of 
capitalist peace and democratic peace, such as free market, capital openness, economic 
growth, and even shared ideology, have similar origins and form a mutually reinforcing 
virtuous circle so that it is very difficult to sort out what belongs to the capitalist peace 
and what belongs to the democratic peace (Russett, 2010; Schneider & Gleditsch, 
2010).19  The three-way interaction of my theory – interdependence, democracy, and 
development, further confirms that the democratic peace effect and the capitalist peace 
effect are very likely to be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. Put 
19 Although Russett (2010) has correctly pointed out that the democratic peace effects work only dyadically, 
not monadically, and so Weede (2010) thinks that it is safer for the Western countries to promote peace 
through establishing economic interdependence rather than through forcing democratization in 
nondemocratic countries. 
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differently, not only the capitalist peace effect is stronger in more democratic dyads, but 
also the democratic peace effect is stronger in more developed dyads. Therefore, the 
capitalist peace and the democratic peace are not theories that may replace each other, but 
those that are mutually re-confirming to each other.  
 Given this unified framework (the three-way interaction) of the liberal 
commercial peace effect, one of the future research agendas based on my theory is to find 
out how my theory can discuss with other theories that specify the preconditions about 
how trade leads to peace or conflict. For example, previous studies on the trade-conflict 
relationship demonstrate that the preconditions include expectations of future trade 
(Copeland, 1996), what states trade (Gasiorowski, 1986; Dorussen, 2006), the difference 
between intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade (Peterson & Thies, 2012), different 
degree of “exit cost” of both sides in a dyad (Crescenzi, 2003, 2005; Peterson, 2011), 
how free the bilateral trade is (McDonald, 2004), and whether both sides have signed 
preferential trade agreements (Blanchard, Mansfield, & Ripsman, 1999; Mansfield & 
Pevehouse, 2000, 2003; Mansfield, 2003; Bearce, 2003). Given the fact that previous 
literature has demonstrated that democracies and developed countries trade more, trade 
more diversified goods, have more trade partners (and so lower exit cost), enjoy more 
free trade relations with each other, and participate in more regional and global trade 
organizations and preferential trade agreements (and so having a more positive attitude 
toward future trade) (Alt & Gilligan, 1994; Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, & Rogowski, 
1996; Keohane & Milner, 1996; Milner, 1997; Mansfield, 1998; Milner, 1999; Mansfield, 
Milner, & Rosendorff, 2000, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Milner & Kubota, 
2005; Mansfield & Solingen, 2010; Mansfield & Milner, 2012), all these preconditions 
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may be part of the intervening variables of the degree of democracy and degree of 
development.20  Thus, compared to these many preconditions proposed by previous 
literature, my theory offers a more parsimonious, consistent, and overarching framework 
to account for the variations of the liberal commercial peace effect around the world. The 















20 Although all the mechanisms can be a reversed and reciprocal one, such as that participating in trade and 
international cooperation can further promote democratization and development (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 
1997; Li & Reuveny, 2003; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006, 2008), the substantive causal effect of 
democracy and development on all these causal mechanisms should be stronger than vice versa given there 
is huge amount of literature on the former. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ASEAN and Southeast Asian Peace: National Building, Economic 
Performance, and ASEAN’s Security Management 
1 Introduction 
East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have enjoyed peaceful international 
relations for decades, especially after 1979. Although there has been some turmoil, intra- 
and interstate wars during the 1960s and 1970s, there is an academic consensus that East 
Asia and Southeast Asia generally have become a very peaceful region since the end of 
the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, in terms of the lack of interstate violence and the 
exceptionally low levels of battle deaths (Leifer, 1989; Tønnesson, 2009; Kivimäki, 2011; 
Goldsmith, 2014). However, even though scholars have consensus to East Asian and 
Southeast Asian peace, what contributes to the peaceful situation remains a puzzle 
because the main theories of international relations have different explanations to account 
for it, while all of them confront with limitations (Solingen, 2007; Tønnesson 2009).  
Specifically for Southeast Asia, the literature provides at least three competing 
perspectives to explain how the peaceful situation could be achieved. First, the liberal 
peace theory emphasizes the pacifying effects of democracy, interdependence, and 
intergovernmental-organizations, the so-called Kantian peace (Oneal & Russett, 1999, 
2001; Goldsmith, 2007). Second, the constructivist theory of peace underlines the 
successful security management of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
due to the mutually-reinforced effects between commonly shared identity, interests, 
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values, and norms that form a well-functioned security community through a process of 
social construction (Acharya, 2001, 2004; Kivimäki, 2001; Ba, 2009). Third, Southeast 
Asian peace may result from the countries that adopt a capitalist development strategy. In 
his article which aims to refute the previous two perspectives, Tang (2012) argues that 
Southeast Asian peace should be understood as a capitalist trajectory. Because of 
Southeast Asian countries’ common interests and preferences of adopting economic 
liberalization policy for economic development exert a strong conflict-constraining effect. 
In his non-directed dyad-year analysis from 1950 to 2001, he uses a dummy variable 
(JntELP) denoting whether both countries in the dyad-year t  jointly adopt economic 
liberalization policy as his independent variable,21  and this independent variable (JntELP) 
is negative with the probability of militarized interstate conflict (MID) and highly 
significant across various models and robustness checks. As Tang (2012) had 
demonstrated, there are few democratic dyads in the region, there is a low degree of 
interdependence between those countries, and interstate conflict does happen between the 
ASEAN members, Southeast Asian stability may be maintained neither by the liberal 
peace components nor by the ASEAN security management, but by the capitalist concern 
as Tang’s argument.  
However, even Southeast Asian peace is not caused by either the liberal peace 
components or the ASEAN security management, whether it is achieved by a capitalist 
21 Tang (2012) adopts Sachs and Warner’s (1995) binary category to define whether both states in a dyad-
year t  are jointly open trade regime, coded as 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. According to Sachs and Warner 
(1995), a country is coded as a closed trade regime if any one of the following criteria is true: non-tariff 
barriers cover 40% or more of trade, average tariff rates are 40% or more, the black market exchange rate 
depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official exchange rate during the 1970s or 1980s, a socialist 
economy is in place, or a state monopoly on exports exists. The Sachs and Warner data spans from 1950 to 
1992, and it is lately expanded by Wacziarg and Welch (2008) through 1999. 
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trajectory does not go without question. After a scrutinization of the Southeast Asia states 
who adopted economic liberalization, I find two problems that cast Tang’s argument in 
doubt. First, observations of JntELP dyads are few. Second, most of the JntELP dyads 
are those that never have any conflict record before they become JntELP; and among the 
JntELP dyads who have experienced conflict before they adopt economic liberalization 
policy, they had resolved the conflict before they switched to economic liberalization 
policy. Therefore, I posit that Southeast Asian peace may not be maintained by this 
capitalist trajectory. Instead, according to the suggestion of previous research and 
empirical evidences, I argue that the ASEAN security management has its contribution to 
the Southeast Asian peace, but its ability of conflict-constraining in the region is 
conditioned by the economic performance of Southeast Asia states. Unlike the European 
countries, most of Southeast Asian countries were colonies of European countries which 
suffered from low level of development and the lack of national autonomy before the end 
of World War II. Given such a background, when they were independent after World 
War II, national building and economic development became the most important goals of 
those countries. Besides, as newly-independent national states where the political elites of 
various standpoints are still struggling under their unstable political regimes, leaders and 
their ruling coalitions must strive to fulfill these goals to keep incumbent. This is also the 
reason that these countries want to form and join ASEAN, to achieve these two goals 
through international cooperation with their regional partners with similar backgrounds. 
When the leaders are able to provide economic growth under the ASEAN cooperation 
and security management, they do not have to consolidate their ruling legitimacy through 
emphasizing national building issues such as old grudges and territorial disputes with 
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each other. However, if the leaders are not able to maintain economic performance, they 
not only lose their confidence in ASEAN but also face the pressure to result to national 
building issues in order to keep their ruling legitimacy, which compromises ASEAN’s 
ability of security management and so increase the probability of conflict. These 
entangled economic development and national building issues are leaders’ most 
important concern for political survival, which distinguish Southeast Asia from the other 
regions in the world, and we cannot know the whole picture of Southeast Asia if failure to 
take this regional characteristic into concern. 
 I proceed this argument as following. In the next section I re-appraise Tang’s 
(2012) argument by investigating the Southeast Asian countries who adopt economic 
liberalization policy, showing that Southeast Asian peace may not be well-explained by 
the capitalist trajectory. Then, I present my argument that the security management of 
ASEAN does play an important role in the maintenance of Southeast Asian peace, 
however, ASEAN’s influence on conflict-constraining in the region is conditioned on the 
economic performance of Southeast Asian states. Next, I explain my research design and 
present the statistical results using data from 1950 to 2001 of all the 11 Southeast Asian 
countries22  along with the substantive effects and various sensitivity checks. In the last 
section I summarize this article and discuss my finding with previous literature as a 
concluding remark.  
22 The 11 Southeast Asian countries in my sample from 1950 to 2001 include Brunei (1984~), Cambodia 
(1953~), Indonesia, Laos (1953~), Malaysia (1957~), Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore (1965~), 
Thailand, North Vietnam (1954~), and South Vietnam (1954~1975), and all of them became ASEAN 
members by 1999 when Cambodia finally got the admission. 
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2 Explaining Southeast Asian peace 
2.1 The capitalist trajectory revisited 
After investigating into the 11 Southeast Asian countries, Tang (2012) argues that 
neither the constructivist theory of peace which emphasizes the security management of 
ASEAN nor the liberal peace theory, which underlines the pacifying effects of democracy 
and economic dependence, can well account for the Southeast Asian peace. Instead, he 
argues, it is those states’ “motivations and preferences to promote national economic 
development on the liberal capitalist trajectory” (Tang, 2012, p. 390) that has a 
significant influence on the formation of Southeast Asian peace, because those Southeast 
Asian leaders’ “failure of promoting national wealth may jeopardize their ruling 
foundation” (Tang, 2012, p. 390). The reason, Tang claims, is that because these 
Southeast Asian leaders’ domestic ruling coalition “prefers the liberal capitalist approach 
of economic development,” and because “the success of the liberal capitalist development 
approach hinges on a stable, open, and adaptable economic environment and market” 
(Tang, 2012, p. 390). Therefore, these leaders will be less likely to act belligerently since 
doing so hurts this capitalist development strategy.  
 To access his argument, Tang first uses empirical evidences to demonstrate that 
the Southeast Asian peace from 1950 to 2000 may not be well explained by democracy, 
economic interdependence, and ASEAN, because in Southeast Asia, democratic dyads 
are very few (only 44 of the total 1,998 non-directed dyad-years, as shown in his Figure 
1), economic interdependence is generally very low (as shown in his Figure 2), and there 
are still 11 of the total 85 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that occurred between 
joint ASEAN dyads (as shown in his Figure 3). These empirical evidences are the starting 
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point that Tang thinks that there may be another factor that promotes Southeast Asian 
peace. 
 However, after scrutinizing the empirical evidences about Tang’s argument,23  I 
find two problems that may compromise the validity of his argument, that is, whether 
Southeast Asian peace is formed by a capitalist trajectory should be put into doubt. The 
first problem is that, observations of JntELP dyads are rather few. Among the total 1,998 
dyad-year observations in the sample, only 258 of them are JntELP dyads (less than 13%). 
In his article, Tang (2012) claims that “such low frequency of democratic dyads gives rise 
to a suspect about the implication of democratic peace in Southeast Asia” (Tang, 2012, p. 
392). By the same logic, we should suspect about the implication of capitalist peace in the 
region as well. Therefore, although JntELP may have a very strong pacifying effect, it 
may not be the main reason that maintains the regional peace.  
The second problem is about whether adopting economic liberalization policy 
does make the country more reluctant to use force as the capitalist peace theory claims. I 
review this effect by tabulating the dyadic and the monadic MID records before and after 
both countries or one of the country adopted economic liberalization policy. Table 3.1 
presents the dyadic result. As we can see in Table 3.1, among the total 55 dyad 
combinations in Southeast Asia, only 10 of them are JntELP dyads. Besides, among the 
10 JntELP dyads, only 2 of them, “Malaysia – the Philippines” and “Malaysia – 
Indonesia,” had experienced MID before they both adopted economic liberalization 
policy, and the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia had been solved long before 
they became a JntELP dyad. As a result, among the whole sample there is only 1  
23 I replicated Tang’s (2012) data in the same way according to his description. 
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Table 3.1 MID onset between JntELP countries before and after JntELP, 1950~2001 
 




Number of MID occurred 
before becoming JntELP (Year of 
MID) 
Number of MID 
occurred  
after JntELP (Year 
of MID) 
Thailand – Malaysia 1963 0 0 
Thailand – Singapore 1965 0 0 
Thailand – Philippines 1989 0 0 
Thailand – Indonesia 1971 0 0 
Malaysia – Singapore 1965 0 1 (1992) 
Malaysia – Philippines 1989 5 (1968, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1988) 0 
Malaysia – Indonesia 1971 3 (1963,1964, 1965) 0 
Singapore – Philippines 1989 0 0 
Singapore – Indonesia 1971 0 0 





dyad-year that had MID after they became JntELP, Malaysia and Singapore. Therefore 
Tang’s independent variable JntELP will be statistically significant for sure under any 
sensitivity check since there is only 1 MID among the total 258 JntELP dyads. Put 
differently, when most of the JntELP dyads are those who had never had any MID before 
or had resolved the conflict issue before they became JntELP, the pacifying effect of the 
capitalist peace factor may be over-emphasized.  
According to Tang’s (2012) argument, Southeast Asia states that adopt economic 
liberalization policy are less likely to act belligerently in foreign policies because “the 
success of the liberal capitalist development approach hinges on a stable, open, and 
adaptable economic environment and market” (Tang, 2012, p. 390). In other words, the 
pacifying effect of the capitalist approach should be not only a dyadic phenomenon but 
also a monadic one. Table 3.2 presents the monadic analysis, comparing the frequency of 
MID before and after the countries’ adoption economic liberalization policy. Among all 
of the 5 countries who adopted economic liberalization policy in the 52-year sample 
space, only the Philippines experienced more total MIDs and had a higher probability of 
experiencing a MID prior to liberalization. All the other 4 countries actually are more 
likely to experience MID after market opening. In sum, both the dyadic and monadic 
analyses of MID record suggest that the capitalist trajectory may be misleading.24  
By re-investigating Tang’s (2012) empirical evidences, I find that Southeast Asian 
peace may not follow a capitalist trajectory as Tang claims. JntELP dyads are few in the 
24 There might be a strategic effect in the monadic level of analysis that other states may be more likely to 
provoke conflict against the countries adopting economic liberalization policy since the former knows that 
the latter does not want conflict and thus is more likely to make a concession. This strategic effect in the 
monadic level further puts Tang’s argument into doubt that Southeast Asian peace is made of a capitalist 
trajectory. 
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Table 3.2 Monadic MID onset analysis of countries who adopt economic liberalization policy, 1950~2001 
 
Country Total number of 
MID occurred 
Year of adopting economic 
liberalization policy 
Number of MID occurred before/after 
adopting economic liberalization policy 
(MID per year, before/after) 
Indonesia 4 1971 1/3 (0.045/0.097)  
Malaysia 10 1963 0/10 (0.000/0.256)  
Philippines 9 1989 7/2 (0.175/0.154)  
Singapore 1 1965 0/1 (0.000/0.027)  
Thailand 51 1950 0/51 (0.000/0.981)  
Note: Among the total 11 Southeast Asian countries, 6 countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
North Vietnam, and South Vietnam) never adopt economic liberalization policy during the sample period 





region. Most of the JntELP dyads are those that had never had any conflict record before 
they become JntELP, and among the JntELP dyads who had experienced conflict before 
they became JntELP, they had reached stable resolution before they became JntELP. 
Therefore, I posit that there must be other factors that contribute to Southeast Asian peace. 
As Tang (2012) had demonstrated, democratic dyads are few in the region and 
interdependence between Southeast Asian countries is generally at a very low degree. 
Given the liberal peace factors are less likely the answer to Southeast Asian peace, and 
many scholars have emphasized the contribution of ASEAN security management, I posit 
that the answer to Southeast Asian peace should lie on a re-appraisement of ASEAN’s 
role in the region, especially on how to explain the variation of ASEAN’s effectiveness in 
security management. In the next section, I will review the debate about ASEAN and 
construct a theory to bridge the different views about the ASEAN’s ability of security 
management in the region.  
2.2 The debate about ASEAN 
When it comes to Southeast Asian peace, literature leads us to the debate of 
whether ASEAN’s security management exerts a meaningful pacifying effect. Opponents 
criticize its inability and weak institutionalization, while upholders emphasize its 
importance of socialization that creates “the ASEAN way” of conflict resolution. Both of 
them can find empirical evidences to support their contradictory perspectives: while 
scholars find that ASEAN did constrain conflict in the region in terms of frequency of 
conflicts, number of battle deaths, and conflict termination (Kivimäki, 2011), others 
demonstrate that failed coordination and militarized conflict did happen between ASEAN 
members (Leifer, 1989; Khong, 1997; Acharya, 1998, 2001), and that ASEAN did not 
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have a statistically significant pacifying effect, at least in the dyadic level of analysis 
(Tang, 2012). These two contradictory perspectives suggest that ASEAN sometimes 
works well but sometimes does not, and that a correct understanding about ASEAN 
should not be arguing whether it works to stabilize the region, but finding out what are 
the preconditions that mediate its effectiveness in interstate-coordinating and conflict-
constraining. Therefore, to explain Southeast Asian peace, it is crucial to figure out what 
enables and disables ASEAN in collective security management. 
As an international regime, different perspectives of international relations 
theories have different explanations about the evolution and decline of ASEAN. Realists 
hold the perspective that the predominance of individual foreign policies has 
compromised the collective actions of ASEAN since the very beginning (Rüland, 2000; 
Jones & Smith, 2007). However, this realists’ perspective does not explain why 
sometimes individual countries are prone to act collectively but sometimes less so, 
especially when there are no clear relative power dynamics in the region (Gilpin, 1981). 
The liberals who start from a functional approach may predict that, as an international 
regime, in ASEAN, cooperation and institutionalization will deepen and legalization and 
contractualization will increase as time goes by (Mitrany, 1948; Keohane, 1984); those 
who are based on the pluralistic domestic approach may content that it depends on the 
attitude of domestic coalitions of each member state (Solingen, 2008). Still we need a 
theory to explain why this “deepening” effect does not embody in ASEAN like its 




The constructivists’ explanation about the role of ASEAN is the most accepted 
view, which distinguishes the uniqueness of the “ideational” Asia from the “material” 
Western world (Acharya, 2001; Khoo 2004; Tan 2006; Kivimäki 2008; Stubbs 2008; 
Narine 2008; Johnston, 2012; Kohno, 2014). Through the emphasis on the social 
construction for consensus among common interests, values, and norms, ASEAN 
maintains the regional peace by constructing a “security community” (Deutsch, 1961; 
Adler & Barnett, 1998) which promotes peace through socialization instead of sanction or 
coerce. Since a security community is built on the process of socialization, “[w]hether 
any specific security community will continue to function in the long run will depend on 
the ability of its facilities for peaceful adjustment to keep ahead of the strains and burdens 
which any growth of social transaction may throw upon them” (Deutsch 1961: 103). 
These “strains and burdens” could result from internal and external, such as the failure of 
consensus building or the adding of new unsocialized actors and the consequent new 
material burdens. However, this constructivist approach does not go without challenge. 
What determines the success or failure of internal consensus building and whether the 
adding of new actors will compromise the original consensus remain a question the 
constructivists have not well answered. For example, the security community argument 
does not give us clear and consistent answers about the questions of ASEAN: why the old 
ASEAN member the Philippines and Thailand have more battle deaths after they joined 
ASEAN while all the other Southeast Asian countries have largely reduced them 
(Kivimäki, 2011); why Indonesia and the Philippines had experienced more conflicts 
after they joined ASEAN (Kivimäki 2011, 75); why MID, especially the fatal ones, did 
happen between joint ASEAN countries (Tang 2012, 395); why after 1996 the ASEAN 
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principle of non-interference in domestic affairs was not as clear as before (Kivimäki, 
2001); why the mechanisms of peace that have existed after the founding of ASEAN are 
in a process of erosion while there is no direct threat to peace in the region (Kivimäki, 
2001); and why the 1997 financial crisis largely compromised the leadership of ASEAN. 
Answering these questions by the failure of internal consensus building seems ad hoc, 
and explaining them by the adding of new unsocialized members is not able to account 
for the variation after each wave of ASEAN expansion. For these reasons, I argue that the 
constructivist’s perspective about the ASEAN security community is not sufficient to 
explain the variation of the effectiveness of the ASEAN security management, and that 
its effectiveness should be a conditional one depending on other preconditions.  
What is the most important precondition that mediates ASEAN’s ability of 
security management in the region? In this article I argue that ASEAN’s conflict-
constraining ability is conditioned on Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance. 
Since Southeast Asian countries were independent from their colonizers after the end of 
World War II, due to their special historical and socioeconomic background, national 
building and economic growth have been the most important goals of the leaders and 
their ruling coalitions. When leaders in Southeast Asian countries are able to maintain 
good economic performance, they thus have enough legitimacy for their political survival. 
However, if they are not able to keep economic growth, they are forced to pursue national 
building issues such as claiming ownership of disputed territory with neighboring 
countries or emphasizing on the priority of their own ethnic groups, and so compromising 
ASEAN’s ability of consensus building and increasing the probability of conflict. The 
importance of pursuing national building and economic growth distinguishes Southeast 
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Asian countries from all the other countries or regions in the world because of their 
unique historical and socioeconomic background. I content that to get a whole picture of 
ASEAN’s role in the region we must take this special background into concern. 
Why are national building and economic performance the most important concern 
of leaders in Southeast Asian countries but not in the others? Taking a look at their initial 
situation at the moment of independence after the end of World War II is informative. 
Table 3.3 summarizes this initial condition of Southeast Asian countries at the moment of 
their independence. There are four unique preconditions that explain why national 
building and economic performance are the most important goals of Southeast Asian 
countries: their experience of being colonized, their variety of domestic ethnic groups, 
their thirst of emerging from poverty, and their disputed territorial issues due to fractured 
geography. When these countries become independent after World War II, these four 
preconditions create domestic coalitions focusing on national building issues and 
requiring for economic performance. Thus Southeast Asian leaders must fulfill these 
goals for their own political survival.  
Different from the other regions in the world, all the Southeast Asian countries are 
colonized by the European countries. The only exception is Thailand. However, although 
nominally Thailand is an independent country, actually as an artificial buffer zone it is 
under control by Britain (in India) and France (in Indochina). Long being colonized by 
the Western countries and then occupied by Japan during World War II, people in 
Southeast Asian countries have been treated unequally across different ethnic groups, 




Table 3.3 Background of Southeast Asian countries in their early years after independence 











Brunei Yes, by Britain and Japan 
Malay 65.7%, Chinese 10.3%, other indigenous 
3.4%, other 20.6% (in 2011) 
Muslim (official) 78.8%, Christian 
8.7%, Buddhist 7.8%, other (includes 








Cambodia Yes, by France and Japan 
Khmer 90%, Vietnamese 5%, Chinese 1%, other 
4% 
Buddhist (official) 96.9%, Muslim 













Javanese 40.1%, Sundanese 15.5%, Malay 3.7%, 
Batak 3.6%, Madurese 3%, Betawi 2.9%, 
Minangkabau 2.7%, Buginese 2.7%, Bantenese 2%, 
Banjarese 1.7%, Balinese 1.7%, Acehnese 1.4%, 
Dayak 1.4%, Sasak 1.3%, Chinese 1.2%, other 15% 
(in 2010) 
Muslim 87.2%, Christian 7%, Roman 
Catholic 2.9%, Hindu 1.7%, other 0.9% 
(includes Buddhist and Confucian), 








Laos Yes, by France and Japan 
Lao 55%, Khmou 11%, Hmong 8%, other (over 100 
minor ethnic groups) 26% (in 2005) 
Buddhist 67%, Christian 1.5%, other 






Malaysia Yes, by Portugal, Britain, and Japan 
Malay 50.1%, Chinese 22.6%, indigenous 11.8%, 
Indian 6.7%, other 0.7%, non-citizens 8.2% (in 
2010) 
Muslim (official) 61.3%, Buddhist 
19.8%, Christian 9.2%, Hindu 6.3%, 
Confucianism, Taoism, other traditional 
Chinese religions 1.3%, other 0.4%, 










Myanmar Yes, by Britain and Japan 
Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, 
Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, other 5% 
Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (Baptist 
3%, Roman Catholic 1%), Muslim 4%, 








Yes, by Spain, the 
United States, and 
Japan 
Tagalog 28.1%, Cebuano 13.1%, Ilocano 9%, 
Bisaya/Binisaya 7.6%, Hiligaynon Ilonggo 7.5%, 
Bikol 6%, Waray 3.4%, other 25.3% (in 2000) 
Catholic 82.9% (Roman Catholic 
80.9%, Aglipayan 2%), Muslim 5%, 
Evangelical 2.8%, Iglesia ni Kristo 
2.3%, other Christian 4.5%, other 1.8%, 












Singapore Yes, by Britain and Japan 
Chinese 74.2%, Malay 13.3%, Indian 9.2%, other 
3.3% (in 2013) 
Buddhist 33.9%, Muslim 14.3%, Taoist 
11.3%, Catholic 7.1%, Hindu 5.2%, 
other Christian 11%, other 0.7%, none 








No, but controlled 
by Britain, France, 
and Japan 
Thai 95.9%, Burmese 2%, other 1.3%, unspecified 
0.9% (in 2010) 
Buddhist (official) 93.6%, Muslim 
4.9%, Christian 1.2%, other 0.2%, none 











Yes, by France 
and Japan 
Kinh (Viet) 85.7%, Tay 1.9%, Thai 1.8%, Muong 
1.5%, Khmer 1.5%, Mong 1.2%, Nung 1.1%, others 
5.3% (in 1999) 
Buddhist 9.3%, Catholic 6.7%, Hoa Hao 
1.5%, Cao Dai 1.1%, Protestant 0.5%, 











Yes, by France 






Note: GDP per capita is the real GDP per capita in 1996 US dollar value, data from Gleditsch (2002). As a comparison, GDP per capita of the United 
States in 1950 is 10,703, and 33,293 in 2000. Data of ethnic groups in each Southeast Asian country is from The World Factbook of the CIA 
website: https://www.cia.gov/index.html. Data of territorial disputes is from Amer (1998).
 
 
of domestic ethnic groups divided by different religions further complicated their national 
identity building. The Western colonizers and Japan selected certain ethnic groups and 
made them leaders of their puppet regimes in order to facilitate their ruling in these 
countries, which further exacerbated the animosity between the ruling ethnic groups and 
the ruled ones. Besides, the ruling ethnic groups also took advantage of their power to 
expropriate the wealth of the ruled, making the societies more unequal and stratified. As 
we can see in Table 3.3, in the 1950s when they became independent, most of them had a 
yearly GDP per capita less than 2,000 USD (in 1996 value) while the United States had 
more than 10,000 at that time, let alone the wealth is highly concentrated on the ruling 
groups. As a consequence, at the moment of their independence from the Western and 
Japanese colonizers, Southeast Asian countries faced extreme difficulty in national 
building and badly needed to get out of poverty.  
Given these preconditions, for Southeast Asia leaders, the best way to stabilize 
their ruling foundation is by making progress of economic growth. Only by doing so can 
the leaders improve the faith of various domestic groups in their undemocratic political 
regimes. When they are not able to do so, their ruling legitimacy will soon be in danger. 
A good example is that the 1997 financial crisis made many long-lasting nondemocratic 
governments in Southeast Asia become overturned or under reform. In Thailand, the 
united government was replaced by the Democratic Party and a new constitution was 
passed in the same year; in Indonesia, the 32-year long Suharto government was 
overturned after the event of May 1998 Riots, in which more than one thousands of 
Chinese Indonesians were killed; in Malaysia, the 17-year long Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad had to start a power struggle against his Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
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of Finance Anwar Ibrahim in order to remain in power.25  In Southeast Asia where the 
political regimes are still in search of an equilibrium, economic downturn forces the 
leaders to find a way out of legitimacy crisis. Another set of preconditions that affect 
Southeast Asia leaders’ calculation under economic downturn – domestic ethnic conflicts 
and international territorial disputes – plays an important role here. Bad economic 
performance forces leaders resort to provoking domestic and international disputes in 
order to maintain their ruling legitimacy. Among the total 85 Southeast Asian MIDs from 
1950 to 2001, 71 of them happened in the year when at least one state in the dyad had a 
growth rate less than 3%. Therefore, I argue that to understand the effectiveness of 
ASEAN’s security management in the region, we must take national building and 
economic performance, the most important goals of Southeast Asian countries, into 
concern. Thus, the effectiveness of ASEAN security management should be condition by 
Southeast Asian countries’ balance between these two factors. When leaders are able to 
maintain growth, they are willing to act through ASEAN to work out a consensus toward 
various issues; however, if they are not able to maintain economic performance, domestic 
pressure from their ruling coalitions and their political competitors will force them to 
seek national building issues for legitimacy, and so compromising the ASEAN way of 
consensus building. As Kivimäki (2011) has demonstrated, “the ASEAN diplomatic style 
avoids situations where one of the conflicting parties would lose face, and thus it is 
reflected in a conflict termination record with a low frequency of defeat of one of the 
parties” (Kivimäki, 2011, p. 68). The fact that both conflicting parties are willing to 
accept a conflict termination without a substantive solution further reveals that getting 
25 Refer to Solingen (2004) to see more detailed discussion about how the 1997 financial crisis reshaped the 
domestic politics of Southeast Asian countries.   
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what they are fighting for per se is not the main reason for both leaders to engage in a 
dispute. If so, we would expect that economic performance does not have a significant 
effect on ASEAN’s security management.  
Based on the reasons above, the hypothesis derived from my argument to be 
tested is: 
Hypothesis: The effectiveness of ASEAN’s security management in Southeast Asia 
is conditioned on Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance.  
3 Research design 
3.1 Dependent variable 
 Following most of the literature on Southeast Asian peace and international 
conflict, I use the onset of a new MID between two Southeast Asian states each year as 
the dependent variable. This is because the dyadic design can better take different 
security threats that different countries face into concern. Thus the unit of analysis is 
dyad-year. I use the MID 3.1 data (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) from the Correlates 
of War database. A MID is defined as “a set of interactions between or among states 
involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of 
military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). The new MID onset is a dichotomous 
variable which is coded 1 for the first year of a new MID in a dyad and 0 otherwise. The 
subsequent years of the same MID in the starting year is dropped from the data to reduce 
the problem of temporal dependence, because the statistical model I employ in this study, 
logit regression, assumes that the conflict events being analyzed are independent of each 
other. Because MID onset is a time-series cross-sectional binary variable across time 
(years) and space (dyads), in order to produce accurate standard errors and consistent 
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coefficients, I estimate the logit regression model with the Huber/White robust standard 
error which assumes that observations within the same dyad across years are correlated 
but those between different dyads are uncorrelated, adjusting for clustering in dyads. I 
also adopt (Carter & Signorino, 2010) method to include peace years, peace years’ square, 
and peace years’ cube into the model to control for temporal dependence.26  As most of 
the literature, I estimate all the models with the dependent variable at time t  and 
independent variables at time 1−t  to mitigate problems of reverse causality.  
3.2 Independent variables 
 My theory argues that the effectiveness of ASEAN security management is 
conditioned on Southeast Asian states’ economic performance, therefore, the set of my 
independent variables should be composed of three different variables: one denotes 
whether the pair of countries are joint ASEAN members, another denotes its economic 
performance, and the other the interaction term of the first two to measure the conditional 
effect of economic performance on ASEAN security management. Given the dyad-year 
design, I create a dummy variable Joint ASEAN to present whether both countries in 
each dyad-year are members of ASEAN, coded as 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. According to 
my theory, Joint ASEAN alone is expected not to have stable statistically-significant 
influence on MID onset in models except for when it is in the interaction term.  
Because my theory expects that conflict is more likely to be initiated by countries 
with worse economic performance in each dyad-year, I construct the variable Low 
growth rate which is the lower value of economic growth rate of the two states in each 
dyad-year to measure Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance. This 
26 I also estimate all the models using Beck, Katz, and Tucker's (1998) peace years and cubic splines to 
control for temporal dependence. The outcomes are almost identical. 
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conceptualization is called the “weak link” logic (Dixon, 1994; Oneal & Russett, 1997) 
which assumes that “the likelihood of dyadic conflict is primarily determined by the less 
constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal & Russett, 1997, p. 273). Data of 
economic growth rate is calculated from Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded trade and GDP 









GDPGDPRate  .  
 Now that the two independent variables are ready, thus the interaction term Joint 
ASEAN ×  Low growth rate conceptualizes this conditional effect. My theory predicts 
that this interaction variable should be statistically significant with a negative sign on 
MID onset across all the models.27  
3.3 Competing and control variables 
 I control for the variables that have demonstrated influence on interstate conflict 
onset in previous research to show that my independent variable is still valid after taking 
these various factors into concern, and some of them are even variables of competing 
explanations against my argument on the maintenance of Southeast Asian peace. The first 
set of competing variables is the democratic peace and the Kantian peace component 
(Oneal & Russett, 2001) because many research has found that democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations have very strong pacifying effects. Low 
democracy is the lower democracy score of the two states in each dyad-year, data from 
27 I also create an ordered independent variable ASEAN ranging from 0 to 2, denoting whether none, one, 
or two of the countries in each dyad are members of ASEAN, and its conditional effect ASEAN X Low 
growth rate. This conditional effect is significant and negative with the probability of MID onset after 
1979. However, I do not further investigate this phenomenon since my theoretical argument is mainly about 
joint ASEAN dyads. 
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the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2013). This democracy score ranges from -10 (the 
most autocratic) to 10 (the most democratic). Besides, because democratic peace is better 
understood as a strictly dyadic phenomenon (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & 
Morrow, 2003; Quackenbush & Rudy, 2009), that is, the democratic peace effect does not 
work in a mixed dyad which is composed of a democracy and an autocracy,28  I control 
for Joint democracy, the interaction term of both countries’ democracy score, to capture 
this effect.29  Low dependence is the lower ratio of the sum of State A’s imports from 
and exports to State B over State A’s GDP in each dyad-year, data from Gleditsch’s 
(2002) expanded trade and GDP data. IGOs is the number of total shared memberships of 
intergovernmental organizations of the two states in each dyad-year, data from 
(Pevehouse, Nordstrom, & Warnke, 2004).30 
 I then control for contiguity, distance, alliance similarity, and power parity of each 
dyad, for these factors are found to be influential on international dispute (Bremer, 1992). 
Contiguity is a dummy variable which denotes whether the two countries of the dyad are 
contiguous by land, predicted to be positively correlated with conflict onset. Distance is 
28 Goldsmith (2014) also finds this similar strategic effect in East Asia. 
29 Following Barbieri’s (2002) measurement of the interactive effect of both states’ democratic scores, the 
















10 BA ePolityScorePolityScor ,  
which ranges from 0 to 100. The reason that she adds 10 to each state’s polity score (ranging from -10 to 10) 
is to avoid a negative value. 
30 Although I have noticed that previous research about IGOs’ pacifying effect is mixed as Dorussen and 
Ward's (2008) review had demonstrated, and that the aggregated count variable of shared IGO membership 
may mislead our understanding of IGOs’ role in promoting peace (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004), 
I still include this aggregated count variable in my models in order to further confirm my argument by 
considering all the Kantian peace variables at the same time. The statistical results are almost identical with 
or without this variable. 
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the logged distance (in miles) between capitals of the two states in each dyad, predicted 
to be negatively related with conflict onset. I adopt (Signorino & Ritter, 1999) weighted 
S-score to construct the variable Alliance similarity, which denotes the level of 
similarity of each dyad’s alliance portfolio.31  Power parity is the weaker state’s CINC 
score (Singer, 1988) divided by that of the stronger state to generate a power ratio which 
ranges from 0 (total preponderance) to 1 (exact parity between the two states). Data of 
Contiguity, Distance, Alliance similarity, and Power parity are from the COW database 
generated by the Eugene software (Bennett & Stam, 2000a). Development is also found 
to have a pacifying effect (Rosecrance, 1986, 2010; Hegre, 2000; Mousseau, Hegre, & 
O’neal, 2003), so I include Low GDP/pc which is logged GDP per capita of the lower 
GDP per capita in each dyad-year to control for development. I also include the 
interaction between contiguity and development, Contiguity ×  Low GDP/pc, because 
economic development decreases states’ incentive for territorial expansion (Gartzke, 
2007). Lastly, I create a Cold war dummy variable, taking a value of 1 between 1950 and 
1989 to control for the change of international structure which may have a systemic effect 
on conflict onset in the region.32 
  
31 I do not control for strategic alliance (whether the dyad has a defense pact, neutrality, or entente) which is 
typically put into control when studying conflict because among Southeast Asian countries, only Thailand 
and the Philippines are formal allies due to their military cooperation with the United States, and Thailand 
and the Philippines never had any MID during my sample period. 
32 Although I include many control variables in my model, this conditional effect of Joint ASEAN X Low 
growth rate holds robustly no matter with or without any of or all of the control variables in all the three 
different levels of MIDs (These results are not shown here for brevity. Please refer to the replication 
archive). 
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Basic analysis 
 The empirical analysis strongly supports my hypothesis. Table 3.4 shows how the 
pacifying effect of ASEAN is conditioned on the economic performance of Southeast 
Asian countries. I list the results of three different time periods (Model 1, Model 2, and 
Model 3) to demonstrate that this conditional effect can still hold under different temporal 
or systemic conditions. The whole sample space ranges from 1950 to 2001 due to data 
availability which is shown as Model 1.33  Model 2 shows the result from 1967 because 
the ASEAN is formally established by the founding five states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in 1967. Model 3 shows the result after 1979, the 
beginning of the prominent Southeast Asian peace. The results of the three different time 
periods all support my hypothesis, and even so during the prominent post-1979 peace.  
I start interpreting the statistical results based on models without the interaction 
term between Low growth rate and Joint ASEAN (not shown for brevity). In models 
without the interaction term, neither Low growth rate nor Joint ASEAN have 
significant influence on MID onset in all the three different time periods. The only one 
variable that has consistent and significant pacifying effect across the three different time 
periods is Contiguity ×  Low GDP/pc, which means that economic development does 
reduce the probability of conflict due to territorial expansion in the region. This result, 
also not in the prediction of my theory, also confirms my argument that economic factor 
plays an important role in the regional peace. When the interaction term is added into 
model specification, it is significant in all the time periods as Table 3.4 presents, and its 
33 Most economic data is available after 1950 and the COW dyadic MID data is updated through 2001. 
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Table 3.4 ASEAN and Dyadic MID onset in Southeast Asia 
 
  Dependent Variable: MID Onset t  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 1950~2001  1967~2001  1980~2001 
[Independent Variables 1−t ]      
Low growth rate -3.183  -0.217  9.801 
 (3.462)  (3.597)  (7.848) 
      
Joint ASEAN -0.968  -1.261*  -0.507 
 (0.656)  (0.740)  (0.975) 
      
Joint ASEAN ×  Low growth rate -7.917*  -13.204**  -23.496* 
 (4.514)  (6.198)  (12.013) 
[Control Variables 1−t ]      
Low democracy -0.599***  -0.543***  -1.338** 
 (0.169)  (0.194)  (0.587) 
      
Joint democracy 0.112***  0.123***  0.303** 
 (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.120) 
      
Low dependence -8.043  0.307  35.401* 
 (10.480)  (15.625)  (19.244) 
      
IGOs 0.055***  0.021  -0.104 
 (0.020)  (0.028)  (0.068) 
      
Low GDP/pc 1.139***  0.757  1.128 
 (0.430)  (0.540)  (0.984) 
      
Contiguity 9.876***  8.751*  21.222*** 
 (3.492)  (4.778)  (5.185) 
      
Contiguity ×  Low GDP/pc -1.295**  -1.064  -2.608*** 
 (0.505)  (0.654)  (0.705) 
      
Alliance similarity -1.385  -3.098**  -3.710** 
 (1.744)  (1.359)  (1.877) 
      
Distance -1.385***  -0.731  -0.395 
 (0.350)  (0.595)  (0.844) 
      
Power parity 0.057  0.939  2.041* 
 (0.583)  (0.744)  (1.110) 
      
Cold war 0.914*  0.787  1.098** 
 (0.535)  (0.571)  (0.500) 




-0.229***  -0.193*  -0.080 
 (0.078)  (0.112)  (0.143) 




0.009*  0.006  -0.002 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
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-0.000  -0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
      
Constant -7.125  -6.325  -16.633 
 (5.432)  (6.840)  (12.227) 
Pseudo R2 0.341  0.300  0.426 
Log likelihood -218.860  -154.815  -65.408 
Chi-squared 358.976  367.817  26320.352 
Clusters (Dyads) 45  45  36 
N 1,649  1,224  692 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The total dyad-year observations of 
Southeast Asian countries from 1950 to 2001 should be 1,998; from 1967 to 2001 should be 1,503; and 
from 1980 to 2001 should be 954. About 246 observations are always missing (not included in the 
regression models) during all the three different time periods which mainly result from the missing polity 
scores of Brunei from 1984 to 2001 and Cambodia from 1979 to 1987. 
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influence remains significant and becomes stronger even after 1979 when the region has 
achieved a prominent peaceful status and when the conflict-resolution function of 
ASEAN has put into doubt after 1994 (Kivimäki, 2001). The Low growth rate variable 
is not significant across all time periods, suggesting that when the coefficient of Joint 
ASEAN ×  Low growth rate is zero – that is, when states are not joint ASEAN 
members, economic growth rate does not have influence on MID onset. This also 
confirms the fact that ASEAN is built by Southeast Asian countries who are sensitive to 
their economic performance and so want to pursue economic growth through regional 
cooperation by putting aside their disputing issues. The coefficient of Joint ASEAN is 
significant only in Model 2 where the temporal coverage is from the founding of ASEAN 
to 2001, but not in Model 3 which only covers the post-1979 Asian peace, suggesting that 
when the coefficient of Joint ASEAN ×  Low growth rate is zero, ASEAN generally 
has a pacifying effect in Southeast Asia after established. However, after 1979, ASEAN’s 
influence on the regional peace maintenance is conditioned on Southeast Asian countries’ 
economic performance.  
 To further make sure the statistical significance of this conditional effect does not 
result from some “cheap MIDs” which involved only low levels of MID such as “threat 
to use force” or “display of force,” I also estimate the same models on force MID (those 
that actually use force against one another) and fatal MID (those that cause fatality) onset, 
the results are presented in Table 3.5.34  Again, in all the basic models without the 
34 Besides, Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre (2000, p. 984) insist that the use of fatality MIDs helps avoid both 
coding irregularities and “attention bias” on low-level disputes. Souva and Prins (2006, p. 191) also echo 
Toset et al. (2000) that “fatal MIDs offer greater temporal and spatial consistency in the historical recording 
of these events. Plus, they avoid very low-hostility disputes that may not reach the attention of 
policymakers.” Therefore, there are good reasons to check whether my independent variable can still work 
on fatality MIDs. 
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interaction term Joint ASEAN ×  Low growth rate, neither Joint ASEAN nor Low 
growth rate is significant (not shown for brevity). As for models with this interaction 
term, as Table 3.5 shows, actually this conditional effect is getting larger with the 
increase of the level of conflict. Put differently, this conditional pacifying effect of 
ASEAN works the best in constraining high hostility levels of MID.35 
 There is some other information in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 worthy of noticing. 
The development variable Low GDP/pc is never significant after the foundation of 
ASEAN in 1967, which may reinforce my argument that Southeast Asian peace does not 
belong to the capitalist trajectory since the capitalist peace theory predicts development to 
have a pacifying effect (Mousseau, 2000; Mousseau et al., 2003; Gartzke, 2007). In 
addition, the interdependence variable, Low dependence, is significant in all the models 
after 1979, but not before, which may suggest that although interdependence in Southeast 
Asia is in a low degree in general, a liberal commercial peace effect is gradually growing 
in the region after 1979 when the region reached a stable situation. Thus, although 
Southeast Asian peace so far is certainly not maintained by the Kantian components 
given all of them are at a low degree in the region, it is not the same to say that the 
increase of these components does not promote peace in the region. As long as Southeast 
Asian states’ economic performance keeps growing stably, chances are that the regional 
peace could benefit from the liberal peace factors in the future. 
To further demonstrate the substantive effects of Low growth rate on the 
pacifying effect of Joint ASEAN during different time periods, I plot the predicted 
35 In Table 5 where the dependent variables are “force MID onset” and “fatal MID onset,” I adjust the 
Peace years variables according to “force MID onset” and “fatal MID onset” respectively. 
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Table 3.5 ASEAN and Dyadic force and fatal MID onset in Southeast Asia 
Dependent Variable t  
 Force MID onset t  
 Fatal MID onset t  
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  1950~2001 1967~2001 1980~2001  1950~2001 1967~2001 1980~2001 
[Independent Variables 1−t ] 
        
Low growth rate  -4.964 -2.504 9.358  3.311 5.088 26.764** 
  (3.764) (4.120) (8.619)  (5.497) (5.308) (11.399) 
         
Joint ASEAN  -1.568*** -2.079** -0.860  -0.467 -0.428 -1.050 
  (0.585) (0.816) (1.088)  (1.045) (1.096) (1.410) 
         
Joint ASEAN  -17.360*** -24.840*** -35.760***  -23.204*** -29.680*** -61.906*** 
×  Low growth rate  (3.898) (5.629) (10.570)  (7.575) (5.273) (18.794) 
         
[Control Variables 1−t ] 
        
Low democracy  -0.735*** -0.679*** -0.991*  -0.763*** -0.829*** -0.574 
  (0.135) (0.094) (0.590)  (0.237) (0.222) (0.744) 
         
Joint democracy  0.139*** 0.150*** 0.239**  0.176*** 0.215*** 0.176 
  (0.031) (0.029) (0.121)  (0.052) (0.055) (0.189) 
         
Low dependence  -1.034 12.669 36.170*  -371.975* -603.185*** -438.464*** 
  (10.913) (14.992) (18.808)  (195.121) (140.434) (168.415) 
         
IGOs  0.070*** 0.054* -0.080*  0.015 -0.002 -0.049 
  (0.019) (0.031) (0.042)  (0.022) (0.042) (0.124) 
         
Low GDP/pc  1.106** 0.663 1.114  0.907* 0.142 2.781 
  (0.451) (0.505) (0.911)  (0.536) (0.721) (4.442) 
         
Contiguity  9.626** 7.925* 20.161***  -3.601 -9.868 -15.754 
  (3.884) (4.570) (5.099)  (4.522) (6.486) (35.954) 
         
Contiguity ×  Low GDP/pc  -1.243** -0.989 -2.439***  0.621 1.546* 1.186 
  (0.561) (0.618) (0.673)  (0.671) (0.914) (6.331) 
         
Alliance similarity  -0.134 -1.757 -3.399  -0.639 -2.142 119.791** 
  (1.966) (1.751) (2.134)  (2.053) (2.168) (59.718) 
         
Distance  -1.379*** -1.027 0.019  -2.548*** -2.371*** -25.193 
  (0.431) (0.689) (0.914)  (0.450) (0.717) (22.216) 
         
Power parity  0.053 0.687 1.949*  0.870 2.096* 12.700*** 
  (0.617) (0.763) (1.094)  (0.946) (1.211) (3.827) 
         
Cold war  1.203 1.222 1.338**  1.020 1.434* 0.781 
  (0.732) (0.798) (0.595)  (0.651) (0.776) (1.358) 




 -0.195** -0.184* -0.136  -0.139 -0.130 0.085 
  (0.081) (0.110) (0.201)  (0.107) (0.122) (0.352) 




 0.007 0.006 0.001  0.006 0.005 -0.008 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) 




 -0.000 -0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Constant  -10.122 -7.233 -17.027  -1.801 2.728 5.171 
  (6.403) (6.989) (14.072)  (6.198) (6.968) (140.907) 
Pseudo R2  0.375 0.359 0.465  0.360 0.376 0.599 
Log likelihood  -178.939 -119.318 -55.791  -113.402 -73.683 -24.256 
Chi-squared  1020.720 1501.045 21201.238  889.253 1046.502 . 
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Clusters (Dyads)  45 45 36  45 45 36 
N  1,649 1,224 692  1,649 1,224 692 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The Peace years variables are adjusted according to force MID 
onset and fatal MID onset respectively. The total dyad-year observations of Southeast Asian countries from 1950 to 2001 should be 
1,998; from 1967 to 2001 should be 1,503; and from 1980 to 2001 should be 954. About 246 observations are always missing (not 
included in the regression models) during all the three different time periods which mainly result from the missing polity scores of 
Brunei from 1984 to 2001 and Cambodia from 1979 to 1987.
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probability of MID onset as well as the frequency of observations in Figure 3.1 for joint 
ASEAN dyads based on the results of Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3, holding all 
continuous variables at their mean and dichotomous variables at their median. Figure 3.1 
shows that the pacifying effect of ASEAN is conditioned on Southeast Asian states’ 
economic performance: the probability of conflict decreases with the increase of 
economic growth rate. The magnitude of this conditional effect holds stably across the 
three different time periods. When one of the countries in the dyad has a negative 0.15 
economic growth rate in a certain year, the probability of conflict onset between them in 
the next year is about 10%. This probability of conflict onset decreases as the increase of 
Low growth rate, and the probability of conflict onset is getting closer to zero when 
Low growth rate approaches 0.10. 
4.2 Robustness tests 
 In this section I exert several robustness tests to demonstrate that my argument 
still holds stably after taking these factors into concern. All the models below span from 
1980 to 2001 to show that the pacifying effect of ASEAN is conditioned on Southeast 
Asian countries’ economic performance even when the region has achieved a long peace 
after 1979.36  The outcomes of various sensitivity checks are presented in Table 3.6. 
 Since I have put in doubt Tang’s (2012) argument that Southeast Asian peace is 
achieved by a capitalist trajectory, I include his independent variable JntELP, a dummy 
variable denoting whether both countries in the dyad adopt economic liberalization policy, 
in my model. Model 10 shows that the conditional effect becomes even stronger and 
36 I also estimate all the sensitivity check models from 1950 to 2001 and the outcomes are almost identical. 
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Figure 3.1 Low growth rate and predicted probability of MID onset at t+1 with 95% confidence interval 























































































more significant with JntELP in the model. Although JntELP is highly significant, as I 
have shown in this article, it should not be the main factor that maintains Southeast Asian 
peace. 
According to the MID data, there are 85 MIDs that happened between Southeast 
Asian dyads from 1950 to 2001. Among them, Cambodia was involved in 31 MIDs and 
Thailand was involved in 51. Only 18 of the total 85 MIDs in the region have nothing to 
do with these two extremely belligerent countries. Thus my statistical results may be 
driven by Cambodia and Thailand as the outliers. In Model 11 I include two dummy 
variables, Cambodia and Thailand, in the model to denote if the dyad is composed of 
Cambodia or Thailand to see whether the effects of my independent variables still hold. 
Model 11 shows that this does not change the outcome of my model.37 
 Considering that interest (dis)similarity resulting from different political regimes 
may influence the relationship between the two countries in each dyad (Bennett & Stam, 
2000b; Peceny, Beer, & Sanchez-Terry, 2002), I take their Polity difference, State A’s 
polity score minus State B’s polity score in absolute value, into concern in Model 12. 
Model 12 shows that the probability of conflict in the region does increase with the polity 
difference of the two countries in the dyad, however, it does not change the influence of 
my independent variables.  
There is a possibility that looking at conflict between all the countries in 
Southeast Asia is misleading. According the logic of “opportunity and willingness” 
(Most& Starr, 1982, 1989), although the Southeast Asian countries are located in the 
same region, it does not mean that each of them has the opportunity to have a dispute  
37 I also run the sensitivity check excluding Singapore because it is an outlier which involved in only 1 MID 
from 1950 to 2001. The outcomes are almost identical. 
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Table 3.6 Robustness checks of dyadic MID onset in Southeast Asia, 1980~2001 
 
Dependent Variable: MID onset t  
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
[Independent Variables 1−t ] 
       
Low growth rate  12.175 10.325 11.418 9.910 26.912*** 19.956* 
  (8.466) (7.697) (7.520) (7.862) (9.844) (11.896) 
        
Joint ASEAN  -0.979 -0.435 -0.494 -0.501 0.573 -4.576 
  (0.701) (0.878) (0.954) (1.033) (1.519) (3.712) 
        
Joint ASEAN ×  Low growth rate  -30.020*** -23.768** -25.179** -25.009** -39.730** -89.384** 
  (11.403) (11.415) (11.550) (12.392) (16.070) (38.238) 
        
[Sensitivity check variables 1−t ] 
       
JntELP  -9.996***      
  (2.676)      
        
Thailand   0.506     
   (1.248)     
        
Cambodia   0.500     
   (0.619)     
        
Polity difference    0.239**    
    (0.117)    
        
Politically active dyad     2.847**   
     (1.185)   
        
Low openness      -6.677*  
      (3.411)  
        
High trade barrier       73.556 
       (248.671) 
        
Constant  -28.452 -15.493 -11.075 -13.265 -33.877*** -138.566*** 
  (19.702) (12.690) (9.297) (12.647) (7.033) (29.133) 
Pseudo R2  0.470 0.428 0.434 0.438 0.280 0.533 
Log Likelihood  -60.405 -65.271 -64.498 -64.052 -46.613 -18.073 
Chi-squared  41236.316 23390.671 16279.450 25433.616 3220.865 . 
Clusters (Dyads)  36 36 36 36 28 21 
N  692 692 692 692 532 375 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Other control variables not shown for brevity. The total dyad-
year observations of Southeast Asian countries from 1980 to 2001 should be 954. About 246 observations are always missing (not 
included in the regression models) during all the three different time periods which mainly result from the missing polity scores of 
Brunei from 1984 to 2001 and Cambodia from 1979 to 1987. 
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with all of the others. For example, the inland Laos would never have a dispute with the 
far away island countries like Indonesia or Brunei. Therefore, controlling for this 
“opportunity” or “necessary condition” is crucial to grasping the Southeast Asian peace. I 
adopt Quackenbush’s (2006) definition of “politically active dyads” and include a 
dummy variable Politically active dyad into the model to denote whether the dyad is 
capable of having a dispute.38  Among the total 55 dyads in Southeast Asia, only about 
half (26) of them are defined as politically active. Model 13 presents that politically 
active dyads do have higher probability of conflict, however, this does not change the 
significance and substantive effect of my independent variables.  
 Besides, although interdependence (Low dependence) does not have a significant 
pacifying effect in the region, it is possible that the pacifying effect of trade does not do 
so through interdependence, but through the general openness of each state, through the 
internationalizing coalition in domestic politics (Solingen, 2001, 2003), or through free 
trade (McDonald, 2004). In order to exclude that possibilities, I check whether openness 
or free trade affects my argument about the regional peace in Model 14 and Model 15. I 
conceptualize the general openness of trade by calculating the trade share of total GDP of 
each state (Low Openness), adopting the lower value of openness in the dyad following 
the weak link logic. The openness data is from Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 
2013). As for the power of internationalizing coalition or free trade, I conceptualize it 
using gravity model residuals (High trade barrier), adopting the lower value of the two 
38 According to Quackenbush (2006, p. 43), a dyad is defined as a politically active one if at least one of the 
following six characteristics applies: (1) The members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through 
a colony; (2) One of the dyad members is a global power; (3) One of the dyad members is a regional power 
in the region of the other; (4) one of the dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other; (5) 
one of the dyad members is allied to a global power that is in a dispute with the other; or (6) one of the 
dyad members is allied to a regional power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other. 
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countries in each dyad because that country has higher trade barriers than the other. The 
gravity model residuals data is from Peterson and Lassi’s (forthcoming) expanding of the 
Hiscox and Kastner’s (2008) trade barriers data. Theoretically, the more the power of 
internationalizing coalition in the state, the more free trade and the lower trade barrier it 
has, therefore, the dyad will have more trade flows than predicted by the gravity model of 
trade. As a consequence, there will be more gravity model residuals (McDonald, 2004; 
Kastner, 2007).39  Model 14 shows that while openness has a significant pacifying effect, 
what is interesting is that when including Low openness into the model, the increase of 
Low growth rate actually increases the probability of MID, but this conflictual effect is 
eliminated by the dominantly conditional pacifying effect of Joint ASEAN   Low growth 
rate. Simply judging by the coefficient, the inclusion of Low openness actually 
strengthens the influence of this conditional effect, which may suggest that leaders in 
Southeast Asian countries which have more open markets are more sensitive to their 
economic performance. Model 15 shows that when taking High trade barrier into concern, 
although it fails to achieve statistical significance, the conditional pacifying effect of Joint 
ASEAN   Low growth rate gets much stronger than without it.40 
 In sum, all the sensitivity checks demonstrate the robustness of this conditional 
effect. 
39 I do not exclude the rival explanations of the PTA peace arguments (peace through preferential trade 
agreements) (Mansfield, Pevehouse, & Bearce, 1999; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2000, 2003; Bearce, 2003; 
Mansfield, 2003) in these sensitivity checks because PTAs between Southeast Asian countries also belong 
to the ASEAN framework.   
40 Due to lots of missing data in Low openness and High trade barrier, Model 14 has only 532 and Model 
15 has only 375 of the total 954 dyad-year observations, so we should interpret these results with caution. 
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5 Concluding remark 
 According to literature, there are competing explanations about the formation of 
Southeast Asian peace. It is not surprising that the liberal commercial peace does not 
work well in the region given the low degree of interdependence and few democratic 
dyads. Most scholars refer to the success of ASEAN’s security management and common 
identity building as the key to the regional stability, however, empirical evidence does not 
support the pacifying effect of ASEAN. Lastly, Tang’s capitalist trajectory argument may 
not give us much leverage to understand the regional peace, either, since countries who 
adopted economic liberalization policy are not those who were prone to conflict. Based 
on literature, I revisit the characteristics of Southeast Asian countries and the spirit of 
ASEAN, arguing that to correctly understand ASEAN we should consider the 
characteristics of Southeast Asian countries. Due to their special historical and 
socioeconomic backgrounds, which make the leaders struggle for national building and 
economic development, ASEAN’s ability of security management is conditioned on 
Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance.  
 My argument also explains and unifies the controversy in literature of ASEAN’s 
ability of security management. While some scholars applaud “the ASEAN way” that 
successfully stabilizes the region, others criticize it for its inability to make the ASEAN 
states resolve disputes without the use of force (Leifer, 1989; Acharya, 1999), especially 
after 1996 (Kivimäki, 2001). In this paper I try to investigate what causes this variation of 
ASEAN’s security management ability and develop a consistent theory that can account 
for this variation; that is, whether ASEAN is no more than a “talking shop” depends on 
Southeast Asian states’ economic performance. As many scholars have demonstrated 
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(Narine 2004; 2008; Haftel 2010), “ASEAN is principally expected to be a platform for 
managing regional security for economic development” (Tang 2012, p. 396), when the 
Southeast Asian leaders are able to maintain economic development, they would be 
willing to put aside their conflictual issues or accept ASEAN’s mediation. Otherwise, 
economic downturn compromises leaders’ faith in “the ASEAN way.” Thus my theory 
bridges the two contradictory perspectives about ASEAN’s ability of security 
management in the region.  
 My finding also, to some degree, put the constructivist’s perspective about 
ASEAN in doubt. For a long time, debate about whether we need new international 
relations theories to understand East and Southeast Asia emphasizes on the difference 
between the “material” Western and the “ideational” Asia (Kang, 2007; Acharya & 
Buzan, 2010; Wang, 2010; Johnston, 2012; Kohno, 2014). Many argue that one of the 
important reasons for the European Union (EU) to evolve is due to the fact that most of 
the EU countries are democracies (Ikenberry, 2000), which is not the case in Southeast 
Asia. Besides, the ideological difference between the European liberal rationalism based 
on democracy and the ASEAN communalism and solidarism based on autocratic legacies 
may well differentiate ASEAN from the EU (Beeson & Jayasuriya, 1998; Pettman, 2010). 
Therefore, many Southeast Asian scholars may agree with Rüland & Jetschke’s (2008) 
conclusion that ASEAN “will neither become an Asian EU, nor fall into oblivion. It will 
remain ASEAN” (Rüland & Jetschke, 2008, p. 407). However, if the effectiveness of 
ASEAN’s security management in the region is conditioned on Southeast Asian states’ 
economic performance, this East-West theoretical distinction may not be so salient. 
Looking back on the history of the EU, sustained economic development plays an 
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important role to reinforce European countries’ faith in democracy, cooperation, and trust 
building (Ripsman, 2005; Miller, 2005), and so further facilitates the evolving of EU’s 
“thick” institution.41  As such, the conditional effect I demonstrated may suggest that 
ASEAN may be likely to move on toward the EU pattern as long as Southeast Asian 
countries are able to maintain stable economic growth, and vice versa.  
 
 
41 For a more detailed discussion about the EU and ASEAN institution and institutionalization, see 
Johnston (2012). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Latin American Peace: Hegemonic Stability during the Cold War and 
Capitalist Peace after the Cold War 
 
Q: Why are there no coups d’état in the United States? 
A: Because there is no U.S. embassy there. 
------ An old joke in Latin America 
1 Introduction 
Since the end of World War II, the Latin American countries have enjoyed 
peaceful international relations for more than a half century (Kacowicz, 1995, 1998b; 
Holsti, 1996; Kacowicz et al., 2000; Ray, 2002; Buzan & Wæver, 2003a; Miller, 2005). 
According to the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, from 1950 to 2001, there were only 2 
wars or 88 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) among the total 9,880 Latin American 
dyad-years.42  In every aspect, the peaceful situation in the region is a phenomenon 
worthy of investigating, since it is a region that has never been in lack of war, civil 
conflict, coup d’état, and foreign great power intervention for hundreds of years (Hensel, 
1994; Mares, 1997, 2001; Buzan & Wæver, 2003b).  
42 The two wars are the 1967 Salvador-Honduras Football War and the 1995 Ecuador-Peru Cenepa Valley 
War. These two wars are included in the total eighty-eight MIDs. Another evidence to prove the Latin 
American peace is the fact that Southeast Asian countries have been known to experience peaceful 
international relations during the same period (1950-2001)(Acharya, 2001; Kivimäki, 2001; Tang, 2012), 
but there were 85 MIDs between the total 1,998 Southeast Asian dyad-years, compared to the 88 MIDs 
among the total 9,880 Latin America dyad-years. 
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According to literature, there are four main reasons that account for the Latin 
American peace. First, peace is achieved by the successful settlements of territorial 
disputes between enduring rivalries. Second, the progress of democratization and 
international integration since the 1980s largely reduces the Latin American leaders’ 
incentive to deal with conflictual issues with force. Third, the cultural or constructive 
approach attributes peace to a construction of shared identity and values among the Latin 
American countries. And fourth, the most controversial one, is the role that the United 
States played in security management in the region.  
While many studies acknowledge that the United States has a salient influence on 
the international relationship among the Latin American countries, whether the Latin 
American peace should attribute to the hegemonic stability trajectory lead by the United 
States is an unsolved puzzle. Generally speaking, there are three competing models about 
the United States’ role in stabilizing the region: the hegemonic stability argument 
emphasizes the United States’ peace keeping; the whirlpool model argues that the United 
States is only involved when its interests are compromised and disengages soon after the 
events are solved; and the radical argument contends that the United States is actually the 
one who provokes conflicts in the region. This problem remains unsolved because we can 
always find different empirical evidences that support or refute any of the three 
arguments about the role of the United States.  
Given the two mainstream controversies in the literature about Latin American 
peace, the goal of this research is twofold. The first one is to find out what causes the 
discrepancies in different schools of literature regarding the role the United States played 
in the regional peace, and the second one is to explain what makes the regional peace 
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according to the contemporary IR theories. I argue that, during the Cold War period, 
Latin American peace should attribute to the hegemonic stability effect lead by the 
United States; however, this does not mean that the United States has sufficient ability to 
restrain conflict in each of the Latin American states. In countries that have higher degree 
of economic dependence on the United States, the United States has enough influence 
and economic leverage on the former to constrain the former from using force. Instead, in 
countries that have lower degree of economic dependence on the United States, the 
United States does not have sufficient policy leverage on the latter. As a consequence, the 
hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ security management becomes less salient. 
Therefore, the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ leadership in the region is 
a conditional one, which hinges on whether the United States has enough economic 
leverage to influence a certain Latin American country’s conflictual behavior. In sum, the 
United States actually played a positive role in maintaining the regional peace, but its 
ability of security management is a conditional one. But this hegemonic stability effect 
became less salient after the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War when 
Latin America lost its strategic importance to the United States, the “capitalist peace” 
effect starts to become a prominent factor that explains the regional peace as well as the 
regional integration.  
 To demonstrate my argument, the structure of this research is as following. In the 
next section, I first discuss the competing arguments about the role of the United States in 
the region as well as the limitations of them; and then I propose my argument and the 
hypotheses to be further tested. I test the hypotheses derived from my argument in the 
third section, using data concerning the onset of militarized interstate dispute (MID) 
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among the total 20 Latin American countries from 1950 to 2001.43  More detailed 
empirical results will be discussed in the fourth section. The last section is the concluding 
remark. 
2 Regional peace and the role of the United States 
 In this section I first discuss what makes Latin America become a peaceful region 
after the end of World War II based on literature, highlighting the unsolved controversies 
regarding the role the United States played in the regional peace. I then investigate 
whether the liberal factors contribute to Latin American peace by analyzing the 
relationships between the number of MIDs and the Kantian peace factors – democracy, 
interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations, in which I find that none of them 
should have a substantive effect on conflict-constraining in the region. Since the liberal 
factors may not be the main reason to explain Latin American peace, I then turn to 
analyzing realists’ hegemonic stability argument to discuss the possible influences that 
the United States exerts on the regional peace. 
2.1 What makes for Latin American peace? 
According to literature, there are at least four explanations about how the region 
reaches a stable peace. The most popular explanation is that the region achieves a stable 
peace because of the successful settlements of territorial disputes between enduring 
rivalries. For example, Hensel (1994) finds that Latin American peace is due to the 
settlement of recurrent MIDs between the same adversaries. Kacowicz (1998a, 2000) 
highlights the importance of the conciliation between main regional powers, the “ABC 
43 The 20 Latin American countries included in this research are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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Triangle” of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as the main reason that stabilizes the region. 
Ray (2002) argues that the lack of war in the region is due to the fact that Latin American 
countries have enough states with definitive boundaries. Miller (2005) offers a slightly 
different argument that peace in the region is because the Latin American countries have 
reached a regional state-to-nation balance, where the demand for states does not exceed 
the supply of state thus avoiding wars of secession, and the supply of states does not 
exceed the demand for states thus avoiding wars of unification. However, Miller calls 
Latin American peace a “normal peace” instead of a “warm peace” because he thinks that 
although the main conflictual issues in the region had been resolved, contingency plans 
for war and possibility of return to war still exist due to limited degree of integration.  
 The second set of explanations is that the progress of democratization and 
international integration since the 1980s largely reduces the incentive of the Latin 
American leaders to deal with conflictual issues with force. For example, Kacowicz 
(1995) argues that democracy tend to be satisfied with the status quo, and with the 
settlement of territorial disputes and spread of democracy, Latin America gradually 
becomes a zone of peace. Miller and Elgün (2011) demonstrate that many international 
conflicts in the region result from leaders’ diversion due to the domestic threat of coup 
d’état, thus with the spread of democratic consolidation in the region, the number of 
conflicts decreases because the leaders’ survival is more secured in democratic regimes.  
 The third set of explanations is based on the cultural or the constructive 
perspective, which is partly related to the spread of democratization. One of the reasons 
that facilitates the Latin American countries’ settlement of territorial disputes is due to the 
commonly accepted principle of uti possidetis, which means that the Latin American 
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countries recognize the colonial borders as their post-independence international frontiers 
(Ireland, 1938; Child, 1985). Besides, there is also a common normative and cultural 
framework derived from a long practice of diplomatic management of resolution of 
international disputes between these countries (Ebel, Taras, & Cochrane, 1991). In 
addition, the establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 194844  and 
Mercusor (the South America regional trade agreement) in 1991,45  due to their 
commonly-shared identity as American or Latin American countries, also contributes to 
conflict management in the region.  
Lastly, the fourth set of explanations about the role that the United States plays in 
the regional peace is the most controversial one. Most of the research about the Latin 
American peace either does not count on the influence of the United States as an 
important factor to the regional peace or questions the United States’ intentions and 
consistency of peacekeeping in the region (Kacowicz, 1995; Mares, 1997, 2001; Buzan & 
Wæver, 2003b), although all of them recognize its peacekeeping endeavor during certain 
periods. The role of the United States in the regional peace is debatable due to two 
contradictory facts. One the one hand, successfully or not, it did try to punish regional 
aggression and mediated interstate conflict in the region, or endeavored to promoted the 
conflict management function of OAS; on the other hand, during the Cold War period it 
44 The Organization of American States (OAS) originated in the 1889-1890 First International Conference 
of American States which established the International Union of American Republics, renamed the Union 
of American Republics in 1910, and then was formally established in 1948 by the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which highlighted the collective security function to facilitate the 
regional peace. 
45 Mercosur originated in 1985 when Argentina and Brazil signed the Argentina-Brazil Integration and 
Economics Cooperation Program (PICE) and then was established in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción, 
which was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto. 
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even rewarded or provoked interstate conflict in the name of anti-communism (Mares, 
1997, 2001), and the United States itself is also a source of threat to Latin American 
peace via a covert or overt intervention or coup d’état initiation (Rabe, 2010).46  The 
United States’ capricious behaviors toward the region make its role in the regional peace 
a controversial issue.  
What we see in the previous literature is that, at the local level, Latin American 
peace can attribute to the conflict resolution between each of the enduring rivalries. 
However, at the system level, the relative explanatory power between the realists’ 
hegemonic stability arguments and the liberals’ peace theories is not clear. Are the liberal 
factors the main reason that contribute to the regional peace? Or is peace actually 
maintained by the United States’ hegemonic security management? In the next part I will 
investigate both the liberal factors and the hegemonic stability factors, showing that the 
former may not be the main reason that contributes to the conflict resolution between the 
enduring rivalries during the Cold War period, and that the latter is a conditional one, 
which depends on whether the United States has sufficient economic leverage on the 
Latin American countries. 
2.2 Do the liberal factors contribute to Latin American peace? 
The liberal triangulating peace argument highlights the pacifying effect of trade, 
democracy, and intergovernmental organizations (Oneal & Russett, 2001). However, the 
explanatory power of these three Kantian factors in Latin America is not beyond question, 
given the facts that interdependence between the Latin American countries tends to be 
46 According to Rabe’s (2010, p. 448) record, the United States tried and largely succeeded in overthrowing 
governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua during the Cold War period, and it continued doing so in Panama, Haiti, 
and Venezuela after the Cold War. 
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low, that few of them are consolidated democracies, and that the number of MIDs does 
not decrease with the increase of their shared intergovernmental organization 
memberships.  
In Figure 4.1 I demonstrate the number of MID onset between the six different 
regime combinations of all the 20 Latin American countries from 1950 to 2001, data from 
the MID 3.1 dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) of the Correlates of War 
database.47  Figure 4.1 shows that, among the total 9,880 dyad-year observations, only 
2,161 (21.9%) of them are composed of democratic countries. Besides, what is worthy of 
paying attention to is that, actually the probability of MID onset among the democratic 
dyads is higher than any other kinds of dyads except for the anocratic ones. Both the facts 
that democratic dyads are rather few among Latin America and that democratic dyads are 
not more peace-prone strongly suggest that the Latin American peace may not hinge on 
the democratic peace effect. This finding is in line with Mares’ (2001) conclusion that in 
Latin America, democracies are not more peaceful than nondemocracies.  
If Latin American peace is not maintained by the democratic peace effect, is it 
done by trade and intergovernmental organization, the other two pillars of the Kantian 
peace? The empirical evidences may suggest that neither of them work. Table 4.1 shows 
the highest average degrees of interdependence of the Latin American dyads during the 
half century. As we can see in Table 4.1, during the past fifty years from 1950 to 2001, 
interdependence among Latin American countries remains at a low degree. Among the 
total 190 non-directed dyads made by 20 Latin American countries, only 15 of them have 
47 I define the three different political regimes (democracy, anocracy, and autocracy) and the six different 
regime combinations (democracy-democracy, democracy-anocracy, democracy-autocracy, anocracy-
anocracy, anocracy-autocracy, and autocracy-autocracy) as the definition of the POLITY IV dataset 
(Marshall et al. 2013). 
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Table 4.1 The highest average dependences of Country A on Country B from 1950 to 2001 
Country A Country B Average dependence of Country A on Country B (%GDP) 
Uruguay Brazil 0.022 (2.2%) 
Paraguay Argentina 0.021 (2.1%) 
Bolivia Argentina 0.018 (1.8%) 
El Salvador Guatemala 0.017 (1.7%) 
Paraguay Brazil 0.016 (1.6%) 
Panama Venezuela 0.015 (1.5%) 
Uruguay Argentina 0.013 (1.3%) 
Dominican Republic Venezuela 0.013 (1.3%) 
Chile Argentina 0.012 (1.2%) 
Guatemala El Salvador 0.011 (1.1%) 
Costa Rica Guatemala 0.011 (1.1%) 
Nicaragua Costa Rica 0.010 (1.0%) 
Argentina Brazil 0.010 (1.0%) 
Chile Brazil 0.010 (1.0%) 





trade flows with the other more than 1% of their gross domestic product (GDP), and the 
average interdependence among the 9,980 dyad-years is low at 0.0016 (0.16%) of their 
GDP. In addition, among the 15 most interdependent dyads, only three of them are 
composed of large economic entities, which means that except for these three dyads (in 
bold in Table 1), the high dependence of Country A on Country B may be due to the 
result of small scale GDP in the denominator. Given this low degree of interdependence 
in the region, the Latin American peace may not be well explained by the liberal 
commercial peace effect, either. 
As for whether the intergovernmental organizations (IGO) promote peace in the 
region, I plot the average number of MID onset per year between each dyad against the 
average number of their shared IGO memberships in Figure 4.2, which explicitly shows 
that, despite the dyads that had never experienced any MID, for those who had at least 
one MID during the past half century, with the increase of shared IGO memberships 
actually comes more MIDs. Although the pacifying effect of shared IGO memberships 
(Dorussen & Ward, 2008) and the aggregated count variable of the sum of it (Boehmer, 
Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004) are called into question, it is obvious that Latin American 
peace is not achieved by their most important regional IGO, Organization of America 
States (OAS), which includes all the Latin American countries and whose core purpose is 
to solve conflictual issues among the Latin American states peacefully. So far, based on 
empirical evidences, we have seen that none of the Kantian peace elements has 
meaningful influence on the Latin American peace. Democratic dyads are few and 
actually have higher probability of conflict, trade interdependence between Latin 




Figure 4.2 The mean Number of MID onsets per year and the mean number of shared IGO memberships of 
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with the increased frequency of conflict. Therefore, the results strongly suggest that Latin 
American peace is not promoted by the liberal peace components. Instead, there must be 
another concern that constrains the Latin American countries from the use of force as a 
dispute-constraining or dispute-resolving measurement. That is, I argue, the hegemonic 
stability effect of the United States’ security management.  
2.3 A hegemonic stability trajectory? 
Early since the 19th century, the international relations between the Latin 
American countries have been known to be in the shadow of the power of the United 
States. Due to the interests concern of economy (to get the agricultural and mineral 
products) and geopolitics (to exclude the influence from the European great powers), the 
United States has played the role of “regional police” since the 1880s (LaFeber, 1995; 
Smith, 1996; Schoultz, 1998; Mace, 1999; Buzan & Wæver, 2003b; Walker, 2011). After 
the end of World War II, because of the decline of the European great powers, the surge 
of the United States, along with the threat of Soviet communism, the influence of the 
United States in the region reached a new peak (Atkins, 1999). In almost all regional 
security literature regarding Latin America, the influence of the United States is always 
the main part of the regional security (Lake & Morgan, 1997; Buzan & Wæver, 2003b; 
Kelly, 2007). 
However, although few put into doubt the “regional police” role that the United 
States played, whether the regional peace attributed to the United States’ hegemonic 
security management is an open question. Generally speaking, there are at least three 
different points of view in the literature regarding the role the United States played in the 
regional peace: the hegemonic stability argument emphasizes the United States’ peace 
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keeping; the whirlpool model argues that the United States is only involved when its 
interests are compromised and disengages soon after the events are solved, a whirlpool-
like trajectory; and the radical argument contends that the United States is actually the 
one who provokes conflicts in the region (Gilderhus, 1992; Friedman, 2003; Pastor & 
Long, 2010; Rabe, 2010; Walker, 2011; Schmidli, 2012). 
Proponents of the hegemonic stability argument contend that the regional peace is 
due to the hegemonic stability effect led by the United States, because it restrains many 
small-scale local conflicts from escalating to large-scale warfare. Besides, the United 
States also promotes nonviolent conflict resolution in the region through the OAS. 
However, the others demonstrate that, according to the empirical evidences, the 
relationship between “the United States hegemony” and “the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of war and MID” in the region is not significant (Mares, 2001, pp. 55–83). 
The mixed empirical evidences result from the inconsistency of the role the United States 
played in different Latin American countries. During the post-World War II period, the 
United States successfully constrained many disputes from escalating in some countries, 
while in another it failed to do so, and in the others the United States was even accused of 
instigating one country to use military measures against another, especially the anti-
communist warfare in the 1960s and the 1970s.48  These contradicting findings call into 
question the hegemonic stability argument about the role the United States played in the 
regional peace. For the hegemonic stability argument to be valid, we should see the 
United States not only constrained the Latin American states from engaging in militarized 
conflict, but also encouraged conflict as a means of proxy war or buck-passing to punish 
48 Refer to Rabe (2010) to see a more detailed review of these events. 
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the state not toeing the line. However, except for some successful “regime change” 
throughout the Cold War,49  most of the time this “hegemonic security management” is 
not the case. After a scrutiny of all the Latin American militarized conflicts to see 
whether the use of force in Latin America “results from the unique influence of the 
United States,” Mares (2001) concludes that:  
“Force is used when the U.S. wants it, and also when the U.S. opposes 
its use. The strongest evidence exists for the anti-communism 
argument. Indeed, the period of the Cold War sees increased military 
conflict in the region. However, though U.S. anticommunism matters, 
it fails to explain the use of force, since force is used before and after 
the Cold War, and during the Cold War on issues entirely unrelated to 
communism. Though the U.S. is uniquely powerful, it is not a hegemon 
that provides the collective good of peace among nations of the region 
which have their own interests” (Mares, 2001, pp. 82–83). 
If neither the liberal factors nor the United States’ hegemonic security management 
worked in maintaining the regional peace, then the question becomes, how do we explain 
the reduction of conflict between the once-warlike Latin American countries in this half 
century? In the next section, I will demonstrate that Latin American peace does follow 
the hegemonic stability argument, while this effect is a conditional one – depending on 
whether the United States has enough economic leverage on the Latin American 
countries to influence the latter’s decision of conflictual behavior. I will also make 
49 According to Rabe's (2010) calculation, the United States “tried and largely succeeded in overthrowing 
governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua” (Rabe, 2010, p. 448). 
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another argument that, the regional peace gradually follows a “capitalist peace” trajectory 
in the post-Cold War period. 
2.4 A hegemony with conditional ability 
Whatever the true motivation of the hegemon is, all the different hegemonic 
stability theories implicitly assume that the hegemon has all the ability to influence all the 
other countries on conflict-constraining, either through coercing or through leading, by 
the hegemon’s hard-power or soft-power (Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1976; Gilpin, 
1981; Lake, 1993; Ikenberry, 2011). However, although the hegemony may have 
sufficient power and ability to constrain all the others from engaging in large scale wars, 
this does not mean that it has the same ability (e.g. resource, time, etc.) to refrain all the 
others from having small scale skirmishes, just like the prediction of the whirlpool model 
which suggests that the United States only involves in when it feels that it is necessary to 
do so. So the questions becomes, why does the United States selectively involve in the 
Latin American interstate disputes? Specifically, what are the factors that determine 
whether the United States chooses to involve or not to involve? And, how could we 
explain why the United States successfully constrains the Latin American interstate 
conflicts most of the time but sometimes it fails to do so? In this research, I argue that 
Latin American peace is maintained by the United States’ hegemonic security 
management; however, this “hegemonic stability” effect is a conditional one, which is 
conditioned on whether the United States has sufficient economic leverage on the Latin 
American leaders to constrain their conflictual behavior. 
I construct a game-theoretical model to demonstrate the conditional hegemonic 
security management of the United States in maintaining the regional peace. The game is 
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played by two actors: the aggressor, typically a certain Latin American state that has an 
incentive to initiate a militarized conflict against another Latin American target, and the 
United States. The aggressor has two options: to initiate a militarized conflict or not to 
initiate. And the United States, once seeing the aggressor initiated a conflict, has two 
options as well. The United States can choose to interfere or not. Therefore, there will be 
three different outcomes in the game. First, if the aggressor chooses not to initiate a 
militarized conflict, the outcome will be “the status quo.” Second, if the aggressor 
chooses to initiate a militarized conflict and the United States chooses not to interfere, the 
outcome will be “invasion,” which means that the aggressor invades the target. Lastly, if 
the aggressor chooses to initiate a militarized conflict and the United States chooses to 
interfere, the outcome will be “interference,” which means that the United States gets 
involved into the conflictual event. “Interference” includes both the successful and the 
unsuccessful United States’ interferences.  
The payoff structure is as following. As for the outcome of “the status quo,” the 
aggressor gets a payoff of α  because it enjoys the peaceful and harmony relationship 
with the target, and the United States gets a payoff of H  because it enjoys the hegemonic 
status in the region as well as its strategic benefits, despite what the strategic benefits are. 
As the outcome of “invasion,” the aggressor get a payoff of α−B , where B  denotes the 
utility the aggressor can get by invasion and α−  denotes the loss of the peaceful and 
harmony relationship with the target.  
As for the outcome of “interference,” the payoff structure depends on whether the 
United States is able to punish the aggressor for invading. Let p  denote the probability 
that the United States successfully punishes the aggressor, and p−1  denotes the 
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probability that the United States fails to punish the aggressor. The aggressor gets α−B  
if the United States is not able to punish the aggressor and AggressorC−−α  if the United 
States is able to do so, where AggressorC−  means the cost of the aggressor when being 
punished. The United States gets USCH −  if it successfully punishes the aggressor and 
USCH −−  if it fails to do so, where H−  means the United States’ hegemonic status in 
the region is compromised and USC−  means the cost the United States pays for exerting 
the punishment. Therefore, under the “interference” situation, the expected utility payoff 
of the aggressor is ))(())(1( AggressorCpBp −−+−− αα  and the expected utility payoff of 
the United States is ))(1())(( USUS CHpCHp −−−+− . Figure 4.3 is the game-theoretical 
model. 
My argument claims that, in Latin America, peace is achieved by two manners. 
First, the aggressor does not initiate militarized conflicts against other Latin American 
countries; and second, the United States goes to interfere aggressions and constrains the 
aggressor. I then solve the game-theoretical model according to these two situations. 
I use backwards induction to solve this game-theoretical model. I start from 
whether the United States chooses to interfere or not to interfere. For the United States to 
choose to interfere, the payoff of “interfere” must be higher than the payoff of “not to 
interfere.”  
TheU United States (Interfere > Not to interfere) 





>         








The United States 
Not to initiate Initiate 
Not to interfere Interfere 
Status Quo 
Invasion Interference (successful or not) 
Figure 4.3 The game-theoretical model 
(α , H ) 
( α−B , H− ) ( p−1 )( α−B )+( p )( AggressorC−−α ), 
( p )( USCH − )+( p−1 )( USCH −− ) 
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interfere, the probability that it can successfully punish the aggressor must be higher than 
the cost divided by twice the benefit of keeping a hegemonic status in the region. That is, 
the smaller the cost and the higher the benefit of keeping a hegemonic status in the region, 
the more likely that the United States will choose to interfere in the conflictual events in 
Latin America.  
 In the second stage of the backwards induction, I compare whether the aggressor 
chooses to initiate or not to initiate. For the aggressor to choose not to initiate, the payoff 
of “not to initiate” must be higher than the payoff of “initiate.”  
TheU Aggressor (Not to initiate > Initiate) 











      (3) 
Equation (2) and (3) show that, for the aggressor to choose not to initiate rather than to 
initiate, two preconditions must be matched: either that the peaceful and harmony 
relationship the aggressor enjoys with other Latin American countries is higher than at 
least half of the benefit the aggressor can get by invading them, or that the probability 
that the United States can successfully punish the aggressor must be high enough. For the 
probability that the United States can successfully punish the aggressor to be high enough, 
according to equation (3), both α  (the benefit of the aggressor when enjoying a harmony 
relationship with the target) and AggressorC  (the cost of the aggressor when being punished) 
must be high enough.  
In sum, Latin American peace is achieved by two manners: the aggressor does not 
initiate militarized conflicts against other Latin American countries, and the United States 
goes to interfere aggressions and constrains the aggressor. According to the solutions of 
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the game-theoretical model, five factors are important to the maintenance of the regional 
peace: the benefit of the aggressor to have a peaceful relationship with the target is high, 
the benefit the aggressor can get from invasion is low, the cost of the aggressor to initiate 
an aggression is high, the cost of the United States to interfere is low, and the benefit that 
the United States could get from maintaining a hegemonic status in the region is high. 
Regarding the role the United States plays in the region, the game-theoretical model tells 
that, for the United States to have a strong incentive to deter or to interfere a militarized 
conflict, two preconditions must be satisfied: either the benefit of being a hegemon in the 
region is high enough, or the cost of interfering the aggressive behavior is low enough. 
 Typically, states have various policy tools to achieve their international goals. 
They can use diplomatic, economic, and/or military tools to persuade or coerce other 
states to behave in accordance with their goals. Among the different tools, military tools 
are usually the most expensive and regarded as the last resort. In addition, it is more 
difficult for leaders to avoid domestic pressure or audience cost by using military 
measures than by using diplomatic or economic tools, especially in democratic countries. 
As a consequence, most of the time leaders will prefer to achieve their international goals 
by using diplomatic or economic tools rather than by using force. This logic applies to the 
United States’ hegemonic security management in Latin America. Whenever there is a 
conflict between two Latin American countries, the United States, on the one hand, 
prefers to manage the conflictual event to maintain its leadership status and strategic 
interest in the region, while on the other hand it does not want to get bogged down in the 
conflict and its own domestic pressure of using force. Therefore, whether the United 
States has sufficient diplomatic and economic tools to influence the Latin American 
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countries becomes an important factor to affect its ability as well as its willingness (Most 
& Starr, 1989) to manage the ongoing conflict. As long as the United States has enough 
diplomatic and economic leverage on the conflict initiator to constrain its conflictual 
behavior, the cost of interfering tends to be lower. So as long as the United States still 
values the benefit of being a hegemon and enjoying the strategic interest in the region, it 
will be more likely to deter or mediate the conflictual events in the Latin American states 
who are highly economically dependent on it because it has more leverage to constrain 
both sides from engaging in conflict. Instead, in the Latin American states who are not 
economically dependent on the United States, it lacks such a leverage to exert its 
influence, which makes the cost of interfering too high to be workable. As a consequence, 
the United States’ ability and willingness of security management in these Latin 
American countries tend to be weak. This is the reason why we observe that the United 
States has played an ambiguous role in the regional peace and why most scholars support 
the whirlpool model when explaining the United States’ Latin American policy. Thus the 
first hypothesis derived from my argument to be tested is: 
Hypothesis 1: Latin American countries who have higher economic ties with the 
United States are less likely to engage in militarized conflict.  
2.5 A capitalist peace trajectory: new development after the Cold War 
 The game-theoretical model predicts that when two preconditions are satisfied, 
the United States is more likely to engage in constraining Latin American leaders from 
having militarized conflict: either the benefit of being a hegemon in the region is high 
enough, or the cost of interfering the aggressive behavior is low enough. According to 
this prediction, two new phenomenon which arise in the region after the end of the Cold 
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War may change the path of the regional peace. The first one is that, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1989, Latin America as a region has lost the strategic value of 
geopolitics it used to have to the United States (Castañeda, 2003). When containing the 
spread of communism and the threat of the Soviet Union is no longer a priority after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the benefit of being a hegemon in the region for the United 
States is not as attractive as before. By the same token, the United States’ incentive of 
interfering in conflictual events in the region should also become less and less salient 
after the end of the Cold War.  
The second one is the rise of the concern of pursuing economic development in 
the region. Aside from the hegemonic security management of the United States, the 
market liberalization reform in the 1980s and 1990s in almost all the Latin American 
countries and the advance of international integration in the South America since the mid-
1980s (Kacowicz, 1995, 1998a, 2000) strongly suggest that pursuing economic growth is 
a shared consensus among the Latin American leaders since the last years of the Cold 
War, which implies that a tendency of the capitalist peace may start to emerge. 
The capitalist peace theories point out four arguments to claim that it is the 
capitalist’s concerns rather than the democratic effects that lead to peace (Mousseau, 
2010): peace through trade and free markets (Weede, 1996; McDonald, 2004), peace 
through market-intensive economy (Mousseau, 2000, 2002, 2003; Mousseau, Hegre, & 
O’neal, 2003; Mousseau, 2009, 2013), peace through financial openness (Gartzke, Li, & 
Boehmer, 2001; Gartzke, 2007), and peace through the limited proportion of 
governments’ nontax revenue (McDonald, 2007, 2009). Despite which of the reasons is 
the main cause that contributes to the regional peace, Latin American countries since the 
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1980s did undergo economic reforms that contain all the four ingredients. For scholars 
who work on linking the internal and external factors to explain states’ foreign policy 
regarding conflict and peace (Solingen, 2001, 2003, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 
Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; McDonald, 2004; Brooks, 2013), a state’s economic policy is 
“not merely a projection of a leader’s personal political calculations and interests, but 
rather it is a combination of political/economic interests and preferences (philosophy and 
prospects) shared by a leader, political officials, and a group of individuals within society 
about how to achieve national prosperity and growth” (Tang, 2012, p. 398). Based on this 
internal-external linkage, the adoption of economic liberalization reform and the progress 
of international integration among the once-warlike Latin American countries since the 
1980s may also imply that there is a gradual change of the preference of these countries. 
After the end of the Cold War when Latin America lost its strategic importance to the 
United States due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the rise of the capitalist 
peace concern in the region, we should see the influence of the United States in the region 
keeps decreasing. Therefore, I posit that, first, in the post-Cold War period, not only the 
United States’ economic leverage but also the capitalist peace concern should have a 
significant pacifying effect on the regional peace; and second, the substantive effect of 
the latter should be more salient than the former since the strategic importance of the 
region is not as critical as it was during the Cold War period. Thus the second and third 
hypotheses to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 2: Latin American dyads who have higher degree of development are 
less likely to engage in militarized conflict in the post-Cold War period. 
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Hypothesis 3: The substantive effect of the capitalist peace concern is larger than 
the substantive effect of the United States’ economic leverage in the reduction of 
militarized conflict in the post-Cold War period. 
In the coming third section, I will explain how I design the statistical models to 
test the three hypotheses derived from my argument, and the fourth section is the 
empirical results of the Latin American conflicts from 1950 to 2001. 
3 Research design 
3.1 Dependent variable: force MID onset 
Following most of the literature on international conflict, I use the onset of a new 
MID between two Latin America states each year as the dependent variable because the 
dyadic design can better take different security threats that different countries face into 
concern. Thus the unit of analysis is dyad-year. I derive the MID data (Ghosn et al., 2004) 
from the Correlates of War database. A MID is defined as “a set of interactions between 
or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or 
actual uses of military force” (Gochman & Maoz, 1984, p. 586). Because of the fact that 
almost all the militarized conflicts between Latin American countries are recurrent ones 
from previous conflicts (Hensel, 1994), I look at only the MIDs that go to at least the 
levels of “use of force” and “war” to avoid the noisy information and coding problems 
pervasive in the low levels of conflicts,50  especially among the Latin American dyads 
where “threats to use military force” is not an expensive concern for many of the 
nondemocratic leaders. Thus, the dependent variable I use is Force MID onset, a 
50 Relative discussion about the miscoding concern of low-level MIDs refer to Toset, Gleditsch, and Hegre 
(2000, p. 894), Souva and Prins (2006, p. 191), and Johnston (2012, pp. 56–58). 
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dichotomous variable coded 1 for the first year of a new force MID in a dyad and 0 
otherwise. The subsequent years of the same force MID in the starting year is dropped 
from the data to reduce the problem of temporal dependence, because the statistical 
model I employ in this study, logit regression, assumes that the conflict events being 
analyzed are independent of each other. Because force MID onset is a time-series cross-
sectional binary variable across time (years) and space (dyads), in order to produce 
accurate standard errors and consistent coefficients, I estimate the logit regression model 
with Huber/White robust standard error which assumes that observations within the same 
dyad across years are correlated but those between different dyads are uncorrelated, 
adjusting for clustering in dyads. I also adopt Carter and Signorino’s (2010) method to 
include peace years, peace years’ square, and peace years’ cube into the model to control 
for temporal dependence.51  As most of the literature, I estimate all the models with 
dependent variable at time t  and independent variables at time 1−t  to mitigate problems 
of reverse causality.  
3.2 Independent variables 
 My theory predicts that it is the country that has less economic ties with the 
United States that determines the militarized conflict during the Cold War period, and 
that countries that are more developed are less likely to have militarized conflict after the 
Cold War, so my independent variables will include the countries’ degree of economic 
links with the United States as well as their degree of development. I operationalize the 
former by measuring the Latin American states’ degree of trade dependence on the 
United States in proportion to their gross domestic product (GDP), Dependence on the 
51 I also estimate all the models using Beck, Katz, and Tucker's (1998) peace years and cubic splines to 
control for temporal dependence, the outcomes are almost identical. 
137 
                                                          
 
United States, which represents how the former is economically dependent on the United 
States and how much economic leverage the latter has to influence the former. Data of 
the trade share is from the COW bilateral trade data, version 3.0 (Barbieri, Keshk, & 
Pollins, 2009; Barbieri & Keshk, 2012). 
As for the degree of development, following most of the capitalist peace literature, 
I measure the Latin American countries’ degree of development by their GDP per capita, 
GDP/pc, and log it to adjust the skewness. Data of GDP per capita is from Gleditsch’s 
(2002) expanded trade and GDP data. 
In the following models I estimate the independent variables following the “weak 
link” logic52  and include both the lower value (Low dependence on the United States) 
and the higher value (High dependence on the United States) of the two countries in 
each dyad-year. 
3.3 Control variables 
  Also following most of the studies on international conflict, I control for the 
variables that are demonstrated to be influential. I control for both countries’ degree of 
interdependence (Dependence),53  degree of democracy (Polity score),54  the number of 
their joint intergovernmental organization memberships (IGOs),55  their power parity 
52 The “weak link” logic is originally designed by Dixon (1994) and then followed by Oneal and Russett 
(1997) and many other following studies on international conflict, which assumes that “the likelihood of 
dyadic conflict is primarily determined by the less constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal & 
Russett, 1997, p. 273). 
53 Data from Gleditsch (2002). 
54 Data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013). 
55 Data from Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004). 
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(Power parity),56  whether they are contiguous (Contiguity),57  and the distance between 
their capitals in logged miles (Distance).58  
 Specifically for my theory, I also control for several rival explanations to 
demonstrate my independent variables are still valid even after taking these factors into 
concern. My theory predicts that whether the United States has enough economic 
leverage on the Latin American countries determines the latter’s conflict propensity, but 
it is possible that the latter’s degree of trade dependence on the United States is resulting 
from whether they have already been in a good relationship with the United States, or it is 
possible that it is the distance between them and the United States that determines their 
trade ties with it. Therefore, controlling for their interest similarity with the United States 
and their distance to the United States is necessarily for my argument to be persuasive. So 
I include the following two control variables: Interest similarity with the US is the 
difference of ideal points between the Latin American countries and the United States in 
terms of their voting pattern in the General Assembly of the United Nations, data from 
Strezhnev and Voeten (2013). Distance to the US is the distance between the two 
capitals in logged miles, data from the COW database.  
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Basic analysis 
 Table 4.2 shows the results of the three models I estimate. Model 1 is the full 
model which includes the whole sample space from 1950 to 2001. My theory predicts 
56 Data from Singer (1988). 
57 Data from Stinnett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer, and Gochman (2002). 
58 Data generated by the Eugene software, Version 3.204 (Bennett & Stam, 2000). 
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that the probability of conflict decreases with the increase of Latin American countries’ 
dependence on the United States during the whole sample period. The result of Model 1 
confirms my argument that it is the Latin American country that has less economic ties 
with the United States that determines the probability of conflict, while all the other 
realism and liberal factors do not have significant effects on conflict-constraining. 
Model 2 shows the result during the Cold War period from 1950 to 1989, and my theory 
predicts that during this period the most important factor that promotes the Latin 
American peace is whether the United States has enough economic leverage on the Latin 
American countries to constrain their conflictual behavior. The result of Model 2 
confirms my argument that Latin American countries who have higher economic ties 
with the United States are less likely to engage in conflict. Again, all the realism and 
liberal factors seem to be irrelevant in the reduction of the probability of conflict.  
Model 3 contains only the samples after the end of the Cold War from 1990 to 2001, and 
my theory predicts that after the end of the Cold War both the United States’ economic 
leverage and the capitalist concern are the key factors to the regional peace. The result of 
Model 3 confirms my claim that, after the Cold War, the higher the United States’ 
economic leverage on the Latin American countries and the more developed they are, the 
less likely they engage in conflict. The substantive effects (in the next section) also 
demonstrate that since 1990 economic development becomes the most important conflict-
constraining factor in the region. Latin American countries gradually walk from the path 
of hegemonic stability toward the capitalist peace trajectory. 
As for the results of the rival explanation variables and the control variables, as 




Table 4.2 Determinants on force MID onset between Latin American countries 
 
[Dependent variable t ] Force MID onset 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Full Model During the Cold War After the Cold War 
 1950~2001 1950~1989 1990~2001 
[Independent variables 1−t ]    
Low dependence on the United States -22.893*** -25.970* -27.515** 
 (6.326) (13.619) (10.783) 
    
High dependence on the United States 2.065 6.167 -2.753* 
 (3.262) (5.069) (1.612) 
    
State A’s GDP/pc -0.130 0.640 -2.393*** 
 (0.501) (0.486) (0.578) 
    
State B’s GDP/pc 0.261 0.868 -1.632** 
 (0.693) (0.686) (0.702) 
    
[Control variables 1−t ]    
State A’ Interest similarity with the United States 0.367 0.690* 0.240 
 (0.267) (0.365) (1.057) 
    
State B’ Interest similarity with the United States -0.449** -0.861** -0.204 
 (0.189) (0.368) (0.698) 
    
State A’s distance to the United States 0.497 0.462 -0.471 
 (1.166) (1.384) (1.512) 
    
State B’s distance to the United States -1.628 -1.925* -1.486 
 (1.021) (1.152) (2.021) 
    
State A’s dependence on State B 46.354*** 61.551*** 43.406 
 (17.811) (17.024) (31.231) 
    
State B’s dependence on State A -41.419* -66.700** 22.220 
 (24.082) (27.596) (41.984) 
    
State A’s polity score -0.022 -0.030 0.007 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.101) 
    
State B’s polity score -0.018 -0.013 -0.059 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.099) 
    
IGOs 0.075*** 0.064* 0.176** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.071) 
    
Power parity 0.342 0.721 0.567 
 (0.662) (0.644) (1.135) 
    
Contiguity 2.476*** 4.331*** 0.314 
 (0.813) (0.624) (0.607) 
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Distance -0.336 -0.391 0.328 
 (0.221) (0.239) (0.863) 
    
Cold War 0.546   
 (0.365)   




-0.174*** -0.153 -0.096 
 (0.066) (0.111) (0.148) 




0.006 0.008 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 




-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Constant 2.353 -7.352 34.726** 
 (4.789) (6.672) (13.752) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.373 0.411 0.479 
Log likelihood. -234.314 -161.725 -51.286 
Chi-squared 1288.293 708.848 552.647 
Probability > Chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of dyads 190 190 190 
Number of observations 9,462 7,410 2,052 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The total number of observations of 
the 20 Latin American countries from 1950 to 2001 should be 9,880, from 1950 to 1989 should be 7,600, 
and from 1990 to 2001 should be 2,280.
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on the probability of force MID across the three different time periods. The only one 
variable which has a consistent effect on force MID onset between Latin American dyads 
is one of the Kantian peace factors – the number of shared intergovernmental 
organization memberships (IGOs), and it is positive with the probability of conflict.  
In sum, all the empirical result confirms the two points I make. First, Latin 
American peace is mainly maintained by the hegemonic stability effect of the United 
States’ security management, and this American hegemonic stability effect is conditioned 
on whether the United States has enough economic leverage on the Latin American 
countries to constrain their conflictual behavior. Second, after the end of the Cold War, 
pursuing for economic growth and development becomes the most important reason that 
reduces Latin American leaders’ incentive to engage in conflict.  
4.2 Substantive effects 
 To further demonstrate the substantive effects of the independent variables, in 
Table 4.3 I list the predicted probabilities of force MID onset when each of the 
independent variables moves from its minimum to maximum, holding all other 
continuous variables at their means and assuming contiguity. In sum, during the half 
century, the most important and consistent factor that promotes the regional peace is 
Latin American states’ degree of dependence on the United States; and after the end of 
the Cold War, the capitalist peace concern, states’ degree of development, becomes the 
dominant effect that reduces the probability of conflict in the region.  
5 Concluding remark: capitalist peace and its threats 
 In this research I propose an argument to explain the ambiguous role the United 
States has played in the regional peace, that is, a hegemony who maintains the regional 
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Low dependence on the United States -0.0201724 -0.0222253 -0.0025403 
High dependence on the United States   -0.0006865 
State A’s GDP/pc   -0.0473534 
State B’s GDP/pc   -0.0291378 
Note: The predicted probabilities of force MID onset are calculated by holding all the continuous variables 
at their means and assuming contiguity. The baseline probability of force MID onset is 0.0061 (46 conflicts 








peace with conditional ability. In countries that have higher degree of economic 
dependence on the United States, the United States has enough influence and economic 
leverage on the former to constrain the former from using force. Instead, in countries that 
have lower degree of economic dependence on the United States, the United States does 
not have sufficient policy leverage on the latter. As a consequence, the hegemonic 
stability effect of the United States’ security management becomes less salient in these 
countries. Therefore, the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ leadership in the 
region is a conditional one, which hinges on whether the United States has enough 
economic leverage to influence a certain Latin American country’s conflictual behavior. 
My argument also demonstrates that after the Cold War, Latin American peace 
largely follows the capitalist peace trajectory. Moving toward this path, as long as the 
Latin American countries are able to keep the pace of economic growth, the regional 
peace may be able to evolve, in Miller’s (2005) phrase, from the “normal peace” of 
conflict resolution to the “warm peace” of deep international integration. However, when 
the United States has lost its strategic incentive to afford the cost for maintaining the 
regional peace since the end of the Cold War, the capitalist peace concern may become 
the only salient factor that reduces the Latin American leaders’ incentive in solving their 
disputes with force. Thus, whether the Latin American countries can sustain their 
economic performance may become the key to the regional peace. If it is the case, then 
two sources of threats to the regional economic development may be critical to the 
international relations among the Latin American countries.  
The first one comes from the international. In the past decades, Latin American 
economy has been sensitive to the world economic circle as well as to the reoccurring 
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financial crises. Therefore, the probability of militarized conflict in the region may 
increase when the regional economy is affected by the negative turbulences of the world 
economy. The second one comes from the domestic. Many Latin American countries are 
notorious for having a highly-unequal society and an unstable democracy. Thus the 
potential unrest resulting from domestic redistribution issues may arise when the Latin 
American countries are not able to keep their growth pace, which may further 






The Embedded Liberalism and the International Relations between the 
European Union Countries 
1 Introduction 
 Since the end of World War II, the European Union countries have been the most 
developed, democratic, and peaceful region in the world. This long and salient peace 
between the European Union counties is composed of many factors that mutually 
reinforce as a virtuous circle. According to realisms, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) collective security and their common enemy – The Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – maintain the peaceful situation between the 
European Union countries. For the liberals, the peaceful relationship attributes to their 
democratic regimes, high degree of interdependence, and successful international 
integration through the European Community. As for the constructivists, they highlight 
the contribution of the constructive process of security community. In any perspective, 
the European Union countries are the most peaceful region in the world after World War 
II.  
 Although the European Union countries are the most peaceful region in the world, 
this does not mean that there is not any conflict happened between them. However, 
previous research on this regional peace seldom discusses the variations of the 
international relations between the European Union countries. One of the reason, I argue, 
is due to the limitation of data availability. The most popular conflict data in 
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contemporary international relations research, militarized interstate dispute (MID) of the 
Correlates of War database, records only the data of militarized conflict. As a consequent, 
if researchers look at the international relations between the European Union counties, 
there is no variation in the dependent variable because there are simply too few 
militarized conflicts happened between them, especially that there is not a single MID 
occurred so far since the end of Cold War.59  The lack of militarized conflicts between 
the European Union countries precludes researchers from further investigating the 
variations of their international relations.  
 However, even though there is a lack of militarized conflict, especially after the 
end of Cold War, non-militarized conflicts do occur among the European Union countries 
from time to time. What are the reasons that cause the variations between the 
international relations among the European Union countries? Why do conflicts still exist 
in a region that is the richest, the most democratic, and the most integrated place in the 
world? In this research, I make an argument to link the logic of the embedded liberalism 
with international relations between the European Union countries. I argue that the main 
conflictual issues among the European Union countries mainly result from trade and 
international integration, which involves the struggle between their domestic 
internationalizing and backlashing coalitions on market opening issues. Due to the market 
opening and international integration concerns, countries who participate in the regional 
integration deeper and simultaneously maintain higher domestic compensation (in terms 
of social expenditure) tend to have less conflicts with other countries. This is because of 
two main reasons. The first reason is that, people in countries with higher domestic 
59 The last militarized interstate dispute occurred between the European Union countries is the 1986 fishery 
dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain. 
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compensation have less risks due to a larger safety net. Therefore, they are more likely to 
support for market opening and international integration, thus reduce the number of 
conflict resulting from these two issues. The second one is that, higher domestic 
compensation also means that the governments are more responsive to domestic demands, 
and these kind of governments are less likely to act belligerently against others. Due to 
these two reasons, among the European Union countries, those who have higher 
interdependence on the others tend to have more conflicts with the others, and those who 
have higher domestic compensation tend to have less conflicts with the others. The 
interaction between these two factors, the degree of interdependence and the degree of 
domestic compensation, accounts for the number of conflicts between the European 
Union countries. Thus, my argument explains the variations of the international relations 
in the most peaceful region in the world.  
 To proceed my argument, the structure of the research is as following. The second 
section is the theory, in which I explain how the logic of the embedded liberalism can 
help predict European Union countries’ international relations in terms of the number of 
different kinds of interstate conflict. I proceed this argument by looking at both the 
pacifying effect and the conflictual effect of trade and domestic compensation. The goal 
of this section is to demonstrate that trade and domestic compensation are the most 
important political issues among the European Union countries, establishing the base for 
the following analysis. Then, in the third section I propose the research design to test my 
argument, in which I lay out how I apply the 10 million international dyadic events (IDE) 
dataset to conceptualize different levels of interstate conflicts to perform the empirical 
tests. The fourth section is the statistical analysis. The data I use to test my argument 
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includes conflicts between the total 15 European Union countries from 1990 to 2004. The 
15 European Union countries include Germany, Netherland, Belgium, Luxemburg, 
France, Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, 
Finland, and Austria. Lastly, the final section is the concluding remark. The contribution 
of this research is, on the one hand, to conceptualize different levels of interstate conflict 
between the European Union countries by applying a useful dataset, and one the other 
hand, to supplement the insufficient literature about the missing part of the international 
relations in the most peaceful region in the world. The finding of this research confirms 
Garrett (1998), Pitruzzello (2004) and Ruggie’s (1982) conclusions that, since the end of 
World War II, the embedded liberalism has been and will still be an important concern of 
international security in this highly globalized world.  
2 Embedded liberalism and international relations 
 In this part I first explain my argument about why we can predict the international 
relations between the European Union countries by looking at their degree of 
interdependence and degree of domestic compensation, and then I point out the 
hypotheses derived from my argument to be further tested in the next section. I begin 
with a discussion about the post-WWII development of their arrangement of economic 
system at both the domestic level and the international level, and then posit the possible 
causal mechanisms that link this post-War arrangement to their international relations. In 
brief, the post-WWII development of the embedded liberalism, the consequence of 
interdependence, and the reasons that states do domestic compensation, together form an 
internal-external linkage as the domestic explanations of international relations between 
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the European Union countries, the most democratic, developed, and integrated place in 
the world.  
 I build my argument by answering three related questions: First, why trade, 
international integration, and domestic compensation are the most important political 
issues among the European Union countries? Second, what are the consequence in terms 
of states’ international relations if they are highly interdependent? Third, what are the 
reasons that the states maintain a high or a low degree of domestic compensation? The 
answers of these three questions suggest four hypotheses about the variation of their 
international relations.  
2.1 The balance between the two contradictory goals of each state and the post WWII 
peace between the European Union countries 
 The first question is, why trade, international integration, and domestic 
compensation are the most important political issues among the European Union 
countries? The answer to this question can be traced back early to the French Revolution 
and the Industrial Revolution which set up the grand socioeconomic background and 
party alignment in the West European countries (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Boix, 1999; 
Cox, 2001; Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice, 2007; Kreuzer, 2010; Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice, 
2010; Boix, 2010). Here I only focus on the post-WWII arrangement because it is more 
directly related to the trade and international integration issues today among the European 
Union countries. 
 Early since the end of the Napoleonic War in 1816, after every systemic war the 
victorious countries will convene a conference to design a new post-war international 
system, and the goal of this new post-war system is to avoid the causes of the war from 
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happening again (Ikenberry, 2000). The Bretton Woods System was designed by the 
same reason (Ikenberry, 2000, p. 163-214). One of the main causes of World War II is 
due to the trade competition between the European countries resulting from two 
contradicting goals: the economic nationalism and the liberalism of the gold standard and 
free trade (Ruggie, 1982, p. 393). The economic nationalism emphasizes the priority of 
domestic policy, neglecting the fact that pursuing domestic policy may cause negative 
externalities to other countries and therefore leads to international conflict. A good 
example is that, in the 1930s the European countries one another adopted policies of 
raising their trade barriers and devaluating their currencies in order to protect their 
domestic markets, which resulted in international disputes and became the main cause of 
World War II (McDonald, 2004; McDonald & Sweeney, 2007). The liberalism of the 
gold standard and free trade pursues the stability of exchange rate in order to facilitate 
trade, neglecting the importance of domestic social stability, therefore makes the state not 
able to use fiscal and monetary policies to adjust their trade deficit or implement 
Keynesian policies to stimulate economic growth. As a consequent, the state will undergo 
social instability, and social instability will further force leaders to adopt economic 
nationalism, which draws the state into a vicious circle of international conflict.  
In order to avoid international conflicts resulting from these two contradicting 
goals, how to find a balance between these two contradictory goals of each state in 
participating in the global market is the key to peace. In order to fulfill this goal, the 
designers of the post-World War II order set up the so-called “Bretton Woods System.” 
Bretton Woods System constructed a multilateral international regime, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), to supervise and coordinate member states’ trade and monetary 
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policies. If a state has trade deficit, IMF can either offer loans or approve the state of 
changing its exchange rate to adjust its trade deficit by other member states’ agreement. 
As a consequence, the member states do not necessary have to use trade barriers or 
devaluate their currencies to alter their trade deficit, therefore avoid international conflict 
resulting from the struggle between the economic nationalism and the liberalism of gold 
standard and free trade. Due to the fact that the European countries’ economy was 
severely destroyed by the war, the United States took the responsibility to take over the 
leadership of the new international system (Kindleberger, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Gilpin, 
1987).  
 After World War II, the Bretton Woods System successfully brought peace and 
economic prosperity to advanced industrial countries for more than thirty years. The 
Success of the Bretton Woods System makes many people think that trade and market 
openness is indispensable for countries who struggle for economic growth. Therefore, 
when it comes to helping the underdeveloped and the developing countries, they drum for 
free trade and liberalized financial and monetary policies, the “the Washington 
Consensus” (Williamson, 1989). But the paradox is that, the reason of the success of the 
Bretton Woods System is not due to unlimited free trade, but the limitation of trade 
(Gilpin, 1987, 2001). Free trade and unlimited market openness is never the goal of the 
Bretton Woods System designers. The designers of the Bretton Woods System set up 
trade statues which leaves huge amount of policy space for each member countries to 
build their own capitalisms according to their different political economic environments, 
which includes their distinct approaches to corporate governance, labor markets, tax 
regimes, business-government relations, and welfare state arrangements (Hall & Soskice, 
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2001; Hancké, 2009). As Rodrik’s (2011) description, the original goal of the most 
important international regime of the Bretton Woods System globalization, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is designed to: 
“…leave each trading nation room to pursue its social and economic 
objectives relatively unencumbered by external constraints, albeit with 
a loose framework of international cooperation. When trade threatened 
domestic distributional bargains, trade would give way…….GATT’s 
purpose was never to maximize free trade. It was to achieve the 
maximum amount of trade compatible with different nations doing 
their own thing” (Rodrik, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
In other words, GATT gives each member state the priority to deal with their own 
domestic issues. States can choose to open their market to the degree that they are well-
prepared for the impact caused by trade. Before they open their specific industries, they 
are able to have enough policy space to handle the social risks of market opening such as 
unemployment, distribution, welfare, and infant industries. Garrett (1998) concludes the 
reason why globalization under the Bretton Woods System is so successful is due to its 
policy of fixed exchange rates with capital controls: 
“Bretton Woods facilitated the twin goals of trade liberalization and 
domestic compensation by combining fixed exchange rates with capital 
controls. Fixed rates promoted trade by stabilizing expectations about 
future price movements. Capital controls gave governments the 
macroeconomic autonomy to smooth business cycles through 
countercyclical demand management” (Garrett, 1998, p. 797). 
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The way the Bretton Woods System facilitate trade globalization and economic 
prosperity is called “the embedded liberalism” by (Ruggie, 1982, 1994). The embedded 
liberalism is a compromise between the extreme nationalism and the extreme liberalism, 
in which neither of them are able to bring long-term stability and prosperity to 
international relations. In Ruggie’s own words, 
“The task of postwar institutional reconstruction……was to maneuver 
between these two extremes and to devise a framework which would 
safeguard and even aid the quest for domestic stability without, at the 
same time, triggering the mutually destructive external consequences 
that had plagued the interwar period. This was the essence of the 
embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism of 
the thirties, it would be multilateral in character unlike the liberalism of 
the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be 
predicated upon domestic interventionism” (Ruggie, 1982, p. 393). 
The spirit of the embedded liberalism is just like the concept of “the double movement” 
emphasized by Polanyi (1944) when he discussed about the emergence of industrial 
democracies in the 19th century, which means that the state fulfills two components 
simultaneously: 
“One component was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at 
the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of 
the trading classes, and using largely laissez faire and free trade as its 
methods; the other was the principle of social protection, aiming at the 
conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, 
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relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by 
the deleterious action of the market, and using instruments of 
intervention as its methods” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 132). 
That is, the state opens its domestic market and supports free trade, while at the same 
time compensates those who are hurt by market opening with welfare policies, therefore, 
people can enjoy the economic prosperity from free trade and the losers of trade do not 
necessarily go against market openness.  
 The logic of the embedded liberalism is further empirically confirmed by 
Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1985), and Rodrik (1998). Looking at 18 advanced 
capitalism countries, Cameron (1978) found that except for those with large domestic 
market or those far away from their main trade partners, countries with higher degree of 
market openness have larger public sectors. This is the reason, he claimed, that the public 
sector of these countries expanded so quickly after World War II. Katzenstein (1985) 
investigated the trade policy of seven small states in Europe, finding that in order to 
survive in the volatile world economy, those European small states chose to largely 
participate in the world market, and meanwhile increased their government spending to 
compensate for the harmful effects of market openness, which made the economic growth 
more insured. Rodrik (1998) further verified the causal mechanisms between market 
openness and public sector expansion. Because the domestic economy is very sensitive to 
international economy dynamics in an open economy, therefore, people in democratic 
countries require the government to compensate the risks of market opening. In order to 
fulfill this kind of demand, government in an open economy builds a large scale social 
security network.  
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In sum, by market opening and domestic compensation, countries one the one 
hand enjoy the benefits of globalization, and on the other hand compensate the losers of 
trade by part of the revenues from the benefits. This “Keynesian welfare state” approach 
gives countries a “win-win” situation by social insurance and social expenditure, and this 
so-called “the compromise of embedded liberalism” is the reason that makes 
globalization under the Bretton Woods System and economic integration between the 
European Union countries run so successfully. As a consequence, trade, international 
integration, and domestic compensation become the most important political issues and 
conflicts in the European Union countries since the end of WWII (Kriesi et al., 2008, 
2012). 
2.2 The consequence of high degree of interdependence: pacifying and conflictual effects 
 Due to the successful liberal factors – interdependence, democracy, international 
regimes and international integration, the European Union countries become the most 
peaceful region in the world after the end of WWII (Mitrany, 1948a; Deutsch, Burrell, 
Kann, & Lee, 1957; Haas, 1958; Deutsch, 1961; Haas, 1964a; Mitrany, 1966; Adler & 
Barnett, 1998; Miller, 2005). According to the most popular conflict dataset, the 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004, p. 3) of the 
Correlates of War database, there are only 1 dyadic MIDs happened without any fatality60  
among the total 2,154 non-directed dyad-year observations of the 15 European Union 
countries from 1950 to 2001. And till today there has not been any single MID happened 
between the European Union countries since 1986 when the last MID occurred. Although 
there is a lack of militarized conflict among the European Union countries, they do 
60 That is the 1986 Britain-Spain fishery dispute. 
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cooperate and compete with each other day by day. The lack of militarized conflict is by 
no means equal to saying that there is no variation in their international relationship. 
Some countries have more conflictual issues with others, while some have less, although 
these conflictual issues never escalate to the degree that involves the use of force. If their 
international relations do vary, how do we explain the variation of the international 
relations between the European Union countries? What are the factors that drive the 
relationship between the world’s most developed, democratic, and integrated countries? 
The answers to the rest two of the three questions, I argue, can help explain the variations 
of the international relations between the European Union countries, where trade and 
international integration are the most important issues in their political arena. 
The second question is, what are the consequences in terms of states’ international 
relations if they are highly interdependent? According to the liberal commercial peace 
theories, generally speaking, trade can promote peace in terms of the reduction of 
militarized interstate disputes (Oneal & Russett, 1999; Maoz, 2009; Hegre, Oneal, & 
Russett, 2010). This is due to three causal mechanisms (Kastner, 2005). The constraint 
arguments state that as interdependence increases, the cost of military conflict also 
increases due to the loss of valuable assets and trade flows (Papayoanou 1996; Oneal and 
Russett 2001a; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; Smith 2014). The informational arguments claim 
that interdependence enables states to signal more efficiently their true level of resolve 
through threatening to use costly economic sanctions, therefore reducing the likelihood of 
dangerous miscalculations about each other’s resolves (Fearon, 1995; Gartzke, 1999; 
Morrow, 1999, 2003; Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001; Powell, 2002; Gartzke & Li, 2003; 
Gartzke, 2003; Stein, 2003). The transformative arguments posit that interdependence can 
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reduce the probability of conflict by reshaping the underlying states’ interests and 
preferences, either through changing the states’ core international objectives or through 
changing the balance of domestic political coalitions (Mitrany 1948; 1966; Haas 1958; 
1964; Deutsch et al. 1957; Deutsch 1961; Adler and Barnett 1998b; Solingen 2001; 2003; 
2007; Simmons 2003). Therefore, as their degree of interdependence increases, the 
European Union countries should enjoy the peace in terms of the lack of militarized 
interstate disputes.  
However, in addition to this pacifying effect, trade has a conflictual effect as well. 
This is due to two main reasons. The first reason is that, as Chapter 2 in this research has 
demonstrated, the pacifying effect of trade is only limited to the reduction of militarized 
conflicts that cause fatality. When it comes to “militarized conflicts that do not cause 
fatality” or “other non-militarized conflicts,” trade actually increases them.61  This is 
because trade, or the degree of interdependence, is also a measurement of the interaction 
density between both sides. Therefore, the more frequently countries interact, the higher 
the probability that they will have conflictual issues simply due to frequent interaction.  
The second reason that trade brings conflicts to states is that, trade brings both the 
positive impacts as well as the negative ones to the society. Besides the pacifying effect 
at the state level as I discussed above, trade has also the distributive effects at the 
individual level. Although trade generally provides aggregates benefits to both states, this 
does not mean that all the people in both states can also enjoy the benefits resulting from 
trade (Kleinberg & Fordham, 2010; Fordham & Kleinberg, 2011). The reason is, no 
matter how beneficial trade is to the society, there will always be winners and losers due 
61 Similar findings refer to Beck, Katz, & Tucker (1998), Zorn (2001), Pevehouse (2004), and Hegre (2009). 
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to their different factor endowments or their different positions in the economy. Based on 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) demonstrate that the relative 
price increase of a certain product leads to the increase of the reward and the actual price 
this certain product intensively-used when producing, which decreases the reward and the 
actual price of another factor. That is, although trade may increase the total welfare of the 
society, it increases the income of some people with a certain factor while simultaneously 
decreases the income of the other with another factor. In other words, trade always 
creates losers as well as winners in the society. Also based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
Rogowski (1989) demonstrate that trade and the different return of factors caused by 
trade will further push people to form political coalitions and thus lead to the consequent 
political conflict. Aside from the Heckscher-Ohlin model, other different models have 
different conclusions about who the winners or losers are. The Heckscher-Ohlin model 
claims that those who possess abundant factors are the winners and those who possess 
scarce factors are the losers (Ohlin 1933); the Ricardo-Viner-Jones model claims that 
who the winners and losers are is determined by class-cleavage instead of factor-cleavage 
(Jones 1971; Samuelson 1971); and the Krugman-Helpman model contends that firms 
who have economics of scale are the winners of market openness and those who do not 
are the losers (Krugman, 1996). Although different models have different predictions 
about who the winners and losers are, it is beyond controversy that trade will create 
domestic winners and losers despite how beneficial it is to the state. 
 What will the winners and the losers do? If we model them as rational actors who 
want to maximize their profits, the winners will try to maintain the trade policy that 
makes them rich and the losers will try to change the trade policy that is not in favor of 
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them. Typically, the winners of trade want more openness, for they are very competitive 
and a more opened market simply gives them more chance to make money, and the losers 
want to reduce the degree of market openness since it hurts them and want more welfare 
expenditures to compensate their loss caused by trade. If the government takes good care 
of the losers by welfare expenditure such as compensation and education, the country can 
enjoy the benefits from trade without sacrificing the social cost. Instead, if the 
government does not take good care of the losers, trade will cause severe social problems 
such as unemployment, inequality, class opposition, social and political polarization, etc., 
so that sows the seeds of future conflict. Besides, these social problems caused by trade 
may well further enhance the strength of the backlash coalitions in domestic politics 
(Solingen, 2001, 2003), so that raise trade barriers and attenuate the country’s inclination 
of joining in the international market (Alt et al, 1996, pp. 35–36), and both of them are 
found to increase the probability of militarized conflict (McDonald, 2004; Brooks, 2013). 
In addition, once this “globalization promised” economic development does not come 
true, the enduring conflict between “the Lexus and the olive tree” (Friedman, 2000) may 
escalate,62  and many people and politicians may resort to nationalism and blame their 
trade partners for hurting their economy. All of these trends monadically become a 
vicious circle that compromises the pacifying effect of trade. Therefore, whether the state 
is able to well manage the negative impact of trade on the society and simultaneously 
take advantage of the profits from trade determines the effectiveness of the pacifying 
effect of trade. 
62 The conflict between the Lexus and the olive tree is similar to the conflict between the internationalizing 
coalition and the backlashing coalition (Solingen, 2001, 2003) in the political arena. 
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 In sum, interdependence should have both the pacifying effect as well as the 
conflictual effect in international relations, and the logic of the embedded liberalism 
strongly suggests that the balance between these two opposite effects should be a 
conditional one, which hinges on the degree of domestic compensation. In the next part, I 
will discuss how the degree of domestic compensation may condition the pacifying effect 
of trade. This will be done by answering the third question. 
2.3 The reasons of high degree of domestic compensation: pacifying and conflictual 
effects 
The last question is, what are the reasons that the states maintain a high or a low 
degree of domestic compensation? According to literature, there are many explanations 
that account for the causes and the dynamics of domestic compensation responding to 
trade, and these explanations are also found to have influence on international relations. 
The main reason is that, the degree of domestic compensation is also a measurement of 
how responsive the states’ are to the needs of their societies. And this kind of 
responsiveness have both the pacifying effects as well as the conflictual ones on 
international relations. 
At most of the time, high degree of domestic compensation, which means high 
degree of states’ responsiveness to society, has a positive effect on international relations. 
This is due to several reasons. First, higher domestic compensation means better safety 
net for people who are hurt by market opening, thus increasing people’s support for trade  
(Hays, Ehrlich, & Peinhardt, 2005; Burgoon, 2009). As a consequence, there will be less 
conflicts resulting from the negative impacts of trade (Ruggie, 1982).  
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Second, high degree of domestic compensation also reflects the weight that 
governments place on aggregate social welfare versus private interests (Grossman & 
Helpman, 1994, 1996, 2005; Gawande, Krishna, & Olarreaga, 2009; Taydas & Peksen, 
2012). Given the fact that most of the society favor a peaceful situation rather than 
conflict, this kind of governments are less likely to initiate conflicts for some narrow 
private interests (Danilovic & Clare, 2007; Brooks, 2013).  
Third, high degree of domestic compensation could also be a result of effective 
input from the society to the government. For example, Hicks and Swank (1992) find that 
countries that have voter turnout, powerful central and left parties, high strength of 
democratic oppositions, and neocorporatist institutions are more likely to have higher 
welfare spending. These factors are also demonstrated as the same conditions that make 
leader more constrained and less likely to engage in international conflict (Schultz, 1999, 
2001; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).  
Due to these reasons, the increase of domestic compensation should have a 
pacifying effect in the reduction of international conflict. This pacifying effect has been 
demonstrated by empirical evidence using the MID data from 1950 to 1992 (Peet & 
Simon, 2000). In sum, the literature suggests that the reasons that states maintain a high 
degree of domestic compensation are also the same reasons that reduce the probability of 
international conflict. 
However, like trade can bring about both the positive impacts and the negative 
ones, high domestic compensation also has negative effects on international relations. 
When the degree of interdependence increases, the increase of domestic compensation is 
associated with the reduction of conflict resulting from the negative impacts of trade. 
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However, when the degree of market openness or interdependence is at a low level while 
domestic compensation keeps increasing, the probability of conflict could increase due to 
the following reasons. First, low level of market openness or interdependence with high 
level of domestic compensation means that there is an over-input of domestic demand for 
protection, and protectionism is found to be related to the increase of the probability of 
conflict, either due to trade dispute or due to a conflict-prone domestic coalition  
(Solingen, 2001, 2003; McDonald, 2004). Second, low level of market openness or 
interdependence with high level of domestic compensation could also mean that the 
government is transferring a disproportional amount of money to certain interest groups 
that are not hurt by trade, which means that the government is less responsive to the most 
of society in general and is more responsive to some narrow private interests. This effect 
is similar to leaders with a relative small winning coalition in terms of the logic of 
political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Under this situation, conflict is more 
likely to happen either because that the interest groups urge the leaders to defend their 
interests internationally or because that the leaders are less constrained after they 
successfully provide interests to their winning coalition. In sum, whether high degree of 
domestic compensation contributes to more harmonious international relations should 
depend on its balance against the degree of interdependence.  
2.4 Synthesizing the effects  
 The discussion about the influences of interdependence and domestic 
compensation suggests that, trade brings both the pacifying effect and the conflictual 
effect to both sides, and that the relationship between trade and domestic compensation 
affects the balance between these two opposite effects. When both the degree of 
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interdependence and the degree of domestic compensation are at a high level, the number 
of dyadic conflicts will be few due to the success of the embedded liberalism. On the 
contrary, when both the degree of interdependence and the degree of domestic 
compensation are at a low level, the number of dyadic conflicts will be few as well, this is 
due to two reasons. First, low degree of interdependence means both sides interact not 
very frequently, so the number of conflicts will be few due to their low interaction 
density. Second, low degree of interdependence also means that, although the conflictual 
effect of trade will be low, the pacifying effect of trade will be low as well. Thus we 
should see that there may be few, but not none, conflicts occurred between both sides. 
Therefore, the first set of hypotheses to be test are: 
Hypothesis 1 (the positive interaction effect): Among the European Union 
countries, all things being equal, countries whose degree of interdependence and 
domestic compensation are both at a high level will have the least number of conflicts 
with their trade partners. 
Hypothesis 2 (the passive interaction effect): Among the European Union 
countries, all things being equal, countries whose degree of interdependence and 
domestic compensation are both at a low level will have few number of conflicts with 
their trade partners. 
 How will the international relations be “when the degree of interdependence is 
high and the degree of domestic compensation is low” or “when the degree of 
interdependence is low and the degree of domestic compensation is high”? My argument 
hypothesizes that, first, when the degree of interdependence is high and the degree of 
domestic compensation is low, the conflictual effect of trade will increase due to the 
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negative impacts of trade on society. As a consequence, the number of conflict will 
increase as well. And second, when the degree of interdependence is low and the degree 
of domestic compensation is high, it denotes the situation that the pacifying effect of 
trade is low, the degree of protectionism is high, and the power of backlashing coalition is 
strong. As a consequence, the number of conflict will increase as well. However, high 
degree of domestic compensation also means the governments are responsive to their 
social purpose, thus the number of conflict should not overtake the number of conflict 
under the previous situation where the degree of interdependence is high and the degree 
of domestic compensation is low. Therefore, the second set of hypotheses to be test are: 
Hypothesis 3 (the interdependence effect): Among the European Union countries, 
all things being equal, countries who have high degree of interdependence and low 
degree of domestic compensation will have the most number of conflicts with their trade 
partners. 
Hypothesis 4 (the protectionism effect): Among the European Union countries, all 
things being equal, countries who have low degree of interdependence and high degree of 
domestic compensation will have a few number of conflicts with their trade partners. 
 Table 5.1 demonstrates the four situations that the four hypotheses propose. In 
short, we should see that the number of conflict should be the most when interdependence 
is high and domestic compensation is low; the number of conflict should be the second 
most when interdependence is low and domestic compensation is high; and the number of 
conflict should be the least when both interdependence and domestic compensation are 
low or high. In the next section, I will test these four hypotheses using data of dyadic 
conflict onset between the total 15 European Union countries from 1990 to 2004.  
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Table 5.1 The influences of interdependence and social expenditure on the number of international 
conflicts 
 Domestic compensation Low High 
Interdependence 
Low 
Number of conflicts: Few 
(The passive interaction effect) 
Hypothesis 2 
Number of conflicts: A Few 
(The protectionism effect) 
Hypothesis 4 
High 
Number of conflicts: The most 
(The interdependence effect) 
Hypothesis 3 
Number of conflicts: The least 






3 Research design 
 Given the fact that the European Union countries are the richest, the most 
democratic, and the most developed countries in the world, with the highest degree of 
interdependence, the most successful alliance (NATO), and multiple shared international 
organizations, they are the least-likely ones to have interstate conflicts according to 
international relations theories. Therefore, looking at the European Union countries per se 
is similar to applying the least-likely case design (McKeown, 1999) to test my argument. 
The research design and model specification are as following. 
3.1 Dependent variable 
 Regarding the dependent variable of interstate conflict, I do not adopt the 
popularly-used militarized interstate dispute (MID) data (Ghosn et al., 2004) for two 
reasons. The first reason is that, as I have discussed above, there is a lack of militarized 
interstate dispute between the European Union countries since the end of WWII, and 
there is not a single MID occurred between them after 1986. So if we look at MID data, 
the dependent variable does not vary simply due to no militarized conflict. But this does 
not mean that the European Union countries do not have any non-militarized levels of 
conflict. Therefore, dataset that contains the information of non-militarized conflicts must 
be concerned.  
And here comes the second reason. My argument contends that high 
interdependence is correlated with more conflicts simply due to frequent interactions, so a 
dataset that contains both the information of “the number of non-militarized conflict 
events” as the dependent variable and “the number of status quo events” as the control 
variable will be the most ideal one to match my theoretical need. According to my theory, 
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in short, countries that have high degree of interdependence or emphasize on domestic 
compensation tends to have more disputes with other countries due to intensive economic 
interaction and domestic pressure, while at the same time have less conflicts due to the 
fact that domestic compensation enhances trade’s pacifying effect. Therefore, I need both 
the information of the number of conflict events and the number of non-conflictual 
dyadic interaction events. I find Gary King and Will Lowe’s (2003) “10 Million 
International Dyadic Events (IDE) data” perfectly matches this theoretical requirement. 
 The IDE data uses machine coding to code all the events reported by Reuters in a 
daily base. According to King and Lowe, the coding method is that “(e)ach event is 
summarized in the data as ‘Actor A does something to Actor B’, with Actors A and B 
recording about 450 countries and other (within-country) actors and ‘does something to’ 
coded in an ontology of about 200 types of actions” (codebook). King and Lowe adopt 
Goldstein’s (1992) modification of McClelland’s (1979) World Event Interaction Survey 
(WEIS) categories to categorize all the recorded events in the IDE data into sixty-one 
different categories, and then assign each event a “Goldstein score” to denote how 
conflictual or cooperative the event is. In Goldstein’s (1992) conflict-cooperation scale, 
each dyadic event is assigned a Goldstein score ranging from -10 (the most conflictual) to 
8.3 (the most cooperative). I adopt Crescenzi’s (2003, 2005) criteria to distinguish Low-
level conflict from High-level conflict to further investigate whether my argument is 
sensitive to different kinds of international conflict. According to Crescenzi’s definition, 
Low-level conflict includes the use of diplomatic and economic tools by one state in an 
attempt to persuade or coerce another state, and High-level conflict includes the use of 
military tools to do so (Crescenzi, 2005, pp. 46-47). I count only the number of events in 
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which both sides are reported as “state actors.” The IDE data records observations in a 
daily base. Therefore, in order to transfer it into the dyad-year unit of analysis to match 
with other dyad-year variables, I sum up how many low-level conflicts and high-level 
conflicts there are between two states in each dyad-year to be the “dyad-year event counts” 
dependent variables. Besides, given the fact that not all dyads have conflictual events in 
every year, I fill in the missing values of the number of dyadic conflictual events with 0 if 
there is not any conflictual events reported by the data in any dyad-year.  
 Because the two dependent variables, the number of low-level conflicts and high-
level conflicts per year, are time-series cross-sectional count variables across 15 
European Union countries and 15 years,63  I adopt the negative binomial model for event 
counts (Long, 1997) and the general estimating equation (GEE) model which allows the 
modeling of temporal (year) and within-panel (dyad) correlations (Zorn, 2001). The 
combination of these two models is a general estimating equation with a negative 
binomial functional link. To account for the possibility that the count of disputes in 
previous year affect the count in subsequent years, I model the data assuming a first-order 
autoregressive process (AR1) as most time-series research did. In addition, to adjust for 
clustering in dyads, I use the Huber/White robust standard error clustered on each dyad 
which assumes that observations within the same dyad across years are correlated but 
those between different dyads are uncorrelated. Lastly, as most literature on conflict 
study, I estimate all the models with the dependent variables at time t  and independent 
variables at time 1−t  to mitigate problems of reverse causality.  
  
63 Maybe the biggest flaw of the IDE data is its short span. The IDE data only contains dyadic events from 
1990 to 2004, only 15 years. 
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3.2 Independent variables 
 My theory predicts that the pacifying effect of trade interdependence in European 
Union countries is conditioned on their domestic compensation for the losers of trade. 
Therefore, my independent variables should be composed of three variables. The first one 
denotes the degree of interdependence between the two counties in each dyad, the second 
one denotes the degree of domestic compensation the governments endeavor to do, and 
the third one is the interaction term between the previous two variables.  
Regarding the degree of interdependence, following the most research in the 
relationship between trade and conflict, I adopt High dependence, the higher ratio of the 
sum of State A’s imports from and exports to State B over State A’s GDP, to measure the 
economic importance of interdependence between the two countries in each dyad (Dixon, 
1994; Oneal & Russett, 2001, 1997), following the “weak link” logic (Dixon, 1994; 
Oneal & Russett, 1997, 2001) which assumes that “the likelihood of dyadic conflict is 
primarily determined by the less constrained of the two states in a dyad” (Oneal & 
Russett, 1997, p. 273). In Dixon (1994) and Oneal and Russett’s (1997) research, their 
liberal peace theories suggest that it is the country with the lower degree of dependence 
that determines the likelihood of dyadic conflict. However, different from their liberal 
peace theories, my argument contends that in the European Union countries, it is the 
country with higher degree of dependence that determines the likelihood of dyadic 
conflict. Therefore, I adopt “high dependence” as my independent variable instead of 
their “low dependence.” I calculate High dependence in each dyad-year observation by 
using the Bilateral Trading Data 3.0 from Barbieri et al. (2009) and Barbieri and Keshk 
(2012) as well as the GDP data from the 2013 World Development Indicators (WDI) of 
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World Bank. I also include Low dependence, the lower ratio of the sum of State A’s 
imports from and exports to State B over State A’s GDP, to the model to have full 
information about both sides’ economic ties with the United States. 
The second independent variable is the degree of domestic compensation. I use 
the portion of states’ social expenditure over their GDP to measure the degree of their 
domestic compensation. Data of social expenditure is from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) website. Following the same “weak 
link” logic, I adopt the lower social expenditure value in each dyad-year observation to 
construct the independent variable Low social expenditure, because my theory predicts 
that it is the country with lower degree of social expenditure that determines the 
likelihood of dyadic conflict. 
 Since both the interdependent variable and the domestic compensation variable 
are defined, their interaction term, High Dependence ×  Low social expenditure, is my 
main independent variable. According to my theory, the interaction term should be 
statistically significant with a negative sign, which means that trade’s pacifying effect is 
increased with the increase of domestic compensation.  
3.3 Control variables 
 Following most research on dyadic international conflict, I control for contiguity, 
distance, alliance, power, development, and major power status, all of which are 
demonstrated to have an influence on international conflict. I do not control for states’ 
polity scores (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013) since all the European Union countries 
are highly democratic states with polity scores more than 9 (out of 10) in my sample 
space from 1990 to 2004. Contiguity is a dummy variable which denotes whether the 
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two countries of the dyad are contiguous by land, predicted to be positively correlated 
with conflict onset. Distance is the logged distance (in miles) between capitals of the two 
states in each dyad, predicted to be negatively related with conflict onset. Alliance is a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 if the two states in each dyad have signed a defense 
pact, neutrality, or entente in the year, and with a value of 0 if otherwise. Among the 
European Union countries in my sample period, Alliance actually denotes whether the 
both countries are joint NATO dyad. Power parity is the weaker state’s CINC score 
(Singer, 1988) divided by that of the stronger state to generate a power ratio which ranges 
from 0 (total preponderance) to 1 (exact parity between the two states). Data of 
Contiguity, Distance, Alliance, and Power parity are from the Correlates of War (COW) 
database. Development is also found to have a pacifying effect (Rosecrance, 1986, 2010; 
Hegre, 2000; Mousseau, Hegre, & O’neal, 2003), so I include both countries’ GDP per 
capita (GDP/pc) which is their logged GDP per capita to control for development. 
Because major power countries are more prone to involve in international disputes 
(Bremer, 1992; Xiang, Xu, & Keteku, 2007), I create a dummy variable None major 
power dyad to control for this influence of power, taking a value of 1 is both states in the 
dyad are none major powers, and 0 if otherwise (if including Britain, France, and 
Germany in the dyad).  
I also control for both countries’ import-to-GDP ratio because high domestic 
compensation is demonstrated as a salient result from high import-to-GDP ratio 
(Cameron, 1978; Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). I control for the import-to-GDP ratio 
instead of trade openness (trade-to-GDP ratio) because imports and exports should have 
opposite effects on government spending. According to (Hays et al., 2005), “Rising 
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imports create losers – displaced workers in import competing industries – that may have 
to be compensated, rising exports do not” (Hays et al., 2005, pp. 476–477).64   Import-
GDP ratio is simply the percentage of import share of the countries’ total GDP. Data of 
Import-GDP ratio is from Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2013). 
To further make sure the number of dyadic conflicts does not intermingled by 
their interaction density, I control for several variables that demote how frequently the 
two countries interact (Hegre, 2009). Because dyads with more population are more 
likely to interact more intensively than those with fewer population, so the former tend to 
have more conflicts than the latter simply due to more interactions. Therefore, I control 
for both countries’ Population, their number of population in millions after logged.65  
Data of Population is from Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013). Both countries’ 
degree of development also affects their ability of interaction, and I already have both 
countries’ GDP per capita as the control variables. Lastly, I include the variable Total 
number of non-conflictual events as well to control for the dyadic interaction density 
revealed by the IDE data. This variable is simply the total number of all the recorded 
dyadic events in the IDE data that are coded as status quo events according to the 
Goldstein conflict-cooperation scale. This variable offers the information about how 
many events happened in each dyad-year, the frequency of dyadic interaction density. 
  
64 By the same token, “falling exports are harmful to domestic employment in a way that declining imports 
are not” (Hays, Ehrlich, & Peinhardt, 2005, p. 477). 
65 I add 1 to each observation of population in millions before taking log to avoid negative values, because 
some countries have the number of population less than 1 million. 
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4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Basic analysis 
 Table 5.2 includes all the models with different levels of conflicts as the 
dependent variables. The first dependent variable is Low-level conflict, which includes 
the use of diplomatic and economic tools by one state in an attempt to persuade or coerce 
another state. Model 1 looks at the influences of High dependence and Low social 
expenditure on the number of dyadic low-level conflict, and Model 2 includes both the 
two independent variables as well as their interaction term. Model 1 shows that, as my 
argument predicts, both the increase of the degree of high dependence and the degree of 
low social expenditure increase the number of low-level conflict. However, Model 2 
shows that, this conflictual effect of both the degree of high dependence and the degree of 
low social expenditure will be compensated by their interaction term. That is, although 
high degree of interdependence and social expenditure will incur more low-level conflicts 
between the dyad, deeper interdependence with sufficient domestic compensation will 
have a strongly pacifying effect on bilateral relationship, in terms of the reduction of the 
use of diplomatic and economic tools by one state in an attempt to persuade or coerce 
another state.  
The second dependent variable is High-level conflict, which includes the use of 
military tools by one state in an attempt to persuade or coerce another state. Model 3 
looks at the influences of High dependence and Low social expenditure on the number 
of dyadic high-level conflict, and Model 4 includes both the two independent variables as 
well as their interaction term. The result of Model 3 partially supports my argument that, 
only the increase of the degree of high dependence increases the number of high-level 
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Table 5.2 GEE negative binomial models of different levels of international conflicts between the European 
Union countries, 1990~2004 
 
[Dependent variable t ] 
 Low-Level Conflict  High-Level Conflict  All Conflict 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
[Independent variables 1−t ] 
         
High dependence  0.049* 0.173***  0.087** 0.352***  0.058* 0.217*** 
  (0.023) (0.029)  (0.034) (0.071)  (0.026) (0.032) 
          
Low social expenditure  0.031* 0.083***  0.006 0.135**  0.035* 0.100*** 
  (0.021) (0.022)  (0.032) (0.049)  (0.019) (0.023) 
          
High dependence ×   
Low social expenditure 
  -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.013** 
(0.004) 
  -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
          
[Control variables 1−t ] 
         
Total number of non-conflictual events  0.005* 0.005*  0.001 -0.000  0.005* 0.004* 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
          
State A’s Import-GDP ratio  -0.004* -0.000  -0.001 0.005  -0.003 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.005) 
          
State B’s Import-GDP ratio  0.000 -0.000  -0.010* -0.011*  -0.002 -0.003* 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.004) (0.004) 
          
State A’s GDP/pc  0.044 -0.077  -0.051 -0.327  0.031 -0.126 
  (0.301) (0.310)  (0.585) (0.629)  (0.278) (0.290) 
          
State B’s GDP/pc  -1.116*** -1.131***  -1.366* -1.338*  -1.077*** -1.066** 
  (0.307) (0.329)  (0.844) (0.870)  (0.306) (0.325) 
          
State A’s Population  0.767*** 0.786***  0.600* 0.629*  0.732*** 0.747*** 
  (0.131) (0.132)  (0.264) (0.247)  (0.130) (0.128) 
          
State B’s Population  0.612*** 0.638***  0.442* 0.513*  0.557*** 0.589*** 
  (0.122) (0.120)  (0.266) (0.278)  (0.117) (0.114) 
          
Contiguity  0.227 0.272*  0.017 0.034  0.185 0.255* 
  (0.373) (0.352)  (0.337) (0.355)  (0.351) (0.325) 
          
Distance  -0.403*** -0.416***  -0.485* -0.545*  -0.411*** -0.423*** 
  (0.108) (0.110)  (0.223) (0.266)  (0.114) (0.119) 
          
Alliance  0.040 0.124  -0.302 -0.024  0.027 0.147* 
  (0.193) (0.191)  (0.478) (0.464)  (0.198) (0.190) 
          
Power parity  0.772** 0.742**  1.786*** 1.696***  0.969*** 0.927*** 
  (0.284) (0.288)  (0.449) (0.461)  (0.271) (0.269) 
          
None major power dyad  -0.206* -0.237*  -0.402* -0.460*  -0.233* -0.282* 
  (0.223) (0.220)  (0.349) (0.339)  (0.197) (0.194) 
          
Constant  7.456* 7.591*  11.529* 11.189*  7.619* 7.555* 
  (3.601) (3.681)  (6.116) (6.494)  (3.306) (3.428) 
Chi-squared  726.654 747.589  202.167 345.531  709.785 723.589 
Probability > Chi-squared  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Number of clusters (dyads)  105 105  105 105  105 105 
Observations per cluster: Min  7 7  7 7  7 7 
Observations per cluster: Mean  12 12  12 12  12 12 
Observations per cluster: Max  14 14  14 14  14 14 
Number of observations  1,257 1,257  1,257 1,257  1,257 1,257 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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conflicts. However, Model 4 shows that, when both the two independent variables and 
their interaction are taken into concern, the two independent variables both have 
conflictual effects, and their conflictual effects will be compensated by their interaction 
term. That is, although high degree of interdependence and social expenditure will incur 
more high-level conflicts between the dyad, deeper interdependence with sufficient 
domestic compensation will have a strongly pacifying effect on bilateral relationship, in 
terms of the reduction of the use of military tools by one state in an attempt to persuade 
or coerce another state.  
 The third dependent variable is All conflict, which is the sum of the total number 
of both the low-level conflict and the high-level conflict. Model 5 looks at the influences 
of High dependence and Low social expenditure on the total number of dyadic conflict, 
and Model 6 includes both the two independent variables as well as their interaction term. 
The results of Model 5 and Model 6 are similar to previous models.  
Overall, all the model results of Table 5.2 suggest that, whether which kinds of 
conflict we are looking at, high degree of interdependence or social expenditure will 
incur more conflicts between the dyad, deeper interdependence with sufficient domestic 
compensation will have a strongly pacifying effect on bilateral relationship, in terms of 
the reduction of the events where one state attempts to persuade or coerce another state. 
In sum, the results support the general idea of the embedded liberalism, which 
emphasizes on the point that whether states can balance the two different goals of 




4.2 Substantive effects 
Table 5.3 records the substantive effects of variables that are statistically 
significant on each of the three dependent variables.  
To further demonstrate how well the empirical evidences fit the prediction of my 
argument in Table 5.1 (about the four situations), in Figure 5.1 I show the 3-dimensional 
plots of the influences of High dependence and Low social expenditure concerning 
their interaction effect on the predicted numbers of each of the three dependent variables, 
holding all other variables constant. Figure 5.1 shows that, when looking at Low-level 
conflict, the predicted number of conflict perfectly match the prediction of my argument. 
That is, the number of conflict is few when both independent variables are at their high 
levels or at their low levels, the number of conflict increases a little bit when 
interdependence is low and domestic compensation is high, and the number of conflict is 
the most when interdependence is high and domestic compensation is low.  
However, my prediction is differing a little from the empirical evidences when 
looking at only the High-level conflict in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 shows that, high-level 
conflicts only occurred between European Union countries when interdependence is high 
and domestic compensation is low, which matches the prediction of my theory. The 
difference is in the situation when the degree of interdependence is low and the degree of 
domestic compensation is high. My theory predicts that there will be a small number of 
conflict in this situation, while empirical evidences show that the number of conflict is as 
low as the situations when both variables are at their high levels or at their low levels. 
Although a little different from the prediction of my theory, this should not be a real 




Table 5.3 Substantive effects of variables that are statistically significant on each of the three dependent variables 
 





   IRR Min  Max IRR Min  Max IRR Min  Max 
High dependence 0.039717 35.14153 + 17.8% +624.8% + 40.8% +1432.2% + 22.1% + 775.8% 
Low social expenditure 12.5 30.7 +  8.7% +158.3% + 14.2% + 258.4% + 10.4% + 189.3% 
High dependence X Low social expenditure 0.7665377 800.8185 -  0.6% -480.0% -  1.3% -1048.1% -  0.72% - 576.0% 
         
Total number of non-conflictual events 0 272 +  0.2% + 54.4%   +  5.8% +1577.6% 
Stata A’s Import-GDP ratio 17.58554 113.0623       
Stata B’s Import-GDP ratio 17.58554 113.0623       
Stata A’s GDP/pc 9.453781 11.10362       
Stata B’s GDP/pc 9.453781 11.10362 - 65.3% -107.7%   - 62.2% - 102.6% 
Stata A’s Population 0.3229708 4.425138 +111.3% +456.6% + 85.7% + 351.6% +104.0% + 426.6% 
Stata B’s Population 0.3229708 4.425138 + 85.0% +348.7%   + 77.4% + 317.5% 
Contiguity 0 1       
Distance 4.682131 7.644919 - 34.4% -102.0% -  41.8% - 123.8% - 34.4% - 101.9% 
Alliance 0 1       
Power parity 0.168211 0.9994754 + 96.4% + 80.1% +401.3% + 333.6% +128.0% + 106.4% 
None major power dyad 0 1       




Figure 5.1 Predicted mean number of Low-level conflict per dyad-year 
 
Figure 5.2 Predicted mean number of High-level conflict per dyad-year 
 
Figure 5.3 Predicted mean number of All conflict per dyad-year 
Note: The unit is % GDP for the independent variables, and number of conflict for the dependent variable.
Low social expenditure 
Low social expenditure 
High dependence 
High dependence 
Low social expenditure High dependence 
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tools to persuade or coerce others, is a very rare event among the European Union 
countries given their very peaceful nature. Among the European Union countries, 
conflicts that result from the protectionism effect (Hypothesis 4) do not escalate to the 
level of the use of force. 
As a comparison, Figure 5.3 shows the predicted number of the sum-up of both 
the low-level and the high-level conflicts. The outcome of Figure 5.3 is similar to Figure 
5.1 when looking at only the low-level conflicts. Overall, generally speaking, the 
analyses of the substantive effects support the prediction of my argument. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
 To make sure my models are not sensitive to various concerns, I do some 
robustness tests to see whether they change the outcomes of my models. These robustness 
checks include adding in a lagged dependent variable, concerning only the politically 
active dyads, taking states’ different ideal points into concern, and implementing the 
zero-inflated Poisson regression model to control for the under-estimate of zero given the 
fact that more than 66.7% observations of the dependent variables are zero.66  All the 
models for robustness checks are shown in Table 5.4 with a replication of Model 6 in 
Table 5.2 as the original model to be compared.  
Although Achen (2000) demonstrates that including a lagged dependent variable 
may suppress the explanatory power of independent variables, many previous research 
use a lagged dependent variable when dealing with time-series cross-sectional data to 
control for the threat of autocorrelation. In Model 7 I include a lagged dependent variable 
into the model to test whether my argument still holds. Model 7 shows that the inclusion 
66 Specifically, 69% of Low-level conflict observations are zero, 90% of High-level conflict observations 
are zero, and 67% of All conflict observations are zero. 
181 
                                                          
 
Table 5.4 Robustness checks models of All conflict between the European Union countries, 1990~2004 
 
[Dependent variable t ] 
   All conflict 
  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 












[Independent variables 1−t ] 
          
High dependence  0.217***  0.200***  0.220***  0.186***  0.081* 
  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.036) 
           
Low social expenditure  0.100***  0.099***  0.105***  0.101***  0.002 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.024) 
           
High dependence ×   











           
           
Lagged dependent variable    0.057**       
    (0.021)       
           
Politically active dyads      1.504     
      (0.774)     
           
Distance between ideal points        0.699***   
        (0.212)   
           
Constant    6.590*  6.083  3.215  11.367*** 
    (3.274)  (3.455)  (3.649)  (3.132) 
Chi-squared  723.589  870.549  741.052  937.719  502.44 
Probability > Chi-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of clusters (dyads)  105  105  105  105  105 
Observations per cluster: Min  7  7  7  7   
Observations per cluster: Mean  12  12  12  12   
Observations per cluster: Max  14  14  14  14   
Number of observations  1,257  1,257  1,257  1,257  1,362 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Other control variables are all 





of the lagged dependent variable does not cause a significant change of the result. All the 
independent variables remain similar effects on the dependent variable. 
There is a possibility that looking at conflict between all European Union 
countries is misleading. According the logic of “opportunity and willingness” (Most & 
Starr, 1982, 1989), although the European Union countries are located in the same region, 
it does not mean that each of them has the opportunity to have a dispute with all of the 
others. For example, the insular Ireland would never have a dispute with the inland 
Austria or Luxembourg. Therefore, controlling for this “opportunity” or “necessary 
condition” is necessary. I adopt Quackenbush’s (2006) definition of “politically active 
dyads” and include a dummy variable Politically active dyad into the model to denote 
whether the dyad is capable of having a dispute.67  Although among the total 105 dyads 
in European Union countries, only 5 of them are defined as none politically active, I still 
put Politically active dyad into concern to further demonstrate that the outcomes do not 
change. Model 8 shows that all the independent variables remain similar effects on the 
dependent variable. 
 In addition, the number of interstate conflict may also result from the interest 
(dis)similarity between both sides. To exclude this threat to my argument, I control for 
the distance between both countries’ ideal points. I adopt Strezhnev and Voeten’s (2013) 
“Dynamic Ideal Point Estimates from United Nations General Assembly Votes” dataset 
67 According to Quackenbush (2006), a dyad is defined as a politically active one if at least one of the 
following six characteristics applies: (1) The members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through 
a colony; (2) One of the dyad members is a global power; (3) One of the dyad members is a regional power 
in the region of the other; (4) one of the dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other; (5) 
one of the dyad members is allied to a global power that is in a dispute with the other; or (6) one of the 
dyad members is allied to a regional power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other 
(Quackenbush, 2006, p. 43). 
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to measure the distance of the two countries’ ideal points in each dyad-year. They 
measure countries ideal points each year according to their voting behavior in the United 
Nations General Assembly and assign each of them a score, which can be interpreted as 
states’ positions towards the U.S.-led liberal order. I construct the variable Distance 
between ideal points by calculating the absolute value of country A’s ideal point score 
subtracting country B’s ideal point score in each dyad-year to measure their interest 
difference. Model 9 shows that, the inclusion of the Distance between ideal points 
variable largely increase the explanatory power of my original model (judging by the 
increase of the Chi-squared value). However, even though the influences of all my 
independent variables do not change significantly.  
 Lastly, there is a concern that, given the fact that most of the dyad-year 
observations of the number of interstate conflict are zero, the GEE negative binomial 
regression model may not be a proper choice to estimate the dependent variable. 
According to my data, among the total 1,380 dyad-year observations from 1990 to 2004, 
953 (69%) of the number of low-level conflict are zero, 1,239 (90%) of the number of 
high-level conflict are zero, and 920 (67%) of the number of all conflict are zero. To 
model the possibility that the zero and non-zero observations are generated by different 
process, I use the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression model (Long, 1997, 
pp. 243–249) to re-run model 6 to see whether this changes the result. The limitation of 
the ZINB model is that it cannot assume an AR1 process when dealing with the time-
series cross-sectional data, although the Huber/White cluster standard error is still 
workable in the ZINP model. The outcome is shown in Model 10. Generally speaking, 
although the coefficients and significances of my independent variables change in a great 
184 
 
deal, the direction of the influences of them still hold. Given the fact that the ZINP model 
does not control for temporal dependence, we should not read too much into Model 10. 
 In sum, all the robustness checks demonstrate that the influences of my 
independent variables on the number of all interstate conflict between the European 
Union countries are not sensitive to various potential threats. 
5 Conclusion 
By investigating the logic of the embedded liberalism – the balance between states’ 
degree of interdependence and degree of domestic compensation – as well as applying the 
IDE dataset, in this research I construct an argument that explains the variations of the 
international relations between the European Union countries, a missing part of previous 
literature. I demonstrate that the European Union countries are most peaceful when their 
degree of interdependence and degree of domestic compensation are both at a high level 
or both at a low level, that the number of dyadic conflict will increase when 
interdependence is low and domestic compensation is high, and that conflict will be the 
most likely to occur when they have a high interdependence and a low domestic 
compensation. The finding of this research confirms Ruggie (1982), Garrett (1998), and 
Pitruzzello’s (2004) conclusions that, since the end of World War II, the embedded 
liberalism – states open their market while simultaneously compensating the losers of 
trade – has been and will still be an important concern of international security in this 







The findings in previous chapters demonstrate how regions become peaceful and 
how to explain the within-region variation of the regional international relations in the 
viewpoint of trade.  In this concluding chapter, I summarize all the findings in this project 
and then discuss how they could contribute to the understanding of the rise of China, the 
most important issue in the study of international relations of our time, as a theoretical 
implication of this research. 
1 Summarizing the findings 
In Chapter 2 I construct a theory which states that trade’s pacifying effect should 
be simultaneously conditioned on the degree of democracy and the degree of 
development. Therefore, trade’s pacifying effect is stronger in regions with more 
democratic and more developed countries and weaker in regions with less democratic and 
less developed countries. Besides, the three-way interaction model also suggests that, all 
things being equal: 
1. With the increase of trade: 
(1) Poor-democratic dyads are more likely to have fatal conflict. 
(2) Poor-autocratic dyads are less likely to have fatal conflict.  
(3) Rich-democratic dyads are less likely to have fatal conflict. 
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(4) Trade’s effect on fatal conflict is not evident in rich-autocratic dyads. 
2. With the increase of democracy: 
(1) Poor-and-highly-interdependent dyads are more likely to have fatal conflict. 
(2) Trade’s effect on the occurrence of fatal conflict is not evident in all the other 
three situations. 
3. With the increase of development: 
(1) Development has a stable and consistent pacifying effect in reducing the 
occurrence of the fatal conflict in all the four scenarios, especially in rich-democratic 
dyads.  
(2) The capitalist Peace effect and the democratic peace effect are mutually 
reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive.  
 In Chapter 3 I demonstrate that ASEAN’s ability of security management in 
Southeast Asia is conditioned on whether the Southeast Asian countries are able to 
maintain their economic performance, which solves a long-lasting debate about whether 
the regional peace should attribute to ASEAN’s successful security management. Thus 
my argument puts into doubt the argument that a non-Western international relations 
theory is necessary to understand the international relations of the Asia Pacific. My 
argument also predicts that before they have reached “democratic consolidation” 
(Huntington, 1991), the future of ASEAN and whether it will evolve to an Asian edition 
of the European Union should hinge on whether the Southeast Asian countries are able to 
maintain their economic performance.  
In Chapter 4 I demonstrate that the hegemonic stability effect of the United States’ 
security management in Latin America is a conditional one, which hinges on whether the 
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United States has sufficient economic leverage to influence Latin American leaders’ 
conflictual behavior. This explanation of conditionality accounts for why the United 
States seemed to have an ambiguous attitude toward the Latin American countries and 
why most scholars support the “whirlpool” model when explaining the role that the 
United States played in the region. My argument also predicts that after the end of the 
Cold War when the region gradually moves toward a “capitalist peace” trajectory, 
whether the Latin American countries are able to maintain their economic growth and 
sustainable redistribution is the key to the regional peace.  
 In Chapter 5 I demonstrate that among the European Union countries, the 
interactive effect between market opening and domestic compensation will affect their 
international relations. According to the findings, my theory predicts that as long as the 
European countries maintain a good balance between these two factors, a more harmony 
and deeper degree of international integration is an expectable future of the European 
Union. However, this situation can also be a reversed one if the governments of the 
European Union countries are not able to maintain a good balance between these two 
factors resulting from the power imbalance between their internationalizing and 
backlashing domestic coalitions.  
 In sum, trade plays slightly different roles in moderating the variation of the 
regional peace in different regions according to their different main domestic political 
issues. The theoretical framework in the viewpoint of trade I proposed is demonstrated as 
a useful one to understand regional peace and to predict regional international relations. 
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2 About the rise of China 
Since China adopted the “reform and open” policy in 1979, the rise of China has 
been the most important issue in contemporary studies of international relations. Will 
China rise peacefully? Or a large-scale conflict is eventually unavoidable between China 
and the United States or between China and other East Asian countries? While most of 
the realists argue that it is very unlikely for China to rise peacefully due to the reasons 
such as security dilemma, imbalance of power, or power transition dynamics, the liberals 
believe that the gradually-increased economic ties between China and other major powers 
will make China’s rising peacefully (Friedberg, 1993, 2005, 2011; Christensen, 2006; 
Goldstein, 2013; Khong, 2013). Based on the debate between the realists and the liberals, 
two important questions are worthy of investigating. First, will the increased economic 
interdependence between China and the US make conflict less likely to happen? Second, 
will the increased economic interdependence between China and other East Asian 
countries bring peace to the region? My research may offer some answers to these two 
questions. 
 According to the findings of Chapter 2, there are bad news as well as good news 
regarding China’s rising and international security. The bad news is, although the degree 
of interdependence between China and the United States or other East Asian countries 
keeps increasing, high degree of interdependence may not help to reduce the probability 
of militarized conflict between China and those countries. This is because the degree of 
interdependence is also the degree of interaction density, so countries that interact more 
frequently are also more likely to have disputes. However, this is only half of the picture. 
According to my theory, the good news is, although the degree of interdependence 
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between China and the United States or other East Asian countries may not help to reduce 
the probability of militarized conflict, it is very likely that it will decrease the probability 
for those militarized conflicts to cause fatality.  
 Besides, my findings also point out two possible scenarios regarding how the 
change of development and democracy may affect whether China will have a peaceful 
rise. First, based on the point of view of development, as long as China keeps its 
economic growth, East Asia may enjoy at least a “negative peace” since my theory 
predicts that development has a very strong pacifying effect despite the degree of 
democracy and the degree of interdependence. Second, based on the point of view of 
democracy, the situation will be more dangerous if China undergoes democratization and 
becomes a newly-democratic regime before it gets rich enough, because my theory 
predicts that poor-and-democratic dyads are more likely to have fatal conflict with the 
increase of interdependence and that poor-and-highly-dependent dyads are more likely to 
have fatal conflict with the increase of democracy. This prediction is somehow in 
accordance with the literature about the conflict propensity of the new democracies 
(Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Wolf, Weede, Enterline, Mansfield, & Snyder, 1996; Ward 
& Gleditsch, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003, pp. 215–272). 
Therefore, for China to have a peaceful rise, becoming democratized or becoming more 
economically tied with other countries is not as important as becoming richer. By the 
same token, the United States and the East Asian countries should not emphasize too 
much on relying upon democracy and interdependence if they want to “guide” China to 
rise peacefully. According to my findings, accommodating China and letting it enjoy the 
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growth with the help of the existed system is the most ideal policy for the United States 
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